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ABSTRACT 
After an accidental release of radioactivity to atmosphere, modelling 
assessments are needed to predict what the contamination levels are likely to 
be and what measures need to be taken to protect human health.  These 
predictions will be imprecise due to lack of knowledge about the nature of the 
release and the weather, and also due to measurement inaccuracy.  
This thesis describes work to investigate this imprecision and to find better ways 
of including it in assessments and representing it in results.  It starts by 
reviewing exposure pathways and the basic dose calculations in an emergency 
response assessment.  The possible variability of key parameters in emergency 
dose calculations is considered, and ranges are developed for each.  The 
imprecision typically associated with calculational endpoints is explored through 
a sensitivity study.  This has been done using both a simple Gaussian 
atmospheric dispersion model and also real-time weather data in combination 
with a complex atmospheric dispersion model.  The key parameters influencing 
assessment imprecision are identified.  These are demonstrated to be factors 
relating to the release, arising from inevitable lack of knowledge in the early 
stages of an accident, and factors relating to meteorology and dispersion.   
An alternative improved approach to emergency response assessments is then 
outlined, which retains a simple and transparent assessment capability but 
which also indicates the imprecision associated with the results through 
incomplete knowledge.  This tool uses input from real-time atmospheric 
dispersion and weather prediction tools.  A prototype version of the tool has 
been created and this has been used to produce example results.  The final 
stage of the thesis describes the use of the new tool to develop ways in which 
imprecise or uncertain information can be presented to decision makers.  
Alternative presentational techniques are demonstrated using example results. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Judgement which is needed to make important 
decisions on imperfect knowledge in a limited time” 
 
Definition of the art of politics, attributed to 
Clement Attlee, British Prime Minister 1945-51 
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GLOSSARY 
Activity:  The rate at which activity decays within an amount of a 
radionuclide.  Unit is the Becquerel (Bq). 
AMAD:   Activity Median Aerodynamic Diameter, the median of the 
distribution of activity against the aerodynamic diameter (which is the diameter 
of a unit density sphere with the same settling velocity as the particle). 
Averted dose:   The dose avoided by the application of a countermeasure 
or set of countermeasures. 
Becquerel (Bq): The name of the SI unit of activity, 1 Bq = 1 disintegration 
per second. 
COBR or COBRA: Cabinet Office Briefing Room (Alpha), the crisis response 
committee of UK government which co-ordinates response to national crisis.  
Dose equivalent:   The quantity obtained when the absorbed dose is multiplied 
by a factor to represent the effectiveness of the absorbed dose in causing harm 
to tissues or organs.  Unit is the sievert (Sv). 
Dose Per Unit Inhaled or Ingested intake (DPUI):  The dose (eg effective 
dose) received per unit of inhaled or ingested intake (unit is typically Sv Bq-1).  
Also referred to as dose coefficient. 
Deterministic effect:  Radiation induced injury characterised by a threshold 
dose and increase in severity of effect with increasing dose. 
Effective dose:  The tissue-weighted sum of the equivalent doses in all 
specified tissues and organs of the body.  Unit is sievert (Sv). 1 Sv = 1 J kg-1.  
Element:    A substance with atoms all of the same atomic number. 
Ensemble forecasting: Enables the uncertainty in meteorological forecasts to 
be estimated, through the repeated running of forecast models, many times, 
with just slight variations in starting conditions. 
ERL:    Emergency Reference Level.  In the UK, the term applied 
to the levels used in the emergency radiation protection system, comprising an 
upper and a lower level of dose for each emergency countermeasure. 
Equivalent dose:  The sum of the dose equivalents in a particular tissue or 
organ, taking into account all the different types of radiation affecting the 
specified tissue or organ of the body.  Unit is sievert (Sv). 1 Sv = 1 J kg-1.   
NAME:    Numerical Atmospheric Dispersion Modelling Environment, 
the Lagrangian atmospheric dispersion model of the UK Met Office. 
NWP:    The UK Met Office’s Numerical Weather Prediction model, 
the ‘Unified Model’, which provides 3-D global weather data.  
Radionuclide:   An unstable isotope of an element that emits ionising 
radiation. 
Residual dose:  The dose incurred after countermeasures have been 
implemented. 
Risk:     The probability of harm.  In radiological protection this is 
mostly in the context of the potential harm to a human being. 
RIMNET:   The UK’s national radiation monitoring network and 
emergency response system. 
Sievert (Sv):  The SI unit of dose, used in dose equivalent, equivalent 
dose and effective dose.  1 mSv= 1/1000 Sv. 
Source, or source term: The release of radioactive material from a nuclear 
installation or facility, usually in the context of an accidental release.  Usually 
comprises a mix of radionuclides, expressed in Becquerels (Bq) of each. 
σy:    Dispersion parameter representing horizontal (cross-wind) 
mixing.  
σz:    Dispersion parameter representing vertical mixing.   
vg:    Deposition velocity, in m s-1, ratio of the deposit to the 
concentration in air above the surface. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 1
1 INTRODUCTION 
The use of radioactive materials in installations or facilities which are part of the 
nuclear fuel cycle, for radiopharmaceutical manufacture or industrial 
radiography, leads to the potential for an accidental release of radioactivity to 
the environment.  Accidents may also occur during the civil transport of 
radioactive materials, or in connection with nuclear weapons or nuclear 
powered submarines.  In addition to accidental releases, there is also the 
possibility of deliberate releases from illicitly held radioactive source material.  
Radiation accidents and deliberate releases, occurring both in the UK and 
overseas, have the potential to affect the environment and the population of the 
UK.   National and international accidents resulting in the atmospheric release 
of radioactivity include the accidents at Windscale in the UK (1957), Three Mile 
Island in the United States (1979) and Chernobyl in the then USSR (1986).  
Radioactivity released to the environment has the potential to cause injury to 
people.  Short term ‘early’ or ‘deterministic’ health effects may be caused, if the 
doses are sufficiently high and above the threshold levels for the effect.  These 
usually occur when high doses are received over short time periods, and they 
can include both fatal and non-fatal effects.  Such effects include central 
nervous system death, bone marrow syndrome, pneumonitis, prodromal 
vomiting, skin burns and cataracts.  Exposures below the threshold levels for 
early effects, so-called ‘late’ or ‘stochastic’ effects, may cause an increased risk 
of longer term health effects such as fatal and non-fatal cancer and hereditary 
disease.  It is therefore important to have a rapid, well-practised and 
comprehensive emergency response capability, so that exposures may be 
minimised.   
In the event of an accidental release of radioactivity to atmosphere from a 
nuclear site, decisions on the necessity for and the extent of actions to protect 
human health will be made rapidly in the emergency phase, either shortly after 
the release has occurred or, with sufficient warning time, before the release.  
Possible early actions include evacuation, advice to shelter, the administration 
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of stable iodine, and restrictions on the movement, sale and consumption of 
foodstuffs. Longer term actions include decontamination measures and 
relocation of the population.  Some protective actions will be triggered on the 
basis of a decision to activate the emergency plan for the affected site, based 
on the results of automated measurements or on the condition of the plant.  
This typically covers an area up to several kilometres away from the site 
boundary.  However, large releases of radioactivity may require decisions on 
the need for actions over larger areas.   
To enable such decisions to be made appropriately, decision makers need the 
best available information from plant operators at the site, such as prognosis for 
the future state of the plant and how control may be regained.  They also need 
information on the nature and scale of the release, so that response actions are 
appropriate to the circumstances.  The results of environmental monitoring are 
important in building up a picture of the radiological situation, but in the early 
stages there may well be insufficient monitoring data to form an adequate basis 
for decisions.  Monitoring data will therefore be supplemented by the predictions 
of emergency assessment systems, to assist in making decisions on protection 
measures and the direction of further radiation monitoring activities.  Such 
systems require the input of technical data, such as weather conditions and 
environmental measurements, and will provide as output predictions of 
radionuclide concentrations in environmental materials, doses to exposed 
people, possible health impacts and information on where countermeasures to 
reduce doses may be required.  Key information for countermeasure decisions 
includes estimates of projected dose across the affected area, and these in turn 
require estimates of activity concentrations in air and deposited activity on the 
ground.  
1.1 Early emergency response 
The alert to an unplanned radiological release will most likely be from the site 
operators in the first instance, possibly before any actual release to atmosphere 
has occurred.  Alternatively, the first warning may come from radiation 
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detectors, when levels of radioactivity in the vicinity have exceeded the trigger 
levels.  Measurements may be made by automatic monitoring devices, 
monitoring teams in the field, aerial monitoring, and information from the UK 
radiological information system RIMNET (see Section 2).  Each measurement 
will be associated with a particular time and place, possibly linked to monitoring 
locations defined in the site’s emergency plan.  The first measurements, for an 
accident taking place at a nuclear site, are likely to be activity concentrations in 
air (eg Bq m-3) or  gamma dose rates (eg mSv s-1), followed by levels of 
deposition on the ground (eg Bq m-2).   
The most significant exposure pathways in the short term are likely to be 
external exposure from the plume, external exposure from material deposited 
on the ground and inhalation of material in the plume.  A major concern, while 
the release is continuing, is the potential scale of the inhalation doses.  To 
protect people from these exposures it is necessary to take countermeasure 
decisions quickly, and to implement them quickly, preferably before the 
radioactive plume has arrived at the location.   
As the time after the start of the release increases, more measurements of the 
same types as the very early measurements will be reported.  These may, for 
example, be a range of activity concentrations in air at different places and 
different times.  Sequential measurements from the same or very similar 
locations but taken at different times could indicate a change in the rate of 
release of radioactivity from the site, while measurements taken at similar times 
but at different points indicate the plume dispersal pattern.  Variations in 
measurements also arise from fluctuations in wind and other weather 
conditions.  Responders and decision makers need information on the current 
and predicted pattern of contamination (including deposition, levels of activity in 
air and dose rates) so that response teams can be deployed effectively.   
Information on what radionuclides are present in the release is likely to be 
lacking in the first few hours.  In the absence of a radionuclide spectrum, an 
estimate of the likely radionuclides released can be made based on the type of 
site involved in the accident.  For example, an accident at a nuclear power 
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station is likely to release radioiodine and mixed fission products such as 
caesium and ruthenium isotopes, and a conservative assumption in the early 
stages of an accident would be that the release is entirely 131I, or a mix of 131I 
and 137Cs.  At some point, information on the proportions of radionuclides 
present in the release will be obtained from gamma spectroscopy.  This will 
relate to a total activity measurement (usually an activity concentration in air) at 
a particular time and place.   
Eventually the release will stop and the radiological picture will become more 
static, apart from the effects of radioactive decay and the relatively minor effects 
of wind-driven or mechanical spread of contamination.  From this point, a 
comprehensive database of radiological measurements can be built up to fully 
characterise the contamination. 
1.2 Overview of emergency assessment systems 
The focus of this section is on emergency response decision support systems. 
Systems are also used to support emergency planning, but the requirements for 
an assessment system which calculates potential dose and risk, as used in 
emergency planning, are somewhat different from those in a response system 
and are not included here.  
A response system will take the information that is currently available, which 
may be an estimated release rate or quantity, or may be location and time 
specific monitoring data, and will combine this with information on the weather 
in the affected area to build up a picture of the radiological situation.  Broadly, a 
response system will address several of the following:  
 predicting the dispersion, deposition and environmental transfer of 
radioactivity released to the environment,  
 estimating the radiological consequences of this dispersion, deposition 
and transfer, usually in terms of predicted doses and health risks to 
humans, 
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 determining what countermeasures are required, where and when, 
 determining the priority locations for monitoring, 
 interpreting limited measurement data collected, 
 planning environmental clean-up and other longer term measures. 
As the incident develops, a system will be regularly re-run to incorporate 
changes in the known situation.  A very early assessment may be initiated only 
on the anticipated scale of a release, before there has been any actual release 
to the environment.  Clearly in this case there will be no measurement data 
available and such an assessment could only be undertaken on the basis of a 
postulated source term for the release.  In the first few hours after a release, 
whatever information is available will be used to predict the likely extent of 
consequences, including the area over which countermeasures may be 
required and the area where monitoring results are required as a priority.  A 
range of measurements may be used, of which the most immediately helpful 
will be activity concentrations in air.  Gamma dose rates are the least useful 
measurements for dose assessment purposes. They will include contributions 
from both material in the air at the time the measurement was made and 
material deposited on the ground from the start of the release to the time of the 
measurement (unless the monitor used was shielded to avoid cloud or ground 
contributions).  Because of this they cannot be used to infer either ground 
deposition levels - unless the release is know to have stopped and the plume 
passed - or activity concentrations in air.   
Emergency response systems and tools are continually evolving and 
developing, and a summary of those available at any one time can only be a 
‘snap-shot’ of the current position.  Many of the tools which currently exist were 
developed from earlier ones, with the Chernobyl accident being a particular 
stimulus to development.  Early initiatives included, for example: 
 the development of some key components of a real-time computerised 
support system, sponsored under a post-Chernobyl EC initiative, 
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including models for atmospheric transport from local to long-range 
distances, model/measurement optimisations, and exposure pathway 
dose assessment (Sinnaeve (ed) 1991a).  
 the RADE-AID system, designed to support the formulation of decisions 
on countermeasures, as an aid after an accident and also for planning 
and training (Sinnaeve (ed) 1991b).  
More recent systems have built considerably on the basis of these earlier tools.  
Internationally there now exist several large and very complex systems 
designed for emergency response and preparedness purposes.  The principal 
systems are ARGOS, HPAC/UDM, RODOS and NARAC, and outline details of 
these are given below.   
Although there is a large quantity of literature published on these systems, 
notably on the RODOS system, it is difficult to comprehensively review the 
merits and drawbacks of each because of their complexity.  They require 
extensive computing resources and training to run.  Although these systems 
have, in most cases, been under development for a considerable number of 
years, the complexity of what is being attempted appears to have resulted in 
products which are in some ways less mature and independently tested than, 
for example, the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) tools which preceded 
them.  These latter tools were subject to major international intercomparison 
exercises, which enabled the user to place a considerable degree of confidence 
in the participating codes, but the equivalent process has not been undertaken 
for the large emergency response systems.  The developers of the four major 
systems (RODOS, ARGOS, HPAC, NARAC) have been consulted and have 
responded that no specific project has either been undertaken or is planned to 
compare the system results.   
ARGOS (Prolog Development Center 2006) is developed and administered by 
the Danish Emergency Management Agency.  ARGOS is an emergency 
management information system used by a number of countries, including 
Canada, Ireland and the Nordic Countries.  ARGOS performs short range 
atmospheric dispersion, food chain and dose modelling and is also designed to 
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download the results of long range atmospheric dispersion models.  ARGOS 
has a map-based interface on which results are displayed.    
HPAC (DTRA 2006) is the US Defence Threat Reduction Agency system for 
predicting the consequences of releases from terrorist events, nuclear sites and 
nuclear weapons. HPAC models the release and subsequent transport of 
materials in the atmosphere, and the impact on civilian and military populations. 
It contains a weather interface, which can receive data from real-time weather 
forecasting systems; this supports the calculations undertaken in the system, 
including probabilistic assessments.  HPAC has an extensive dispersion model, 
with some urban dispersion capability through the Urban Dispersion Model 
(UDM) (Hall 2001, Hall et al 2001) developed at the UK’s Defence, Science and 
Technology Laboratory (DSTL).    
RODOS, the Real-time On-line DecisiOn Support system for off-site emergency 
management in Europe, was developed by a number of European 
organisations with a combination of EC and national funding (Ehrhardt et al 
1997; Ehrhardt and Weis 2000, FzK 2005). It is distributed via the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology (previously known as Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe, or 
FzK) in Germany on behalf of the EC.  RODOS has been obtained by a number 
of countries, although it is not clear to what extent it would be used outside 
Germany in emergency response mode, rather than as a research tool.  The 
aim of RODOS is to provide ‘consistent and comprehensive information on the 
present and future radiological situation’ (www.rodos.fzk.de), in the event of a 
nuclear accident in Europe.  The system is aimed at ‘those responsible at local, 
regional, national and supra-national levels for off-site emergency 
management’.  However, the system also has applications in training and 
exercises.  One of the acknowledged difficulties with RODOS has been its 
assumption that detailed measurement information and meteorology data will 
be readily available, and this requirement has limited the applicability of the tool 
outside Germany (where such data are more readily obtainable than in most 
other countries).    
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NARAC (National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center) is located at the 
University of California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and 
is ‘a national support and resource center for planning, real-time assessment, 
emergency response, and detailed studies of incidents involving a wide variety 
of hazards, including nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, and natural 
emissions’ (Sugiyama 2004).  The US Department of Energy (US DOE) 
maintains NARAC, at LLNL.  The customer base for NARAC is primarily US 
government agencies (federal, state, and local).  NARAC provides tools for 
atmospheric plume modelling and services for chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear airborne hazards (both gases and particles), with real-time access 
to worldwide meteorological observations and forecasts.  In some senses, 
NARAC is more a suite of tools than a single system, but it appears that a 
significant part of the tool-box can act in a co-ordinated way. 
Less complex and/or purpose-specific tools have also been developed: 
SEER (Spreadsheets for Early Emergency Response) was developed at HPA 
for internal use in the early stages of an accidental release of radionuclides to 
the atmosphere.  SEER is a Microsoft Excel workbook containing a set of linked 
spreadsheets, each undertaking a particular radiological emergency 
assessment.  SEER enables a range of calculations to be made, based on 
source term information or radiological monitoring data in the form of 
concentrations of radionuclides in the atmosphere or deposited on the ground.  
It assumes Gaussian-based atmospheric dispersion modelling. 
HOTSPOT was developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the 
US (Homann and Wilson 1995, Homann 1999) for modelling explosive releases 
or nuclear weapons accidents.  It is included in the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory NARAC system.  HOTSPOT is a fast, fairly simple model 
for radiological releases, which is based on the assumption of a Gaussian 
plume dispersion model with the addition of a radiation dose estimate 
component.    
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DIFFAL is an atmospheric dispersion code developed by the Atomic Weapons 
Establishment (AWE) of UK MOD, primarily to model releases from explosions 
and nuclear detonations.  DIFFAL is essentially a simple Gaussian model, with 
the inclusion of gravitational settling.  AWE regard it as ‘particularly applicable 
to large releases of particulate material such as those from fires or explosions, 
from which the stabilised cloud is extensive and the subsequent dispersal is 
significantly influenced by gravitational settling’ (Shaw 2004).  DIFFAL uses 
wind speed and direction (in both the horizontal and vertical directions, at up to 
twenty different heights), and the Pasquill stability category, to determine 
dispersal.  As input, DIFFAL needs the shape and dimensions of the cloud to be 
specified.  Input data are also required on the mass/activity and particle size 
distribution in the cloud.  The user-defined cloud geometry may be defined as a 
cylinder, or it may be calculated within the code in other shape forms. 
1.3  Imprecision in emergency response predictions  
Imprecision1 is inevitably associated with the output of an emergency response 
system for radiological releases to atmosphere in the early stages of an 
accident, due to incomplete knowledge of the environmental factors (including 
the weather) and the nature of the release itself.  Decisions on protective 
actions must be taken in spite of this lack of knowledge.  Decision making under 
uncertainty, especially in the context of emergencies, has been discussed (see 
for example Reichert and Borsuk (2005), Bailar and Bailer (1999)).  Dieckmann 
et al (2010) have said that although ‘decision makers may be more likely to 
discount information or avoid making a decision when ambiguity is made 
explicit in a forecast’, their work suggests that ‘decision makers were able to 
use the explicit probability presented as a range, and did not show a tendency 
to discount this information and rely on more easily evaluable information’.  
Dieckmann et al (2010) conclude that ‘the goal of presenting numerical 
                                                          
1 The term ‘imprecision’ is mostly used here, in preference to ‘uncertainty’, because strict ‘uncertainty 
analyses’ have not been undertaken (see section 3 for discussion).  Imprecision has been defined (Parry 
1996) as the uncertainty arising due to a lack of knowledge or information, which is the definition used 
here. However, the term ‘uncertainty’ is retained in places where this best expresses the concept referred 
to (for example, in quoting from published sources).  To some extent the terms are interchangeable. 
 
 10
probabilities [to decision makers] is to be as precise as possible when 
communicating uncertainty’.  
French, in particular, has addressed the issues of uncertainty in the context of 
emergency countermeasures following radiation accidents (French 1995, 
Papamichail and French 1999, French 1999, French and Niculae 2005, French 
et al 2007).  Key conclusions drawn from this research by French have been 
that the uncertainties in using models in support of emergency management are 
often underestimated and under-acknowledged and that complicated models 
can lead decision-makers into over-confidence, in part through an incomplete 
representation of the uncertainty associated with model predictions.  In the field 
of radiological emergencies, French and Niculae (2005) state that complex 
decision support systems developed for radiological accidents (RODOS is given 
as an example) contain over-detailed prediction models and often ‘grossly 
underestimate’ the inherent uncertainty; the authors conclude that there is a 
genuine need for modelling, but that this should be to a level of detail 
commensurate with the information requirements, and not overly detailed and 
unnecessarily complex. Finally, French (1999) has reported that decision 
makers tend, if confronted with uncertainty, to assume worst case outcomes 
rather than to take the possible spread of outcomes into the decision.   
In summary, on the basis of the above literature, it can be concluded that: 
 The nature and extent of the uncertainty in model-derived predictions 
should be taken into account if the predictions are used in decision 
making, particularly in an emergency health protection context when 
either overestimating or underestimating the need for protective 
measures may have an impact on health. 
 The different scales and sources of uncertainty in alternative 
management options should be assessed and made transparent. 
 The management of risks may be made more complicated by bringing to 
the surface uncertainties which were previously present but hidden. 
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 The manner in which the uncertainty in an assessment is treated should 
be compatible with the requirements of the application to which the 
assessment results will be put. 
 Large, complex decision support systems may underestimate and under-
present uncertainty but their very complexity may lead to over-
confidence in decision makers, because of the detailed results presented 
and the apparent sophistication of the tool. 
 Decision makers are often not familiar with, or comfortable with, 
uncertainty as a scientific concept.  Scientific descriptions of uncertainty 
provided to decision makers should therefore be clear and easily 
understood.  
With regard to emergency response modelling for radiological accidents there 
are two areas where the current state of knowledge and availability of tools are 
lacking.  First, there has been no study of the key causes of imprecision in the 
predictions output by emergency assessments.  Second, there is no tool which 
currently incorporates these elements of imprecision comprehensively and 
which presents imprecision information to decision makers.  None of the 
radiological emergency response systems summarised in section 1.2 include all 
significant sources of imprecision and most do not include any.  The 
consequences of possible alternative weather evolutions are incorporated in the 
most complex systems (RODOS, ARGOS and possibly HPAC) through the use 
of real-time weather predictions and the optional use of ‘ensemble1’ dispersion 
modelling, but non-weather sources of imprecision can only be represented 
through a series of alternative runs, by varying input parameters.  The 
EURANOS research programme, which concluded in 2009, incorporated a 
research project which was presented at the EURANOS final contractors 
meeting in June 2009 (Powerpoint presentation by Hiete 2009), but which does 
not appear to have been otherwise published.  This considered the 
communication of uncertain results to the decision maker through two variables, 
                                                          
1 Ensemble dispersion modelling is when forecast models are run many times with slight perturbations in 
starting conditions, to achieve a collection of plausible dispersion options. See Section 4. 
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the source term and the wind direction, and represented the results of example 
calculations on a shaded map in terms of the probability of exceeding a dose 
threshold, but did not include the other possible sources of imprecision.  
Consideration of an uncertain source term reflects the emphasis in RODOS of 
an estimated source term as the starting point for radiological assessments.  It 
is not normally assumed in the UK that source term information would be 
available to emergency responders in the first few hours of an accident and this 
element of imprecision would therefore have limited application in early 
emergency response in the UK.  
1.4 Brief overview of thesis 
The purpose of this study is to fill the gap described above, to investigate 
comprehensively the sources of the imprecision potentially associated with the 
predictions of assessment support tools for assisting early phase off-site 
countermeasure and public health protection decisions, to consider the 
implications of this imprecision for decision making and to develop improved 
techniques for early phase assessments, including the visualisation of the 
results.   
In particular, the study: 
 investigates the variability of the key input parameters to emergency 
response assessments, and estimates the values they may potentially 
take in a particular emergency, 
 explores the sensitivity of the predictions of emergency response 
calculations to variations in key input assumptions and parameters, 
 outlines a new method for assessing radiological consequences, to be 
used in conjunction with real-time weather prediction and dispersion 
tools, to improve early phase response to future emergencies by 
estimating the consequences of lack of knowledge, 
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 develops new ways in which imprecise information, in particular that 
resulting from alternative weather outcomes and different radiological 
measurements, can be presented to decision makers and demonstrates 
these using example results. 
 
The study starts by reviewing mechanisms and exposure pathways and the 
basics of dose calculation.  Current assessment models and data and the 
current basis for countermeasure decisions in the UK (including the ERL 
system), are reviewed and the aims of an emergency response tool and the 
needs of the decision maker are summarised.  The extent of the imprecision 
typically associated with emergency response calculations in the first few hours 
of a release is investigated through two sensitivity studies, and the key 
parameters influencing assessment imprecision are identified.  An improved 
approach to emergency response assessments is then proposed which is both 
simple and transparent, and which uses input from real-time dispersion and 
weather prediction tools.  Finally, techniques are developed in which imprecise 
or uncertain information can be presented to decision makers.  This includes 
possible alterative weather and dispersion situations and the use of alternative 
measurement information, as well as other assessment input parameters.   
 
One aspect of emergency response calculations in the UK was considered 
especially important.  The Health Protection Agency has a responsibility in 
radiological emergencies to advise on what measures are necessary to protect 
human health from radiation. As part of this responsibility, HPA has 
recommended Emergency Reference Levels, which are the levels of averted 
dose at which the introduction of emergency countermeasures such as 
evacuation and sheltering should be considered (ERLs are discussed more 
below). During the incident in November 2006 when Alexander Litvinenko was 
poisoned with 210Po, HPA was asked to present precise details of dose 
calculations to government emergency committees, while the response to the 
emergency was on-going.  This would not be possible if a complex ‘black-box’ 
system such as RODOS or ARGOS was used.  These very complex systems 
 14
contain in-built calculational assumptions and models which cannot be readily 
explained to, or appreciated by, the decision maker.  It is also easy for even a 
trained user to inadvertently make use of inappropriate or inadequate input 
data, or to not fully understand the basis of the calculations performed in the 
code.  The need for a relatively simple and transparent calculational approach 
in whatever new techniques were developed was therefore considered to be of 
importance in the development of UK response capability.    
1.5 Section summary 
The section summarises why emergency response systems are needed for 
health protection purposes in the event of an accidental or deliberate release of 
radioactivity to atmosphere.   The development of the accident situation over 
the first few hours, the impact this changing picture has on emergency 
assessments, and the implications of this for response systems is summarised. 
The section goes on to briefly review the key aims of emergency response 
systems and the main national and international systems currently in use. The 
issues for emergency decision making in a situation which is only partly 
understood and in which there is likely to be considerable imprecision 
associated with any assessment results are summarised.  It is concluded that 
there is presently no clear understanding of what the key sources of imprecision 
in emergency assessments are, and also that no current system 
comprehensively incorporates these.  There is therefore a lack in the 
information which can be presented to decision makers.  The intention of this 
study to fill this gap is summarised and the key aims are outlined. 
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2 REVIEW OF ASSESSMENT MODELS AND DATA 
This section summarises the exposure pathways and the basic dose 
calculations in an emergency response assessment.  Currently available 
assessment models and data are reviewed.  The possible variability of key 
parameters in emergency dose calculations is considered, and ranges are 
developed for each; this is input required for Section 3.  The current basis in the 
UK for countermeasure decisions, including the Emergency Reference Level 
(ERL) system, is then summarised. 
2.1 Environmental transfer and exposure pathways 
The basic components of an accident consequence assessment model for early 
stage dose assessments are shown in Figure 2.1 below.  Key elements are:  
 the source term (eg. the amount and type of radioactive material 
released), usually estimated on the basis of early measurements, 
 atmospheric dispersion, including the processes of removal of material 
which lead to deposition on the ground and other surfaces, and the 
impact of weather conditions on dispersion and deposition,  
 the modelling of exposure pathways arising from atmospheric dispersion 
and deposition processes, including inhalation of airborne radionuclides, 
external irradiation from airborne radionuclides, irradiation of the skin 
from radionuclides deposited on to the skin, external gamma irradiation 
from radionuclides deposited on the ground, and inhalation of 
resuspended material, 
 impact of exposures in terms of health effects, and the impact of 
measures taken to reduce exposures (countermeasures). 
For longer term exposure assessments, the subsequent behaviour of the 
radioactive material in the terrestrial environment, and doses from 
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contamination of the terrestrial and aquatic foodchains are potentially significant 
but they are not reviewed here as these pathways do not impact on the 
emergency actions considered in this study. 
The type of information presented in this section has been included in many 
reports, such as McColl and Prosser 2002, NRPB and KfK 1986, IAEA 1987a.  
Other key references or composite sources of information for this section are 
NEA/OECD 1991, NEA/OECD 1989, Jones et al 2003.  
 
Figure 2.1 Basic components of an accident consequence assessment model 
  
2.2 Source term 
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at which the release takes place, the heat and energy content of the released 
plume, and the duration of the release are also classed as part of the source 
term.  It is to be anticipated that there will be a lack of detailed source term 
information available in the early stages of the release.  Approximate estimates 
of the source term may be made by engineering judgement of plant conditions, 
and interpretation of levels of environmental contamination in combination with 
atmospheric dispersion and deposition conditions.  With time, iterative 
comparisons between measured levels of contamination and predicted levels 
lead to increasing refinement of the source term estimate and a more complete 
picture of the scale and consequences of the release.  Alternatively, instead of 
a source term, environmental measurements may themselves be used as the 
basis for dose assessment; in effect, the measurements estimate the 
approximate source term. 
2.3 Atmospheric dispersion and deposition 
Radioactive material released to atmosphere will disperse under the influence 
of the prevailing meteorological conditions.  Weather conditions influence the 
direction in which the material is transported, and the rate and extent of 
dispersion.  In most circumstances, the radionuclides will eventually deposit on 
surfaces, which may be land (rural or urban), vegetation/crops, buildings or 
people, and again the weather conditions will influence the rate of deposition.   
Atmospheric dispersion and deposition models are used to predict the spatial 
and temporal distribution of radioactivity, taking into account the particle size 
distribution of the released material, the chemical form of the radionuclides, the 
height and duration of the release and the meteorological conditions prevailing 
during the release and during the subsequent time of travel of the plume.  
Dispersion models include mechanisms for removal of activity from the plume, 
namely radioactive decay and dry and wet deposition processes.  Depending 
on the characteristics of the release being considered, special features may 
also need to be modelled, such as the effect of release energy on the height 
and initial dispersion of the plume, as for example with an explosive release or 
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a severe accident with considerable energy.  The behaviour of plumes released 
into an area with significant buildings, for example an urban or residential area, 
can also be modelled with sufficient data on the structures in the area, the 
localised meteorology, and time. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the basic atmospheric processes following release:  
dispersion, transport, turbulence and dry and wet deposition.  Models which 
simulate the dispersal of radionuclides following a release to atmosphere are an 
essential part of an emergency response system. The following sections 
summarise some of the key processes influencing dispersion and deposition. 
 
Figure 2.2 Basic atmospheric dispersion processes 
 
Dispersion 
Unless the release of radioactive material occurs with very large amounts of 
energy, it is likely that the material will enter into the atmospheric layer known 
as the boundary layer1 which is the part of the troposphere directly influenced 
by the earth’s surface. The height of the boundary layer is variable, typically 
                                                          
1 For the purposes of this study the boundary layer has been considered to be the same as the inversion 
layer and the mixing layer. 
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being between about 200 and 2,000 metres; it is likely to be shallower at night 
than in the day-time.  The dispersion in this area is influenced by effects from 
the land surface (for example, heating and cooling), and by increasing height 
above the ground, due to the wind speed increasing with height due to reduced 
friction with the earth’s surface.  Dispersion and diffusion depends upon the 
degree of turbulence, which relates to the stability of the atmosphere.  There 
are several alternative classifications of atmospheric conditions, in terms of 
stability categories; terms often used include neutral, unstable and stable 
conditions.   
Features of the accident itself may strongly influence dispersion, particularly the 
height of the release and the energy associated with it.  In particular, the 
injection of material into high levels of the atmosphere, because of the initial 
energy associated with the release, could (as in the case of part of the 
Chernobyl plume) result in at least part of the released material travelling 
considerable distances before reaching levels low enough to be deposited on 
the ground.  Also, material which is discharged into the atmosphere from a 
stack will often be at a higher temperature than the surrounding air and so will 
have thermal buoyancy which will effectively increase the release height.  
Serious accidents may well be associated with large amounts of thermal 
energy.  The effects of these phenomena are termed plume rise, and may have 
a substantial influence on air and ground concentrations.     
Meteorology also strongly influences dispersion and deposition processes, in 
particular wind speed, and fluctuations in wind direction may result in non-
uniform dispersion and irregular patterns of concentrations in air. There will, in 
general, be less dispersion (in all directions) of the plume in stable conditions 
and more dispersion in unstable conditions.  Air moves in different directions 
and at different speeds at different heights above the ground, influencing both 
dispersion and deposition. 
Atmospheric dispersion has a fundamentally random nature and all models can 
only attempt to approximate the processes involved. It is, however, a field of 
modelling where a wide variety of approaches exist. From the late 1950’s, the 
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standard approach to modelling atmospheric dispersion was based on 
Gaussian plume modelling.  The Gaussian plume model, and variations of this 
(see, for example, the ‘R91’ model of Clarke (1979)), assumes the plume 
spreads in vertical and horizontal directions by simple diffusion along the 
direction of the mean wind.  The concentration is assumed to be normally 
distributed, spatially, about the plume centre-line and the plume spread is 
described by the dispersion parameters σy and σz, representing horizontal 
(cross-wind) and vertical mixing respectively. Time-integrated activity 
concentrations in air (Bq s m-3) are related to the total amount of material 
released (Bq) by means of a formula using wind-speed, release height and σy 
and σz.  Similarly, the instantaneous activity concentration in air (Bq m-3) is 
related to the release rate (Bq s-1).  Reflection from the top of the atmospheric 
boundary layer can also be taken into account.  The simple Gaussian model 
may be turned into a Gaussian puff model, which produces a sequence of puffs 
representing a release varying with time, by the addition of a further parameter 
σx to represent the spread along the wind direction.  A puff model avoids some 
of the limitations of the basic Gaussian model (CERC 1988).   The Gaussian 
model is a fairly simple and robust method of predicting accidental release 
dispersion, but there are limitations and problems associated with it.  The 
Gaussian dispersion profile is the idealised form and significant variations on 
this may well arise in reality, through topography, urban areas or localised 
building effects.  Upward and downward dispersion within a plume is not always 
a symmetrical process, as plumes may grow at different rates in different 
vertical directions, and this will lead to concentrations which are non-Gaussian 
in profile.  It is also assumed that meteorological conditions are homogeneous 
over the area covered.  The simple Gaussian plume model is strictly only 
applicable for distances of up to a few tens of kilometres in mostly flat terrain 
with no significant features.  Also, the Gaussian plume model is not applicable 
in zero or very low wind speeds as the formula contains the reciprocal of the 
wind speed.   
Two broad categories of more advanced atmospheric dispersion model are 
Eulerian and Lagrangian models.  Eulerian models describe movement in 
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relation to a fixed grid or reference system, dividing the air in the atmosphere 
into a three-dimensional grid and solving advection/diffusion equations to give 
the concentration at each grid point.  The equations of an Eulerian model apply 
to a volume assumed to be fixed in space, through which the air moves.  
Lagrangian models consider the movement of a specific particle or puff/parcel 
of air, assume homogeneous mixing within the puff/parcel, and follow the 
particles as they are transported.  Lagrangian models therefore usually require 
a wind-field pattern, to predict the movement of the particles/parcels/puffs, and 
the generation of this can be computationally intensive.  For this reason, 
sophisticated Lagrangian models may have considerable computing 
requirements, and this has in the past been a significant limitation on their 
applicability, but with increasing computing power the run times are now 
sufficiently rapid to permit use in emergency response. 
A widely used categorisation system to define the conditions of stability and 
turbulence in the atmosphere is the Pasquill system A to G, where A denotes 
the most unstable (most turbulent) conditions, G denotes the most stable (least 
turbulent) conditions and B to F are intermediate.  Broadly, categories A and B 
are relatively low wind speed and warm conditions in which material disperses 
relatively quickly, categories E, F and G are associated with low wind speed 
and cold conditions which may be foggy, in which material disperses more 
slowly, and categories C and D are associated with higher wind speed.  
Categories A, B and C are most common during the day, and categories F and 
G are most common during the night.  Category A is typically a hot sunny day 
with a gusty wind, category B a sunny warm day with some gusts of wind, 
category C a slightly cloudy day with a little gustiness, category D overcast 
conditions with a moderately strong wind but not gusty, category E a partly 
cloudy night, category F the inversion conditions typically found at night, 
category G a clear night with low wind speed.  Atmospheric conditions in the UK 
often correspond to Pasquill category D.  However, other methods are 
increasingly used in the newer generation dispersion models to take into 
account atmospheric conditions, such as the height of the boundary layer and 
the Monin-Obukhov length. The Monin-Obukhov length is the height in the 
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atmosphere that separates the areas in which the mechanical or buoyant 
productions of turbulence dominate, and is determined by the temperature, the 
friction velocity and the heat flux.   
The meteorological processes which affect the transport and diffusion of 
radioactive materials in the atmosphere vary with distance from the release 
point.  Because of this variation different types of models are available for 
different distance ranges from the source.  These distance ranges are often 
referred to as ‘close-in’, ‘short-range’ or microscale, for distances up to a few 
kilometres (and for time periods of minutes), ‘long-range’ or macroscale, for 
distances of a thousand or greater kilometres (and for time periods of days), 
and the intermediate mesoscale for distances and time periods in between.  In 
the context of emergency response, the objectives of atmospheric dispersion 
models differ depending upon the distance from the release point at which they 
operate.  Short-range dispersion models need to be run quickly, to enable 
decisions to be made at distances quite close to the release point (or to allow 
confirmation of the decisions that will be made based on the emergency plan), 
and the available input data will probably be sparse.   
A particular problem in dispersion modelling is dispersion in urban 
environments, where building structures, the effect of the ‘urban canopy’ (where 
wind/turbulence varies with height), and movement of air into and out of 
buildings will influence dispersion.  This is an area where there has been 
considerable work in recent years (see for example Colvile et al 1999, Robins 
and Macdonald 2001), but it still remains a problem for emergency response 
applications in particular.  This is due not only to the difficulties in modelling the 
interaction between specific building structures and the plume, but also to the 
need for detailed 3-D weather data which are not currently available in 
sufficiently refined detail in an emergency situation.  A report prepared for the 
UK Atmospheric Dispersion Modelling Liaison Committee (ADMLC) in 2003 by 
Cambridge Environmental Research Consultants Ltd (CERC) (CERC 2003) 
reviewed the current understanding of urban dispersion processes, the 
available modelling approaches, and urban dispersion experiments.  It is clear 
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from the review that the variability associated with urban dispersion has the 
potential to cause serious problems for dispersion modelling in an emergency 
response situation at close-in distances where complicated and variable 
concentration patterns are frequently seen.   
Deposition 
Radioactive material will be removed from the plume by both dry and wet 
processes.  The particle size, the radionuclide, the chemical form (in terms of 
solubility), the nature of the surface(s), and the degree of precipitation will 
significantly affect deposition.   
In the case of dry deposition, as the particle size of particulate material 
increases, the particles become more likely to be deposited by gravitational 
settling.  Because the vertical profile of the concentration of the radioactivity in 
air is influenced by the wind speed, this factor also influences the deposition 
velocity as measured experimentally.  Gravitational settling will be of 
importance for particles sizes above a few µm (Devell 1989).  Material may also 
be deposited on the ground through direct contact with the surface (including on 
buildings and on vegetation). The nature of the underlying surface may 
significantly alter the extent of dry deposition.  Surfaces which may be 
described as ‘rough’ such as trees and shrubs will receive more deposition (by 
up to a factor of 100) than relatively ‘smooth’ surfaces, such as paved, 
tarmaced or tiled areas.  
The deposition of material on the ground, by dry processes, is roughly 
proportional to the concentration of the radionuclide in unit volume of air close 
to the ground; this proportionality is modelled by the use of a term called the 
deposition velocity (vg).  Deposition velocity has been defined (eg Chamberlain 
1953) as: 
vg (m s-1)  =  Amount deposited per m2 of surface per second 
   Concentration per m3 above the surface 
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  = Amount deposited per m2 of surface   
   Time integrated concentration per m3 above the surface 
The dry deposition velocity may vary from 10-2 m s-1 to 10-5 m s-1 for different 
radionuclides in different circumstances.  For most radionuclides in particulate 
form, a value of 10-3 m s-1 is an average value often applied, but for iodine in 
(inorganic) vapour form the commonly used value is 10-2 m s-1.  Values for 
deposition velocity are discussed in more detail in Section 3. 
Precipitation removes material from the air, reducing the concentrations in air 
and hence leading to reduced deposit further downwind.  There are two types of 
precipitation removal: ‘rain-out’ when rain droplets condense around the 
radioactive material, and ‘washout’ when the radioactive particles are below the 
cloud producing raindrops and are ‘caught’ on the drops as they fall through the 
air.  It has been concluded (Jones 1985) that it is reasonable, for modelling 
purposes, to consider washout and rainout in a single coefficient; the 
significance of this for assessments is that it is therefore not necessary to 
distinguish between radioactive material below the rain cloud and material 
within it. 
As a rule of thumb, typical levels of rainfall may be expected to increase particle 
deposition by about a factor of 10 compared to dry conditions, while very heavy 
rain can increase the deposition by around a factor of 100.  A consequence of 
this is that if there is patchy and localised rain, the deposition levels may vary 
over a factor of 10 or more over a small area.  The effect of deposition in snow 
and fog is likely to be somewhat less than that in rain, but still enhanced 
compared to dry deposition.  In the modelling of wet deposition processes, a 
parameter called the washout coefficient is used.  The washout coefficient,  (s-
1), represents the fraction of the plume that deposits in unit time, and can vary 
over several orders of magnitude depending on the type of radioactive material 
in the plume and the nature of the rain.  Values for washout coefficients are 
discussed in more detail in Section 3. 
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2.4 Inhalation of airborne radionuclides 
The direct inhalation of radionuclides in the plume is potentially one of the most 
significant short-term exposure pathways after an accidental release of 
radioactivity.   The dose received from inhalation over a period reflects the time 
integral of the radioactivity concentration present in the atmosphere, the 
breathing rate of the individual and the dose conversion factor for the 
radionuclide: 
Dose (Sv) =  integrated activity concentration in air (Bq s m-3)   
   x  breathing rate (m3 s-1) 
   x  dose per unit intake (Sv Bq-1) 
This calculation can be modified if an indoor dose is required by means of a 
factor to represent the protection provided by buildings.  For typical UK 
buildings with doors and windows closed, the concentration indoors in the first 
few hours when outdoor concentrations rise is about half of the concentration 
outdoors, for inhalable particles and also for iodine vapour (Brown 1988; 
Andersson et al 1995), although indoor and outdoor levels will equalise with 
time.  After the radioactive plume has passed, further inhalation doses may be 
received through resuspension of the ground deposit by natural or man-made 
disturbance. However, this pathway is usually only significant for those 
radionuclides which do not give rise to a significant external radiation hazard, as 
there will otherwise be a greater external dose received from the material on the 
ground and other surfaces.   
2.5 External exposure from airborne radionuclides 
Beta and/or gamma emitting radionuclides which are present in the air will 
externally irradiate a person immersed in or situated near to the plume. In the 
event of a release, the importance of this pathway may be assessed directly, 
using measurements of gamma or beta dose rate, from, for example, installed 
monitoring networks, hand-held monitors, or integrating dose meters which may 
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be placed at fixed points.  Modelling can be used in addition to measurements, 
but requires an assumption about the location of the person in relation to the 
pattern of the nearby plume, which will be uncertain as well as a complex 
calculation.  Simple modelling can be used, for example the ‘semi-infinite cloud 
model’.  This model assumes that all the air in a hemisphere around the person 
is uniformly contaminated to a radius sufficient to account for the range of the 
radiation in air.  It is further assumed that the surface of the hemisphere is flat.  
This is clearly a simplification of reality, and the model will not be a good 
representation where the assumptions are inappropriate, such as close to the 
release point (where the plume may be elevated, leading to low concentrations 
in air at ground level but still significant gamma dose rates), or at distances 
close to where the plume first touches the ground, as the pattern of 
contamination at this point is not a uniform hemisphere.   More complex models 
are possible if the radionuclide concentrations in the plume can be estimated, 
for example a finite cloud model may be used for gamma emitting 
radionuclides.  An example is MCNP (LANL 2001), a Monte Carlo code which 
can also be used for calculating doses from ß sources.  More complex methods 
may utilise complex dispersion modelling, for example a Lagrangian model 
such as the Met Office’s NAME model now has a cloud gamma model built in 
on the Lagrangian equations (Bedwell et al 2010).  
An estimated external dose may be modified for indoor occupancy (for 
example, to evaluate the dose saved by sheltering), by the use of a factor to 
represent the degree of protection afforded by buildings.  A review of location 
factors (Brown and Jones 1993) has suggested that for typical UK houses a 
protection factor of 80% should be used to modify the external doses from 
airborne activity. 
2.6 External exposure from deposited radionuclides 
Gamma emitting radionuclides which are deposited on the ground and other 
surfaces such as buildings will give rise to external gamma exposures in the 
vicinity, potentially from material deposited at considerable distances from the 
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person as they can travel hundreds of metres in air.  Beta emitting radionuclides 
may also give rise to a dose but this would be low in most circumstances 
because the β dose rate from a surface decreases rapidly as the distance from 
the surface increases, and because clothing provides a substantial degree of 
shielding.   
Once the plume has gone, dose rate monitoring may be used to assess the 
current significance of the pathway (although the normal background dose rate 
in the area should be deducted from the reading, if the measured dose rates do 
not dominate it).  However, assessment of the future gamma dose rates from 
those currently being measured, or assessment of external doses on the basis 
of ground concentrations of radionuclides, requires the use of a model. 
A model for estimating external doses from deposited radionuclides, on the 
basis of either measured or modelled radionuclide concentrations on the 
ground, together with an appropriate conversion factor, will essentially be of the 
form: 
Dose (Sv) =  integrated ground deposition (Bq m-2)  
  x dose conversion factor (Sv s-1 / Bq m-2)   
  x time of exposure (s) 
The basis for the dose conversion factors typically applied in such models is the 
assumption that all the ground, in a radius sufficient to account for the range of 
the radiation in air (of the order of several hundred metres for gamma emitters 
and a few metres for beta emitters) is uniformly contaminated in an infinite 
plane, that the doses are delivered at a height of 1m above the ground, and that 
the surface is flat.  As in the case of the semi-infinite plume/cloud model for 
estimating doses from radioactivity in air, this is usually a simplification of 
reality, and the limitations of the modelling approach need to be borne in mind, 
with the use of appropriate modifications where necessary.  The MCNP model 
referred to in the previous section on external doses from air is an example of a 
model used to calculate the doses from ground deposits. 
 28
Buildings provide a degree of shielding from gamma radiation, and for 
emergency planning and response purposes this shielding may be an important 
factor in determining appropriate countermeasures.  Sheltering, for example, 
will reduce doses but the degree of protection provided will depend on how 
solidly built the building is.  Radioactive decay and removal through weathering 
processes and deliberate decontamination will reduce the dose rate with time.  
In the longer term, downward migration through the soil will reduce the activity 
on the soil surface and in the upper layers of soil, and the dose will reduce 
accordingly because of the shielding provided by the soil, but this is not a factor 
in early emergency response.  More complicated models, which predict the 
spatial and temporal movement of radioactivity in an inhabited area, and also 
the effects of decontamination techniques on the concentrations and 
exposures, have been developed (Jones and Singer 2003, Charnock et al 
2003), but these are not of direct relevance in the early emergency phase. 
Airborne radionuclides may deposit onto, and irradiate, exposed skin. On the 
basis of a review of experimental evidence, it has been suggested (Jones et al 
1998) that in outdoor conditions deposition onto skin is typically about an order 
of magnitude greater than deposition onto ground for small particles, although 
the deposition velocity of large particles to skin may be similar to that to the 
ground (Jones 2006). In the case of gamma emitting radionuclides, it has 
usually been considered that, in general, the exposure from this pathway is 
likely to be relatively insignificant in comparison with the doses from other 
pathways, and in particular from the exposure to deposits on the surrounding 
surfaces.  This is because of the relatively low surface area of the body 
compared with the size of the area in the vicinity of the exposed person from 
which gamma exposures would be received.  However, more recent 
calculations at HPA have indicated the potential for this to be a more significant 
pathway than previously thought. The duration of skin contamination also 
influences the doses received, and hence the effect of skin and hair washing is 
of relevance (Bell 1998): if a person is removed from the contaminated area, 
but the skin and clothing deposits remain, the potential significance of the skin 
pathway increases.  In the case of beta emitting radionuclides, the Chernobyl 
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accident in 1986 led to the deaths of a number of emergency personnel, and it 
is thought that skin burns from beta emitters deposited on the skin were a 
contributing factor.   
2.7 Key parameters in emergency assessments 
In the event of an accident, certain information is likely to be quickly available.  
The parameters which are required as input to an emergency response system 
and which are likely to be approximately known in the first hours are: 
 
 the location and approximate start time of the release, 
 the end time, if the release has stopped; if the release is continuing, 
there may be no information on a likely end time, or the information may 
be very uncertain, 
 a rough estimate of the current weather stability category, 
 an approximate ground level wind speed and direction, 
 whether it is raining or likely to rain close to the site in the near future, 
 the approximate height of the release (in terms of the height of the 
affected stack, or an obvious escape point such as a crack, but probably 
not in terms of effective height due to heat content). 
 
The possible sources of imprecision in assessments which are considered in 
this study are listed in Table 2.1; this list has been based on the review 
summarised above and includes all the parameters which have been suggested 
in the reviewed literature to have significant influence on assessed 
consequences.  To undertake sensitivity studies to investigate the relative 
influence of imprecision in these parameters (as described in Section 3), 
plausible minimums and/or maximums for each parameter were derived as 
discussed below.   
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Table 2.1 Parameters considered in the study 
Release duration Release height 
Plume rise Weather stability classification 
Wind speed Wind direction  
Dry deposition velocity Precipitation and washout coefficient 
Particle size Location specific effects (terrain, buildings, coastal)
 
This section examines the sources and scales of imprecision in key parameters 
in emergency dose calculations, and develops plausible ranges.  These ranges 
are applied in Section 3 to estimate the extent and causes of the imprecision 
typically associated with emergency response calculations in the first few hours 
of a release.  The aim is to estimate the impact of the imprecision associated 
with predictions based on a few off-site measurements at early times, by 
considering the range of values each parameter may take, within the context of 
a specific emergency. This has been done by developing a baseline set of input 
parameters and then for each parameter in turn varying its value to a plausible 
minimum and/or maximum by considering the range of values the parameter 
may take within the context of a ‘baseline’ accident (i.e., not the full range of 
values the parameter may take in any accident), and hence calculating the 
effect on the predicted extent of countermeasures.  Therefore, the plausible 
ranges developed in this section represent variability within a specific 
emergency, not the full range of values each parameter may take in any 
emergency, and relate to selected baseline parameter values for the reference 
accident considered in Section 3.  The parameters of the baseline calculation 
are shown in Table 2.2; two radionuclides were considered, 137Cs and 131I, to 
represent two significant radionuclides in potential accidental releases, which 
have differences in their modelling and data requirements.    
 31
Table 2.2 Parameter values for the baseline calculation. 
Release duration 1 hour 
Release height (stack) 10 m 
Pasquill meteorological stability category D 
Wind speed 5 m s-1 
Wind direction Either initial wind direction (non-Gaussian 
model) or plume centre line (Gaussian model) 
Particle size: 
137Cs 
131I 
 
100% 1 μm AMAD 
Assumed elemental iodine vapour 
Dry deposition velocity: 
137Cs 
131I 
 
10-3 m s-1 
10-2 m s-1 
Rain-out/washout coefficient No rain 
Terrain and building effects None 
 
 
2.7.1 Release duration 
The release duration is a significant factor in the consequences of an accidental 
release as, clearly, the overall release to the environment is dependent on the 
release rate and the duration.  Published UK PWR degraded core source terms 
(Kelly and Clarke 1982, Kelly et al 1983) were assumed to be released mostly 
within one hour, although the smaller degraded core accidents and the 
containment by-pass accidents (Jones and Williams 1988) were assumed to be 
released over times in excess of one day,   The design basis accidents (Kelly et 
al 1983) were assumed to be released in 30 minutes.  Depending on the nature 
of the release, it is likely that some accident scenarios could have much longer 
release durations than this, of the order of a number of hours or days.  The 
Three Mile Island and Windscale accidents each released activity for around a 
day (although the release pattern for Three Mile Island was complicated due to 
activity being held up in the containment), and Chernobyl for over a week.  
However, in the context of assessment accuracy in the early response to an 
actual release, it is unlikely that the imprecision on this factor would be 
significantly greater than 4 hours, as a duration much longer than this would be 
a known factor in subsequent assessments. A 4 hour release duration has 
therefore been used in this study as the upper level, together with a shorter 
release duration of 0.5 hour as the lower level. 
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2.7.2 Release height and plume rise  
Site information for a UK accident is likely to be sufficient to enable the release 
height (excluding plume rise effects) to be approximated with reasonable 
accuracy.  Published UK source terms have attempted to associate likely 
release heights with scales of accident.  The PWR degraded core source terms 
(Kelly and Clarke 1982), in which some or all of the core may become molten, 
were predicted to occur with a release height of 10 m (with two exceptions, for 
smaller degraded core accidents, which were predicted to be ground level 
releases). The containment bypass and degraded core source terms were all 
predicted to have a release height of 10 m. For the purposes of this study, it is 
therefore estimated that the release height (excluding modifications for plume 
rise) will be known to within a factor of 2 of the true value, and as a baseline 
release height of 10m is assumed, the influence of varying this to 5m and 20m 
is examined. 
Serious accidents involving fires or explosions may be associated with large 
amounts of energy, effectively increasing the release height. The Chernobyl 
accident involved considerable plume rise (IAEA 1991), leading to relatively low 
levels of deposition (in the first stage of the release) close-in, and considerably 
more at distances beyond tens of kilometres from the plant.  It has also been 
concluded (Beyea and DeCicco 1990) that a key factor in the estimate of doses 
received as a result of the Three Mile Island accident was the uncertainty 
associated with the plume rise. The Buncefield petro-chemical explosion and 
fire in December 2005 (in Hertfordshire, UK) was associated with very high 
energy, which led to much of the plume rising above the boundary layer (see 
Figure 2.3).  Webster et al (2007) have discussed the difficulties which arose in 
emergency modelling of the Buncefield dispersion due to the uncertainty at the 
time over the energy released, using the Met Office’s NAME model.  NAME 
performed well once satellite imagery was used as an input, but this will not be 
readily available in the very early stages of emergency response and is in any 
case only of help with a visible plume.  This is likely to be a general problem 
with all predictive models in the case of high energy releases. 
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Figure 2.3 Buncefield petro-chemical explosion and fire in December 2005 
Plume rise may have a substantial influence on ground level activity 
concentrations in air, and may also have a significant impact on post accident 
decisions.  For example, near-ground close-in activity concentration in air 
measurements may be observed to be low or zero, which could erroneously be 
taken to imply a low level of release, when in reality a substantial plume is 
present but at a higher height.  The extent to which significant plume rise would 
be appreciated in the early stages of an accident is not clear.  Some reasons for 
plume rise such as a major fire or explosion leading to significant building 
damage would be obvious, however even small accidents may be associated 
with some degree of thermal buoyancy, and this may be less observable.   
Plume rise can lead to an increase in the effective source height by a factor as 
great as 10 times the actual release height, reducing the maximum activity 
concentration in air at ground level substantially, and it may also lead to greater 
plume spread due to the greater vertical velocity increasing entrainment, which 
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causes air to be pulled into the plume.  For the purposes of this study the 
influence on the results of an effective release height of 200 m is considered.  
2.7.3 Meteorological information 
A key issue in emergency response assessments is the availability of 
meteorological information applicable to the point of release and to the areas 
and times covered by the dispersing plume.  In UK emergency exercises, and 
currently in the event of a real emergency, basic meteorological information 
available for input to assessments includes Pasquill stability category, wind 
speed and direction (broadly applicable to ground level) and the 
presence/absence or likelihood of rain in the affected area.  In the event of an 
emergency, UK nuclear sites provide information from on-site weather 
recording equipment (Nelson et al 2003).  Such results from a single 
meteorological point would be of limited value as they would not be applicable 
to all the areas covered by the plume as it disperses.  Increasingly full area 
meteorological information and projections are becoming available from the UK 
Met Office1, but the ability to incorporate such spatial and temporal information 
into assessments is limited.  Consideration of the imprecision in the following 
meteorological factors is therefore examined in this study: 
 the atmospheric stability classification,  
 boundary layer depth 
 wind speed and wind direction 
The presence or absence of precipitation is a further meteorological factor, 
which is considered with the washout coefficient.   
                                                          
1 Such information now forms the basis, for example, for the Met Office’s CHEMET and PACRAM 
forecasts for emergency responders (see Section 2.9).  
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2.7.3.1 Atmospheric stability classification 
 
The Pasquill stability categories are based on wind speed and cloud cover at 
night, and on wind speed and the incoming solar radiation by day (Clarke 1979, 
McColl and Prosser 2002) and were originally developed as a rough 
approximation to be used in the absence of wind fluctuation data.  They 
represent parts or sections of a continuous distribution of conditions.  Table 2.3 
(based on Jones 1986) shows the probability that Pasquill stability categories 
will persist for a given time, and also shows typical wind speeds in these 
categories as reported by Clarke (1979) for a height of 10 m.  It can be seen 
that only Category D, the most likely stability category in the UK (occurring 
about 60% of the time), has a probability in excess of 10% of persisting for 
times in excess of 5 hours.  The other, less likely, categories are unlikely to 
persist for more than 3-4 hours.   
The imprecision considered here is the accuracy of the specified stability 
category (as measured) and its applicability to all the areas to which it is 
assumed to apply.  It has been suggested (Jones 1986) that in selecting an 
appropriate category, the choice is unlikely to be in error by more than one 
category from the true category near to the point where the weather 
observations are made but that the errors involved in assigning a category 
increase as distance from the observation point increases.  It has also been 
suggested (Fisher and Moore as referenced in Clarke, R H, 1979; Jones, 1986) 
that the concentrations in adjacent stability categories should be considered, in 
addition to the specified one, and this is the approach followed here, where the 
effect of the true category in the region of interest being one of the adjacent 
categories is examined. Stability category D is assumed in the baseline case, 
and the influence of the actual category being C or E is therefore examined. 
The baseline Category D considered here corresponds to overcast conditions 
with moderately strong wind speed, which are conditions seen in the UK for 
about 60% of the time.  The adjacent category C is more unstable and category 
E is more stable.  The typical nature of the other categories (for example 
Categories A and B being typically a warm sunny day with a low wind, and 
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categories F and G being calm conditions usually at night time) means that 
there is little danger of mistaken classifications across more than neighbouring 
categories.      
Table 2.3 Probability a stability category persists for given times, from Jones (1986) 
 A  
Very 
unstable 
B 
Unstable 
 
C 
Unstable/ 
Neutral 
D 
Neutral 
 
E 
Stable/ 
neutral 
F 
Stable 
G 
Very 
stable 
 
Typical wind speed at 10 m (m s-1) 
1 2 5 5 3 2 1 
Duration (hours) Probability that a stability category persists for given times 
1 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.6 
2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.4 
3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.3 
4 0.07 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.05 0.2 0.2 
5 0.03 0.09 0.1 0.6 0.03 0.1 0.1 
6 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.5 0.02 0.06 0.08 
9  0.003 0.009 0.5 0.003 0.01 0.02 
12   0.0003 0.4 0.0001 0.003 0.0004 
15    0.3  0.0003  
18    0.3    
24    0.2    
 
2.7.3.2 Boundary layer depth   
The extent to which the boundary/mixing layer depth is linked to other factors 
such as stability category depends on the model.  Boundary layer depth will in 
general only significantly affect air concentrations when the plume height 
reaches its vicinity.  Newer models such as ADMS (a short range dispersion 
model developed by CERC Ltd in the UK) and NAME (the Lagrangian 
dispersion model of the UK Met Office) use boundary layer depth as an input 
into determining parameters relating to turbulence and plume growth.  The older 
R91 model assumes a relationship between distance and plume size which is 
independent of both wind speed and boundary layer depth, and has an in-built 
boundary layer depth in the air concentration curves which is dependent on 
stability category (100m in categories F and G, 400 m in category E, 800 m in 
category D, 850 m in category C, 900 m in category B and 1300 m in category 
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A).  In such a model, the boundary layer depth only influences activity 
concentrations in air at distances of typically tens of kilometres from the release 
point, although in conditions of low wind speed in combination with early 
morning and little cloud it is possible that low boundary layer heights may occur.  
These could theoretically result in higher air concentrations than would 
otherwise be predicted, however it is difficult to envisage situations in which the 
conditions which result in a low boundary layer would simultaneously occur with 
a very dispersive plume, and so this situation is unlikely to arise. The 
imprecision resulting from boundary layer depth is partially included through the 
variation in the stability category, and any residual variability is not thought to be 
significant over the short distances for which emergency countermeasures are 
likely to be applicable.   
2.7.3.3 Wind speed and wind direction 
Errors in estimating wind speed and direction arise from inaccuracy in 
instrumentation, variation within the plume (including with height above the 
ground), inapplicability of the measurement to the conditions experienced by 
the plume, and variation with time (over both release duration and plume 
transit). 
Surface wind has been defined by the Met Office as being the wind at 10 m 
above the ground, over open and level terrain (Nelson et al 2003).  Surface 
wind is known to be affected by factors such as buildings or a copse of trees.  
Wind speed is commonly measured by an anemometer, which now have start-
up speeds of about 2 knots (roughly 1 m s-1).  Below this, if there is insufficient 
wind to trigger a reading, a calm will be reported.  For higher levels, radiosonde 
stations provide data on both wind speed and wind direction at heights above 
the ground up to about 20 km, and this data can be input into the more 
sophisticated dispersion models. 
Smith and Readings (1982) have estimated that the error associated with a 
10 m wind speed is up to 2 m s-1 (for wind speeds up to about 6 m s-1) as a 
result of a combination of instrument error and distance from the instrument 
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location (up to a few tens of kilometres), although less error may be associated 
with more modern instrumentation.  The measurement of low wind speed is 
known to be particularly inaccurate, and this affects certain stability categories 
more than others, particularly A and G which are associated with a mean wind 
speed of about 1 m s-1.  Wind speed will vary significantly with height above the 
ground, with the extent of the variation being influenced by stability category.   
The approach followed here is to consider the effect of the baseline wind speed, 
which for stability category D is 5 m s-1, being in error by ±3 m s-1, hence from 
2 m s-1 to 8 m s-1.  This range, although slightly in excess of the value estimated 
by Smith and Readings (1982), has been chosen as it covers the typical 
variation in wind speed at heights above 10 m; a wind speed of 5 m s-1 a few 
metres above the ground suggests a likely wind speed at 100 m above the 
ground of around 10 m s-1, giving an average wind speed up to 100 m of about 
7 m s-1.  In Category D, wind speeds covering this range are plausible (see 
Clarke 1979) although they reflect considerably different weather conditions.   
Wind direction is measured by a wind vane, which usually transmits information 
on a dial graduated in tens of degrees from true North.  If there is sufficient wind 
to move the vane (to record direction) but not to move the anemometer (to 
record speed), this is recorded as a ‘variable’ wind condition (if there is 
insufficient to record either, a calm will be reported).  Smith and Readings 
(1982) have also estimated that the error associated with measured wind 
direction is up to 20º as a result of a combination of instrument error and 
distance from the instrument location (up to a few tens of kilometres), although 
again less error may be associated with modern instrumentation.  
In the same way that stability categories do not persist for more than a few 
hours for most categories, wind directions are also likely to change over similar 
times.  In the case of the Three Mile Island accident, it has been shown 
(McKenna 2000) that the direction varied greatly over a 12 hour period, around 
an almost complete 360º circle (and also that a considerable variation in wind 
speed was seen over the same period, from a few m s-1 to in excess of 
10 m s-1).   A further complication may arise due to changes in wind direction 
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with height (shear), which could cause part of the plume to travel in a direction 
different to that measured by instrumentation set at a different height. The 
Chernobyl plume is known to have split into several parts, due to different wind 
directions at different heights above the ground (IAEA 1991).  Smith and Clark 
(1989) concluded, in reviewing the Chernobyl release, that ‘it is almost certain 
that individual trajectories starting from Chernobyl at the same time differed 
significantly’, and that ‘changes in wind speed and direction with height through 
the plume are a principal factor in diluting the concentration within the plume’.  
Satellite imagery following the Buncefield petro-chemical explosion and fire in 
December 2005 also suggests that there were at times two separate smoke 
plumes, travelling towards the south east at lower levels of the atmosphere and 
south west at higher levels, and that these subsequently merged (Webster et al 
2007).  This situation may arise in many meteorological conditions, in the case 
of a release associated with high energy/temperature, due to the height of the 
initial plume above the ground and the complexities of dispersion processes 
involving plumes of considerable height.  The initial Buncefield plume, which 
rose above the boundary layer due to the high energy, moved in a direction 
different by 60 to 70 degrees compared with that which would have occurred at 
ground level.  The variation in wind direction with height above the ground will 
depend on stability, and may range from 10 degrees variation (compared to the 
ground level wind direction) to tens of degrees.  It seems likely, however, that a 
very significant wind shift with height would be noticed at a fairly early stage, 
through the early measurements. 
In this study the error associated with a measured wind direction at 10 m of 10º 
and 20º in either direction is investigated.  Wind direction may vary more than 
this (for instance, with height above the ground) resulting in a greater impact on 
countermeasure extents than those assessed here. A very significant error in 
the estimate of wind direction should become apparent as more measurements 
become available but it is possible that factors such as plume meander and 
rapid variation in wind direction with time may be a confusing factor in the early 
stages and possibly later.   
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2.7.4 Particle size, dry deposition velocity, and wet deposition 
Particle size may affect dispersion and deposition in several ways.  Large 
particles are less sensitive to atmospheric turbulence than small particles, and 
hence the dispersal of the plume that would be due to turbulence may be less 
for large particles, leading to a plume which develops more slowly than one 
which contains smaller particles.  Conversely, the gravitational settling velocity 
is greater for larger particles than it is for smaller ones, because the effect of 
turbulence is reduced, and this velocity increases with increasing particle size 
for particles of AMAD greater than 10 – 20 μm.  As a result of these effects, the 
size distribution of the airborne aerosol and the deposited activity changes as 
distance from the source increases.  As large particles are deposited more 
quickly than small particles, the airborne aerosol has a greater proportion of 
small particles as distance from the source increases, and the deposited 
material closer to the source has a greater proportion of large particles than that 
further away1.  The overall effect is one of a reduction in mean particle size with 
distance from the source. 
Particle size will also affect the dose received following inhalation, which 
depends on the particle size of the released material.  This is partly because 
large particles are less likely to be inhaled than small particles (as they fall 
under gravity) and partly because large particles do not penetrate into the deep 
lung and are more likely to be cleared by pulmonary mechanisms than smaller 
particles.  The respirable range is regarded as being 0.1 – 10 μm AMAD. 
The dry deposition velocity vg (m s-1) depends on the wind speed, the chemical 
form of the released material and the nature of the underlying surface.  It 
incorporates the effect of gravitational settling as well as the other processes 
which influence deposition, and is therefore also particle size dependent.  An 
assumption frequently made for modelling purposes is that all particles in a 
released aerosol are of 1 μm AMAD although the aerosol released in an 
accident can include particles with a wide range of sizes, from sub-micron to 
tens or hundreds of microns. Particle sizes considered here, for dry deposition, 
                                                          
1 This is with the exception of distances very close-in to the source, where there may be less large 
particles because of the effects of the energy associated with the initiating event, which may throw 
particles up into the atmosphere. 
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are 1 μm AMAD and 10 μm AMAD.  Dry deposition velocity shows a minimum 
for particles of size about 1 μm AMAD and then an increasing monotonic 
relationship for particles in the range 1 μm to 10 μm AMAD, and also an 
approximately linear relationship with wind speed (see Underwood 2001).  It 
increases rapidly with particle size, beyond AMADs of around 20 μm (see for 
example, Sehmel 1980).   
Although radionuclides deposit to different extents on different surfaces with (for 
iodine and caesium) deposition to rough surfaces (trees, shrubs, grass) 
apparently greater than to smooth areas (paved, tarmaced or tiled), and the 
deposition to walls considerably less, this factor is not considered further here 
as the exposure received by a person does not come from just one type of 
surface and the use of a single value reflects an averaging process. 
The dry deposition velocity for 137Cs is usually taken to be 1 10-3 m s-1, and in 
this study this is assumed to be within a range of an order of magnitude on 
either side (ie 10-2 m s-1 to 10-4 m s-1) when combined with a particle size of 
1 μm AMAD (see, for example, Jones 1986).  However, to represent the 10 μm 
size particle, a dry deposition velocity of 10-1 m s-1 is applied, to examine the 
effect of large particles. For 131I in elemental vapour form (as opposed to 
particulate), the dry deposition velocity is usually taken to be 1 10-2 m s-1, which 
is the baseline value assumed here, and the range assumed in this study is 
10-1 m s-1 to 10-3 m s-1 (again consistent with Jones 1986). 
As wet meteorological conditions are less likely than dry conditions on a 
particular day in the UK (where on average it rains for approximately 10% of the 
time, although significantly more in the west than in the east), wet deposition 
has sometimes been considered to be less influential on a ‘likelihood of 
occurrence’ basis.  The consequences of wet deposition are, however, 
considerably greater than dry deposition, for the area over which the rain 
extends, because wet deposition is a much more effective method of removing 
material from the plume to the ground.  Wet deposition is often modelled 
through a washout coefficient,   (s-1), which is dependent on particle size, 
rainfall rate and the type of rain, including raindrop size and electrostatic forces.  
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However, a simple multiplying factor approach is used in this study in the simple 
Gaussian approach (see Section 3).  The multiplying factors used are 
supported by calculations undertaken (Bexon 2007) with the well-established 
PC COSYMA probabilistic risk assessment system (Jones et al 1995, and for 
international benchmarking of this system see EC and OECD NEA 1994), see 
Table 2.4.  For heavy rain, the PC COSYMA results show the influence of 
plume depletion at the largest distance, as it is assumed that the heavy rain has 
persisted throughout the plume transit to this distance.  The proportional 
increase in deposition in wet conditions as opposed to dry ones is dependent 
on many factors including the duration of rainfall, rainfall rate, particle size, 
release height and distance from the release point, and the values chosen are 
therefore only intended to be broadly indicative of the potential effect. It is 
assumed here that light rainfall increases deposition by a factor of 10 compared 
to dry conditions for 137Cs particles of 1 μm AMAD and by a factor of 2 for 
elemental iodine.  For heavy rain the factors used are 100 for 137Cs and 10 for 
131I.  For heavy rain in combination with large particles, it is possible but 
uncertain that a multiplying factor to convert from dry to wet deposition of the 
order of a few 100’s may be appropriate. There is little information on washout 
coefficients for particles above 10 um AMAD, but the combination of large 
particles and wet conditions is not considered here because the effects on the 
extent of countermeasures would be significantly reduced by plume depletion 
under these circumstances. 
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Table 2.4 Ratio of wet deposition to dry deposition as predicted by PC COSYMA for a 
release height of 10m, for three downwind distances (Bexon 2007) 
131I Downwind distance 
      Rainfall rate (mm h-1) 1 km 10 km 20 km 
       0.5 2 3 3 
      10 4 8 5 
137Cs Downwind distance 
      Rainfall rate (mm h-1) 1 km 10 km 20 km 
      0.5 5 20 22 
      10 42 84 38 
 
 
2.7.5 Location-specific effects 
Although the area potentially affected by countermeasures has been assumed 
in this study to be predominantly rural, location specific effects may potentially 
influence the prediction of countermeasure extents. Features of the local terrain 
such as hills, valleys and coastline, and significant buildings, have the potential 
to significantly influence dispersion.     
The influence of buildings on dispersion patterns will be very dependent on the 
specific circumstances of the release and the position and size of the buildings.  
In some situations, the plume may be split because of the presence of 
structures, leading to peak concentrations in significantly different locations to 
those which would have occurred otherwise.  Increased turbulence may cause 
greater variation in air concentration measurements than would otherwise be 
expected.  Jones (1986) has summarised investigations into the effect of 
buildings on model predictions, and concludes that the influence of buildings on 
the spread of a plume out to a distance of about 10 building heights downwind 
is substantial, but that the overall effect is likely to increase the horizontal 
spread of the plume and hence to reduce concentrations at any given point.  
More recently, it has been suggested (Jones 2006) that if the release height is 
greater than 2-3 times the height of nearby buildings, dispersion will be largely 
unaffected by the presence of the buildings, and that if the release point is at or 
below building height, the effect will be to broaden the plume and hence reduce 
peak concentrations.   
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There would therefore seem to be only a limited number of circumstances in 
which the presence of buildings will significantly increase the peak activity 
concentration in air.  These circumstances are a split or channelled plume, and 
these are likely to be accompanied by a shift in plume location which should be 
at least partially detected by early measurements. 
Terrain effects can be regarded simplistically as the effects of valleys and hills. 
Hill and Lurman (2006) refer to ‘the highest relative increases in concentrations 
due to the effects of complex terrain', and for UK conditions it is suggested that 
these highest increases are approximately a factor of 3.  This study supports 
the conclusion that the effects of valleys on dispersion are complicated and 
both site and release specific.   
The effect of hills depends on the position and height of the hill relative to the 
release point and the height of the release.  If a plume encounters a 
significantly sized hill during its early dispersion in stable weather conditions, 
the peak concentration is likely to occur at the point where the plume 
encounters the hill.  In this case, the peak concentration will be increased (as it 
will occur at a point earlier in the plume’s travel than would have happened 
otherwise).  However, the scale of the impact will be very dependent on release 
height and travel distance.  In unstable conditions, the plume is more likely to 
go over the top of the hill, and the overall effect is unpredictable.  The peak may 
occur around the top of the hill, due to the plume being carried over the hill and 
depositing earlier than it would otherwise have done, but there is a 
compensating effect of increased wind speed over hill tops which will reduce 
concentrations. Hunt et al (2002) have suggested that hilly terrain may change 
activity concentrations in air at ground level by a factor of up to 2 or 3 compared 
to the dispersion over level ground.   Lawson et al (1989) have presented 
results showing the influence of terrain which indicate an increase in the peak 
air concentration (compared to that seen in flat terrain) of a factor of up to 4. 
Coastal effects were reviewed in Jones (1986), where it is suggested that sea 
breezes penetrate 50 km inland approximately 5 times per year, and 100 km 
inland less than once per year.  Sea breezes would give rise to less vertical 
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mixing, hence increasing concentrations, but would also typically be associated 
with higher wind speeds, which would reduce concentrations. The effects may 
therefore be expected to often compensate for each other, unless the release is 
very short (a few minutes) when concentrations may be increased by a factor of 
about 2 (Jones, 1986).  Jones (1985) has reviewed the influence of coastal 
effects other than sea breezes on inland concentrations.  He shows that coastal 
effects, in certain weather conditions, may affect concentrations inland by up to 
a factor of 2 for distances up to a few tens of kilometres from the coastal site.  It 
is possible that peak concentrations at distances of a few kilometres from the 
site could be up to a factor of 5 times higher, depending upon the assumptions 
made concerning, for example, the depth of the boundary layer. 
On the basis of the above, the influence of terrain effects, coastal effects and 
buildings on the peak concentration may increase the magnitude of the peak 
concentration by up to a factor of 5, and this is the value used in this study.  It 
appears to be more likely that the peak concentration will be reduced by hills or 
buildings.  It is possible that the direction of dispersion will be altered, but the 
extent of this (and the duration of the effect) is totally dependent on the specific 
circumstances, and, as it is also likely to be identified in the early 
measurements, it is not considered further here.   
2.8 Emergency Reference Levels and countermeasures 
This section reviews the current basis in the UK for countermeasure decisions, 
including the Emergency Reference Level (ERL) system, what emergency 
countermeasures are available for use in protecting the public from the effects 
of an accident and what is the typical effectiveness of these in reducing doses.   
2.8.1 Emergency countermeasures and their effectiveness 
The key objective of emergency countermeasures, in the short term crisis 
phase, is to minimise health effects, in particular to prevent the occurrence of 
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early (deterministic) health effects, and to limit the occurrence of late 
(stochastic) health effects. 
A range of emergency protective measures may be implemented to avoid the 
public being exposed to radiation, or to reduce exposures.  These measures 
may be introduced during a release, after a release or - if there is thought to be 
a strong likelihood of a release occurring - before it.  Very early countermeasure 
decisions are more likely to be based on information on plant damage and 
status than on measurements (IAEA 1987a).  In the UK this will occur through 
the activation of a site emergency plan, where, for a release for which there is 
adequate warning time of imminent system failure, implementation of the 
emergency plan would take place in the planning zone prior to measurement 
data being available.  However, in the area beyond the planning zone, it may be 
likely for certain types of reactor (particularly older generation plant) that there 
would not be a meaningful warning time, and in such cases decisions are more 
likely to be measurement based. 
The measures justified in a particular situation will depend on many factors, 
which include the severity and type of the release (or of the anticipated 
release), whether there is a release still in progress, the proximity to the release 
site, the principal exposure pathways, the meteorological conditions, and the 
nature of the land affected (for example, whether it is predominantly urban or 
agricultural, and the density of the population).  Consideration in this study is 
limited to the emergency countermeasures, which may be defined as those 
which must be implemented rapidly if they are to be effective.  They are usually 
only considered in areas fairly close to the point of release, to protect against 
the inhalation and external dose pathways.  The emergency countermeasures 
are sheltering, evacuation and the administration of stable iodine.  
Sheltering simply means people staying inside a robust building with doors and 
windows closed.  It is a countermeasure which may be used to provide a good 
degree of protection to the public, especially in circumstances where the 
release is underway and where evacuation, while the plume is present, would 
lead to unnecessarily high exposures.  Sheltering provides some protection 
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from both the inhalation pathway and from external irradiation, although the 
effectiveness of the countermeasure will depend on the type of building used.  
Sheltering is a low-risk countermeasure, and is therefore undertaken at fairly 
low levels of projected dose. 
Evacuation is removing people from the affected area for a short time, into an 
area where there is considerably less contamination, and preferably none.  It is 
a very effective countermeasure in terms of dose reduction, providing 
considerable and possibly total protection from inhalation and external 
irradiation pathways.  The evacuation process does, however, have risks 
associated with it which are not insignificant (see for example, Aumonier and 
Morrey (1990)) and for this reason it is undertaken at higher levels of projected 
dose than is sheltering.  The practicability of evacuation depends on the 
particular circumstances, for example the accessibility of the area in terms of 
transport links.  The weather conditions may also have an impact, for example 
the road conditions may be poor, making the evacuation process hazardous.  In 
such circumstances, sheltering may be regarded as the optimal measure, in 
terms of overall risk reduction.  Practical implementation of evacuation may 
differ from theoretical implementation. For example, it has been observed that 
in chemical emergencies 50% of the people recommended to shelter evacuate 
themselves, and 10% refuse to evacuate if told to (Crick et al 2003). 
The ingestion of stable iodine as a countermeasure reduces or prevents the 
uptake of radioactive iodine to the thyroid gland, by the dilution of radioiodine 
with stable iodine. It is effective in reducing the risk from both ingestion and 
inhalation of radioactive iodine, but only if taken fairly quickly after the intake 
(or, preferably, before), and for this reason pre-distribution of iodine tablets in 
the vicinity of nuclear sites has been recommended for the UK (NRPB 1990).  
The tablets are usually in the form of potassium iodate.  The issue of stable 
iodine is not regarded as a stand-alone countermeasure, because external 
exposure from the radioactive iodine is not reduced by stable iodine, and also 
the contribution to dose from the other radionuclides present in the release is 
unaffected by stable iodine intake. 
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In addition to these three main emergency countermeasures, other actions may 
be recommended. These include potentially contaminated people 
bathing/showering and changing into clean clothes. These actions may lead to 
some dose savings, although they are unlikely to be as significant as those 
achieved by the principal countermeasures.  They will also limit the transfer and 
spread of contamination.  
Both nationally and internationally, it is generally agreed that countermeasures 
should only be introduced if they are expected to achieve more good than harm, 
that they should be introduced and withdrawn in such a way that the protection 
of the public is optimised, and that they should be introduced at levels of dose 
which would avoid the occurrence of serious deterministic health effects.  As 
the aim of introducing countermeasures is to ensure the most good for the most 
people, implemented countermeasures should aim to maximise the overall 
benefit, taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each 
measure.  The advantages include risk/dose saving and reassurance.  The 
disadvantages include disruption, expense, practical problems (eg the provision 
of alternative accommodation) and stress.  The optimum level will depend on 
factors such as the nature of the accident, the weather conditions, the 
resources available, the nature of the affected area (size of population, type of 
buildings, land use), seasonal demographic factors, and likely shielding 
provided by buildings.  
2.8.2 The UK Emergency Reference Level (ERL) system 
In the HPA Emergency Reference Level recommendations (NRPB 1990, NRPB 
1997b) and also in other international advice (for example, ICRP 1992), the 
recommended levels of dose at which countermeasures are introduced is on 
the basis of the dose it is estimated will be averted by the measure (see Figure 
2.4).  Most recently, ICRP (2007) has proposed a new system in which the 
overall benefit and detriment of the countermeasures are considered 
collectively under a reference level of dose, but these recommendations have 
yet to be interpreted and implemented into a UK approach to emergency 
protection. 
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Figure 2.4 Averted and residual doses before, during and after a countermeasure 
 
Two levels of dose are given for each emergency countermeasure (see Table 
2.5). If it is estimated that the dose averted by the countermeasure will be 
greater than the upper level, implementation of the countermeasure is regarded 
as being almost always justified, whereas if it is estimated that averted doses 
will be less than the lower level, the countermeasure is unlikely to be justified in 
almost all circumstances.  The reasoning behind this dual level system is that 
the appropriateness of a countermeasure will depend very much on the 
circumstances (location, severity etc) of a particular accident, and these factors 
cannot be known in advance.  In the UK, the lower ERLs are intended for 
situations which are ‘favourable for the introduction of a countermeasure’ 
(NRPB 1990), in particular where relatively few people are affected and where 
the implementation of the countermeasure has been planned in some detail. 
The upper ERLs are intended for those situations where it is more difficult to 
undertake the countermeasure, for example in more heavily populated areas or 
in areas where the implementation of the countermeasure has not been 
planned.  However, it was not intended that ERLs would completely bound the 
total possible range of intervention levels, because extreme situations may 
indicate optimum ERLs outside the range.   
Time 
      Dose 
Time when 
countermeasure 
introduced 
Time when 
countermeasure 
lifted 
Dose averted by 
countermeasure 
Dose received 
despite 
countermeasure 
Dose received 
after 
countermeasure
Dose received 
before 
countermeasure  
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Table 2.5 HPA recommended ERLs for emergency countermeasures (NRPB 1990)  
Countermeasure Averted dose (mSv) Effective dose/organ 
 Lower ERL Upper ERL  
Sheltering 3 30 Effective dose 
Evacuation 30 300 Effective dose 
Stable iodine 30 300 Thyroid dose 
 
ERLs are intended to apply to the averted dose to young children, as it is 
recognised that society gives priority to the protection of children in an 
emergency (NRPB 1997b).  It was envisaged (NRPB 1997b) that the primary 
use of ERLs is in emergency planning, as an input to the development of 
optimum site-specific action levels as part of the emergency plan for each site.  
If an accident occurs, there is not enough time available to undertake a detailed 
optimisation analysis of all the issues, because emergency countermeasures 
need to be implemented quickly to be effective, and also because they are 
applied in areas close to the site of the accident where the plume will arrive very 
quickly once the release has started.  Hence, a key part of licensed nuclear site 
emergency plans in the UK is the semi-automated introduction of emergency 
countermeasures close to the site on the basis of the appropriate intervention 
levels and the features of the specific site.  NRPB (1997b) gives guidance for 
the UK on how the concept of averted dose should be incorporated into a plan 
designed for urgent response, and on how ERLs may be applied in the 
development of an emergency plan.  ERLs may also be used in emergency 
response as a broad check on the adequacy of the measures being 
implemented, but they should not be used directly and inflexibly, as firm 
numerical levels, to determine appropriate response because they are generic 
and do not take into account the features of a particular accident or site.  In 
emergency situations which require consideration of the implementation of 
countermeasures outside the pre-planning zone, the requirement to consider in 
any detail – once the emergency is underway - the benefits and disadvantages 
of a measure are reduced, because there will not be time available, or adequate 
data, on which to base a comparison.  However, issues of practicability are still 
important.  In areas beyond those covered by the emergency plan 
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(extendibility), the optimum intervention levels are thought likely to be higher 
than the lower ERL (as these relate to favourable conditions and small numbers 
of people). 
Emergency reference levels, or intervention levels, are not the same as action 
levels, which are either levels of received or projected dose or quantities which 
are directly measurable (for example, a dose rate or a concentration in air) 
above which a particular action or actions should be taken.  A commonly used 
action level in the UK is a total activity concentration in air of 105 Bq m-3; this 
level may be used to trigger evacuation (see, for example, British Energy 
Generation Ltd 2004).   
The concept of optimised and averted dose leads to several issues for decision 
making after an accident: 
 As countermeasures can only influence the dose that will be received in 
the future, only future doses are relevant to decisions1. 
 Future doses cannot be measured and therefore there must be a 
modelling component in their assessment.   
 Dose estimates should not be overly cautious when being estimated for 
comparison with ERLs; because countermeasures have potential risks 
they should be introduced on the basis of realistic dose estimates. 
2.9 Supporting services for emergencies 
2.9.1 The UK Met Office 
The UK Met Office, as a Regional Specialist Meteorological Centre (one of eight 
worldwide), has international responsibilities for environmental emergency 
response modelling in the event of a serious atmospheric pollution incident in 
the European and African regions.  A range of operational and support services 
                                                          
1 The exception to this is if there is a possibility that cumulative doses may exceed the thresholds for 
serious deterministic health effects, in which case both past and future doses, over an appropriate time 
period, need to be considered.  However, the ERL system is not intended for use in protection against 
serious deterministic effects, as it is a general principle that every effort must be made to avoid these. 
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are provided in the event of atmospheric releases, including chemical and 
biological incidents as well as radiological, from the Environmental Monitoring 
and Response Centre (EMARC), and these are available around the clock and 
throughout the year.  Met Office predictions are automatically forwarded to over 
50 met services worldwide.   
A key component of the Met Office’s emergency capability is the Numerical 
Atmospheric Dispersion Modelling Environment (NAME) dispersion model, a 
sophisticated Lagrangian dispersion model, with air parcel trajectories used to 
compute concentrations in air and ground deposits.  NAME was originally 
developed in the late 1980’s, following the Chernobyl accident, to give long 
range (>100km) emergency response dispersion predictions for nuclear 
incidents (Maryon and Ryall 1996, Maryon et al 1999).  Although originally 
designed as an emergency response nuclear accident model NAME is now 
used for both accident analysis and general pollution forecasting; it was, for 
example, used in the Icelandic volcanic ash release in Spring 2010.  The 
current version is NAME III (Jones et al 2007).  NAME is capable of 
backtracking to identify the cause of pollution incidents1.  It includes plume rise, 
boundary layer simulation and transport at multiple atmospheric levels, and can 
now do this on all spatial scales from short range up to global.  Both short-term 
and long-term releases can be considered.  For UK emergency use, a key 
strength of NAME is its ability to incorporate 3-D global weather data from the 
Met Office’s Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP) model, the ‘Unified Model’ 
(Cullen 1993, Jones 2007).  
Validation studies with NAME against experimental data have indicated that its 
predictions compare satisfactorily with observations (see for example Webster 
and Thomson 2002 which presents NAME predictions against the Kincaid 
experimental data set, and Webster et al 2006).  
Two specific services provided by the Met Office are of relevance to radiological 
emergency response: 
                                                          
1 Termed ‘source attribution’: calculating a source term (source strength) and source location based on 
monitoring information. 
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 The CHEMET service is available to all emergency authorities, with the 
main users being the emergency services.  The service provides detailed 
forecast weather information, and also basic plume modelling for any 
atmospheric release (for example, for fires or tanker accidents).  The 
information is initially provided by phone, and is followed up by a weather 
commentary and a map of the area at risk, by FAX or email, within 10-20 
minutes.  Predictions are then updated on demand, using the predictions 
of the Met Office’s NAME atmospheric dispersion model. 
 The PACRAM (Procedures And Communications in the event of a 
release of Radioactive Material) service, provides government and the 
nuclear industry with access to predictions of the trajectory of a 
contamination plume, also originating from predictions from the NAME 
model. PACRAM can either use default release source terms, or can 
base its results on a provided source term, if this is available. 
The UK Met Office is continually developing improved techniques for assessing 
the uncertainty associated with weather prediction, and the assessment of risks 
arising from such predictions (for example, Mylne 2004).  The projection of 
weather conditions into the future, for times beyond about a day to a few days, 
are influenced by the chaotic nature of the atmosphere and by the considerable 
uncertainty associated with weather details, such as rainfall rate and location.  
The Met Office, and other major international meteorological organisations, 
therefore use ‘ensemble forecasting’ to enable the uncertainty in meteorological 
forecasts to be estimated.  This entails the repeated running of forecast models, 
many times, with just slight variations on starting conditions.  Currently 51 
international member organisations contribute to ensemble forecasting via the 
European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasts.  The resulting spread 
of forecasts may be very diverse.  If there is a wide spread, the resulting 
weather forecast can be presented cautiously, while similarity in the results will 
give greater confidence.  The associated uncertainty, and the risk of the various 
different outcomes, may be quantified, and probabilities associated.  This is 
particularly helpful with high impact weather conditions, as the decision maker 
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can then take appropriate decisions on the basis of the likelihood of the event 
and the costs associated with preparations to mitigate for the possible 
consequences.  This ensemble meteorological forecasting can theoretically be 
taken forward into dispersion predictions, through the generation of an 
ensemble of dispersion scenarios associated with multiple forecasts of the 
meteorology, where results are obtained from running a number of dispersion 
models with the same input data for the same release scenarios.   
The EC ENSEMBLE project has used an internet-based platform to collect (in 
real-time) the dispersion forecasts produced by 22 different models operational 
in the EC and around the world to produce a ‘pan-European’ ensemble 
dispersion forecast.  However, the project found significant differences between 
the participating models due to different national meteorological predictions, 
and differences in the dispersion modelling. There has been disagreement 
during this project on the usefulness of the ENSEMBLE system for decision 
making.  The collation of modelling results is only representative of the 
predictions of the set of participating models.  It is not necessarily 
representative of the results of all possible models, and it is also not necessarily 
representative of reality.  Some participating codes were essentially the same 
model, with national modifications and refinements added, giving a false 
impression of agreement. Many of the participating models also shared weather 
forecast projections. Political difficulties arose in weighting the models by 
judgement of their respective merits. 
2.9.2 Environmental radiation monitoring networks 
The Chernobyl accident led to organisations and authorities in the UK and 
elsewhere around the world establishing their own local automatic 
environmental monitoring networks, with the primary aim of detecting and 
measuring any abnormal increases in the background levels of gamma dose 
rate.  Some of these networks are very simple, while others are sophisticated 
national monitoring networks established with government funding.  Monitoring 
results are transferred automatically, on a frequent and regular basis (eg 
hourly), to some form of centralised computing system, often with the capacity 
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to increase the frequency of measurements if a predetermined alarm level is 
reached.  In the UK, the average background level of gamma dose rates range 
from about 50 to 120 nanoGray per hour (NRPB 1997a); the levels may be 
naturally elevated for a short duration due to the washout of radon gas in heavy 
rain.  The reliable detection of a genuine elevation in levels requires dose rates 
to be a significant fraction of the normal background levels, with the likelihood of 
the elevation being due to washout of radon gas having been considered and (if 
appropriate) rejected on the basis of a pre-agreed protocol.  
The UK’s national radiation monitoring network and emergency response 
system, RIMNET (Defra 1993), is now managed by the UK Met Office in 
partnership with DECC (Department for Energy and Climate Change, the 
nominated lead Government Department) and Defra (Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs).  RIMNET is part of the UK’s National 
Response Plan to nuclear emergencies and is available to all UK government 
departments and agencies with responsibilities for reacting to major nuclear 
incidents. Originally developed 
following the Chernobyl accident in 
1986, RIMNET is applicable both to 
overseas releases and also to releases 
originating in the UK.  RIMNET is 
primarily a platform for data co-
ordination. It contains a fixed and fully 
automated network of 94 gamma dose 
rate monitoring stations across the UK, 
which automatically and constantly 
measure, analyse and report on 
gamma radiation dose rates.  These 
would enable increases in gamma 
radiation levels to be speedily detected.   
Figure 2.5 Location of RIMNET monitors  
(McColl and Prosser 2002)   
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At a European level, EURDEP is the EUropean Radiological Data Exchange 
Platform.  It is a network for the exchange of automatic monitoring data, and is 
currently at version 2.0.  Currently (2010) EURDEP provides a data exchange 
for 31 European countries.  In an emergency, participating organisations would 
make data available at least every 2 hours.   
2.10 Section summary 
This section has summarised the processes underlying environmental transfer 
of radioactive material and the subsequent doses to man, and has reviewed the 
principles of modelling these, and the assessment models and data currently 
available.  The section goes on to look at the possible variability of key 
parameters in emergency dose calculations, developing minimum/maximum 
ranges for these in the context of the baseline calculation applied in Section 3.  
The current basis in the UK for countermeasure decisions, including the ERL 
system, is summarised.  Finally there is a summary of the emergency data input 
which may be available in an emergency from the national and international 
environmental radiation monitoring networks and from the UK Met Office.   
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3 ANALYSIS OF SOURCES OF IMPRECISION 
3.1 Introduction 
In the first few hours after an accidental release of radioactivity to atmosphere, 
model predictions will supplement monitoring data to increase understanding of 
the radiological situation and to form a basis for emergency health protection 
decisions.  The model predictions will be based on either measurements or on 
an estimate of the release source term.  There will be imprecision associated 
with these predictions, partly resulting from lack of knowledge (for example, 
about the nature of the release and the actual state of the weather), partly due 
to imprecision in the models themselves and partly due to intrinsic imprecision 
associated with the accuracy of the measurements.  Although there is a 
common view that weather parameters are among the most significant in 
estimating the radiological consequences of releases in emergency response, 
with a correspondingly significant impact on the decisions regarding early 
countermeasures in the local affected region, this conclusion has not yet been 
clearly demonstrated by a modelling study considering the imprecision 
associated with a wide range of input parameters. 
This section therefore investigates the key sources and extents of imprecision 
in radiological emergency response assessments, in the very early phase – the 
first few hours of a release - when there are limited off-site measurements.  This 
has been done in two separate analyses, one applying a simple approach to 
atmospheric dispersion modelling in the R91 model, the other using the more 
complex Langrangian model NAME.  The focus was on the imprecision 
associated with assessing the extent of countermeasures in the area beyond 
that covered by the emergency planning zone, typically in excess of a few 
kilometres from the site.  This reflects the areas in which the doses are 
predicted to exceed given criteria.  These endpoints were chosen as they are 
key to the information typically required by decision makers; they also 
incorporate other endpoints, such as estimates of effective dose.   
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The aim was to identify the key parameters influencing assessment imprecision 
in the predictions of countermeasure extents, and in particular to determine 
whether the key influences are parameters relating to the accident itself (some 
of which may only become known a while after the release has started) or 
parameters affecting the dispersion, for which real-time weather data are 
potentially available which could improve predictions and which a new tool 
could then incorporate.   
A full uncertainty assessment has not been attempted, as: 
 There is insufficient information available on the likelihood (the shape of 
the probability distributions) of the range of values many of the input 
parameters may take, and there is even less information on the ranges 
which they may take in the event of other parameters being constrained. 
 Many of these parameters are inter-related and there is insufficient 
information on the nature of these correlations. 
 As such a detailed uncertainty analysis could not be made generic, but 
would be strongly influenced by the features of the particular accident 
considered, there is a danger that accident specific results would be 
extrapolated to other situations for which they were not valid. 
For these reasons, the extent of the imprecision on emergency assessments 
has been explored by means of sensitivity analyses.  While work has been 
undertaken to assess the uncertainties associated with meteorology and 
dispersion, much of this has related to the prediction of dispersion from a known 
or estimated release, which is not the same as estimating the imprecision 
associated with predictions based on a few off-site measurements at early 
times, although the issues are clearly related.  Also, although extensive work 
has been undertaken to analyse the uncertainty associated with probabilistic 
risk assessment systems (see for example Päsler-Sauer and Jones 2000, 
Goossens and Kelly 2000), this is also not of direct relevance here, as such 
studies focused on the uncertainty associated with the best estimate of each 
parameter, rather than with the range of values each parameter may take in an 
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specific emergency situation which is incompletely understood, which is the 
issue of interest in emergency response calculations. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Simple Gaussian model 
The Gaussian plume model is a simple and robust method of predicting 
dispersion, although with recognised limitations, which are summarised in 
Section 2.  The ‘R91’ straight line Gaussian plume dispersion model (Clarke 
1979) requires limited information.  It needs an assumed effective release 
height and release duration, the atmospheric stability category (eg Pasquill) 
(which in turn assumes a default wind speed for each category), and either a 
release rate or a total release or the value and location of a measurement(s), in 
terms of downwind and off-axis distances.  As applied here, it assumes no 
radioactive decay during the plume passage and does not include plume 
depletion due to deposition processes.  Dry deposition is modelled through 
deposition velocities (see Jones, 1983).  Also as applied here, wet deposition is 
represented empirically as enhancement factors to dry deposition, representing 
light and heavy rainfall. 
The basic Gaussian plume model equation for time integrated activity 
concentration in air on the plume centre line at ground level1 (including 
contributions from the first plume reflection from the ground but ignoring later 
reflection terms) is as follows (from Higgins and Jones 2003): 
 C (x) = Q (2 σy σz u10)-1 exp(-h2/2σz2)     (1) 
where: 
C (x) is the time integrated activity concentration in air over the release 
period (Bq s m-3) at downwind distance x (m) 
 Q is the total amount of activity released (Bq) 
                                                          
1 Activity concentrations in air at ‘ground level’ are assumed here to be 1 m above the ground. 
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σy and σz are the standard deviations of the horizontal and vertical 
plume size at distance x (m)  
 u10 is the wind speed at 10 m above the ground (m s-1) 
 h is the effective release height (m).  
The σy term can be represented as follows (from Clarke 1979): 
 σy2  = σyt2 + σyw2        (2) 
where: 
 σyt is the component of σy due to turbulent diffusion, and 
 σyw is the component of σy due to fluctuation in wind direction. 
One approximation for the σyw term (also from Clarke 1979) is: 
 σyw = 0.065   √ (7T/u10)  x       (3) 
where: 
 T is the release duration (hours) 
 x is the downwind distance on the plume centre-line (m). 
The exponential term in equation 1 tends to 1 in circumstances other than at 
distances close to the release point in combination with very high release 
heights.  For the conditions considered in this study, C varies monotonically 
with release height, release duration and weather category (with an exception, 
again, in the case of very high effective release heights).  Although, using the 
above formulation, C does not strictly vary monotonically with wind speed, the 
σyw term only becomes significant in terms of its impact on σy for long duration 
releases, otherwise C is inversely proportional to wind speed.  Both σy and σz 
are predominantly a function of downwind distance rather than wind speed.  
Therefore, for the application considered here, the calculations can be 
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considered to be approximately multiplicative (if the complexities introduced by 
very elevated release heights are ignored) and the peak concentration or 
deposit will correspond to the maximum or minimum value of the parameter 
considered.  The results will therefore indicate to a first approximation the 
significance of the input parameters considered in a sensitivity study of the type 
presented in this section. 
This simple approach enables changes in key input parameters to be made 
simply and the link between changes in input parameters and changes in the 
results to be transparent because of the relative simplicity of the calculations 
involved.  The method reflects that used at HPA at present for the early stages 
of an accidental release of radionuclides to the atmosphere or in a national or 
international exercise, which produces robust dose assessments through 
transparent calculations, and requires very few input data to produce 
predictions on which an early understanding of the scale of the accident can be 
based. 
3.2.2 NAME model 
The UK Met Office’s Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment 
(called NAME III, but referred to as NAME for simplicity here) is a Lagrangian 
particle-puff model for predicting dispersion and deposition of gases and 
particulates.  In emergency response applications, NAME can use as input 
observed local meteorological data, 3-D meteorology from a Numerical Weather 
Prediction (NWP) model such as the Unified Model (UM) and radar measured 
rainfall data. For radiological releases, NAME incorporates both radioactive 
decay processes and estimates of the external dose from the radioactive 
plume, in addition to non-radiological features such as plume rise and the 
effects of buildings.  NAME provides as output the time-averaged and time 
integrated activity concentrations in air, and wet, dry and total ground 
depositions of radionuclides. 
NWP meteorological models are run at global or large region scale, primarily for 
the purpose of operational weather forecasting.  However, the UK Met Office’s 
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Unified Model is an NWP model used for both weather prediction and long term 
climate modelling (Cullen 1993; Staniforth and Wood 2008).  The UM 
comprises a set of sub-models and processing systems that can be configured 
in alternative ways to suit the particular application.  The latest version of UM 
has a grid resolution of 1.5 km2, sufficient to enable plume dispersal resulting 
from an accidental release to be adequately indicated at the distances over 
which the early countermeasures of sheltering and evacuation may potentially 
be required (up to a few 10s of kilometres from the release point), although still 
finer resolution may be available in the next few years.  
3.2.3 General method 
The method that has been used is to combine the predictions of a dispersion 
model with simple dose assessment and countermeasure prediction 
calculations.  Theoretical measurement locations are used, together with 
assumptions on basic meteorological data (wind direction, rainfall 
presence/intensity and stability category) to estimate the locations where 
evacuation and sheltering are required.  In terms of the dispersion modelling 
applied, both in the simple R91 model and NAME, the affected area is assumed 
here to be predominantly rural. 
Inhalation doses are estimated on the basis of predicted activity concentrations 
in air.  The doses are calculated for 10 year old children, and for effective dose, 
for comparison against the ERLs for sheltering and evacuation.  The calculation 
assumes standard breathing rates and dose per unit intake factors (see 
Table 3.1).  
The calculation of external doses from deposited radionuclides requires 
predicted levels of ground deposition.  These are based on activity 
concentrations in air and require assumptions concerning dry and wet 
deposition velocities.  Wet deposition requires assumptions on the type of 
rainfall (eg light or heavy).  From ground deposition, external doses can then be 
calculated using a model which allows for radioactive decay, including ingrowth 
of daughter products, and simple redistribution through the underlying soil 
 63
following a single instantaneous deposition; the model used here is that 
specified in Kowe et al (2007).  The values of dose per unit deposited activity 
used are shown in Table 3.1.  Estimation of external dose requires an 
assumption about the length of time a person is present at the location for, 
which for the purposes of estimating the need for countermeasures is here 
taken as 2 days.   
Table 3.1 Basic data assumptions in the assessments 
Breathing rate, 10 year old child (m3 s-1)  1.8 10-4 
Inhalation dose per unit intake (Sv Bq-1): 
137Cs 
131I 
 
3.7 10-9 
3.4 10-8 
External dose per unit deposit for 2 days exposure (Sv per Bq m-2): 
137Cs 
131I 
 
6.44 10-11 
4.37 10-11 
 
The measure of dose used in emergency planning to determine the need for a 
countermeasure is the dose averted by the countermeasure, which is then 
compared with the ERL.  Here, the countermeasure extents are based on the 
addition of the committed effective inhalation dose to a 10 year old child from 
the cloud and the effective external dose to a 10 year old child from deposited 
activity, from the start of the release up to 2 days afterwards, compared against 
the criteria of the lower ERLs for sheltering and evacuation1.  The period of 2 
days has been selected as an approximation to the duration of the sheltering 
and evacuation countermeasures.  The indicator of the need for 
countermeasures is expressed in terms of the distance on the plume centre line 
out to which the appropriate ERL is exceeded.   
The doses are the sum of doses from the plume arrival time to the 
disappearance of the cloud from the location (for inhalation dose) or to 2 days 
(for external dose).  The doses used here are therefore the total dose to 2 days 
at each location rather than the dose averted, which is the measure of dose 
                                                          
1  These ERLS are averted doses of 3 mSv and 30 mSv effective dose, respectively.     
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which is used for comparison against ERLs in emergency planning.  However, 
since the purpose of this study is to identify the key parameters likely to 
introduce imprecision into the decision making process, this distinction is not 
important here. 
Single values of effective dose per unit intake (DPUI) for inhalation were used in 
the study as shown in Table 3.1 and no variation on these was considered as it 
is common practice to base early countermeasure predictions on a single 
assumed value for the DPUI of each radionuclide in a form considered likely to 
be released in an accident.  More refined DPUIs, for specific chemical forms, 
may be used in later assessments on the basis of measurement information.  
The values used here are applicable to a 10 year old child, and are standard 
assumptions for 137Cs and 131I in early emergency calculations at a time prior to 
identification of chemical form1.    
Using this method, the impact of the imprecision associated with predictions 
based on a single postulated off-site measurement at an early time has been 
estimated.  This has been done by developing a baseline set of input 
parameters (see Table 3.2) and then for each parameter in turn varying its 
value to a plausible minimum and/or maximum by considering the range of 
values the parameter may take within the context of the baseline accident (i.e., 
not the full range of values the parameter may take in any accident), and hence 
calculating the effect on the predicted extent of countermeasures.  In effect, this 
has investigated the consequences, in terms of the furthermost extent of 
required countermeasures, of a set of related accidents.  By varying a single 
parameter at a time, the difference caused by making a plausible error in that 
one parameter can be seen.  The calculations using the R91 model and also 
the NAME model are based on an assumed single ‘measured’ activity 
concentration in air at 2 km which is then extrapolated to other downwind 
distances using the dispersion model. For the NAME analysis, the calculations 
were then repeated for an assumed single ‘measured’ activity concentration in 
                                                          
1  For 137Cs the DPUI is for absorption Type F and a particle AMAD of 1 μm, and for 131I is for an average 
of the dose coefficients for the inhalation of elemental iodine vapour and inhalation of particulate aerosols 
with AMAD of 1 μm, with an absorption type F.    
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air at 5 km.  By holding unchanged the ‘measured’ activity concentration while 
changing a single parameter in the calculation, in effect a new source strength 
is estimated and the dispersion model is rerun with this source strength to 
estimate concentrations elsewhere.  In the derivation of the parameter ranges 
below, it is important to note that the calculations are not based on an assumed 
release or source term but on this single assumed downwind activity 
concentration in air. 
Table 3.2 Parameter values for the baseline calculation (R91 and NAME) 
Release duration 1 hour 
Release height (stack) 10 m 
Plume rise (effective release height) None (i.e., the release height is the baseline 10 m) 
Pasquill meteorological stability category D 
Wind speed (in NAME, wind speed at 10m above 
ground) 
5 m s-1 
Wind direction ‘Measured’ activity concentrations in air at 2 km and 
5 km are assumed to be on plume centre line 
Particle size: 
137Cs 
131I 
 
100% 1 μm AMAD 
Assumed elemental iodine vapour 
Dry deposition velocity: 
137Cs 
131I 
 
10-3 m s-1 
10-2 m s-1 
Rain-out/washout coefficient No rain 
Terrain and building effects None 
 
 
3.3 Assessment of imprecision using a simple dispersion model 
Baseline calculations were set up, for hypothetical releases of 137Cs and 131I; 
the parameters of the baseline calculation are shown in Table 3.2.   The 
calculations assume a single measurement of activity concentration in air at 2 
km downwind, based on the relationship implied by the Gaussian plume model 
between the source term and the activity concentration in air at 2 km, using the 
baseline parameter values.   The baseline source term for 137Cs was 1 1016 Bq, 
and the baseline for 131I was 10 times smaller to ensure a similar predicted 
extent of countermeasures for the two radionuclides, see Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Source terms and measurements assumed 
 R91 NAME 
Assumed source term: 
137Cs 
 
131I 
 
1 1016 Bq (released uniformly 
over 1 hour) 
1 1015 Bq (released uniformly 
over 1 hour) 
 
- 
 
- 
‘Measured’ instantaneous activity 
concentration in air at 2 km downwind and 
1 m above ground level on plume centre 
linea: 
 
137Cs 
131I 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 107 Bq m-3 
1.1 106 Bq m-3 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 107 Bq m-3 
1.1 106 Bq m-3 
‘Measured’ instantaneous activity 
concentration in air 5 km downwind and 
1 m above ground on plume centre linea: 
 
137Cs 
131I 
 
 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
 
 
2.6 106 Bq m-3 
2.6 105 Bq m-3 
a Dividing an air sample measurement, in units of Bq s m-3, by the number of seconds in the measurement period gives 
an instantaneous air concentration in Bq m-3 which is analogous to the value given here.  In the case of the R91 runs 
the measurement was assumed to be constant over the release duration, while in the case of the NAME runs the 
measurement was assumed to be taken 50-60 minutes after the start of the release. 
 
Plausible minimums and/or maximums for each parameter considered were 
derived as discussed above in Section 2 and as summarised in Table 3.4, and 
the impact on the predicted countermeasure extents (as indicated by the 
distance to which these are required on the plume centre line) and on the 
source term, of the variation of each parameter in turn was then calculated, with 
all parameters other than the one being varied held at the value in the baseline 
case.   
In addition, certain combinations of parameter changes were also considered.   
The impact of variations in two or more parameters on the time integrated 
activity concentration in air may be different in combination compared to their 
separate effects; in some instances the parameters themselves may have 
correlated likelihood (eg, if one is high or low, the other is more likely to also be 
high or low). To explore this impact, several joint parameter variations have 
been considered: 
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 The persistence of stability category, and hence wind speed and wind 
direction, is linked to the duration of the release.  The effect of this 
combination has been investigated by considering a 4 hour release 
duration in conjunction with adjacent stability categories to the baseline 
category, wind speeds at the minimums and maximums for the 
categories and a 10º off centre-line wind direction.  
 Wind speed increases with height above the ground, hence there is a 
correlation between higher release heights and higher average wind 
speeds.  The effect of this combination has been explored by considering 
a 200 m effective release height with an 8 m s-1 wind speed; an 8 m s-1 
wind speed has been chosen to remain within the limitations of the R91 
approximations.  Wind speed is also linked to stability category, but 
typical wind speeds for the stability categories considered here (C, D, E) 
are similar (in the range 3 to 5 m s-1).  
A number of possible parameter combinations have not been analysed jointly.  
Although there is an approximately linear relationship between dry deposition 
velocity and wind speed, combining a high deposition velocity with a high wind 
speed will not influence the results obtained if Gaussian dispersion is assumed, 
because the relationship between activity concentrations in air at different 
points downwind is constant regardless of wind speed.  Some correlation 
between high plume rise and the degree of variation in wind direction seems 
likely, but this effect is likely to be observed through early deposition 
measurements in combination with visual observations and so has not been 
considered separately here.  The combination of large particles and rain has not 
been considered because of the interaction between this effect and plume 
depletion, which would have an impact on countermeasure extents which would 
be both accident and location specific, and is therefore beyond the scope of the 
simple Gaussian approach used here to model.  Similarly, the combination of 
rain with a high effective release height would have an effect on time integrated 
activity concentrations in air but this has not been assessed as the impact on 
the extent of countermeasures of such a combination would again be complex 
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and dependant on both the accident and the location.  Finally, correlation 
between very low wind speeds and variable wind direction is to be expected but 
simple models are currently inadequate for very low wind speed (ADMLC 2004) 
and it is also likely that decision makers would be aware of very low wind speed 
situations and would take them into account in emergency decision making.  
Table 3.4 Summary of the assumed meteorological and dispersion imprecision ranges  
Parameter Range Notes 
Release duration  0.5 hours 
4 hours  
Baseline duration is 1 hour.   
Release height 5 m 
20 m 
A factor of 2 from the baseline release height 
(10 m), excluding plume rise effects. 
Plume rise 200m  Effective release height. 
Pasquill stability 
category 
C 
E 
The effect of the true category being either 
side of the baseline category (D) is 
considered.  
Wind speed  2 m s-1 
8 m s-1 
It is assumed that the possible error in 
estimating wind speed is +/- 3 m s-1 of the 
baseline value of 5 m s-1 
Wind direction +/- 10 degrees and +/- 
20 degrees 
The error associated with a measured wind 
direction of 10 and 20 degrees in either 
direction is investigated. 
Particle size  Dry: 10 μm AMAD and 
10-1 m s-1 deposition 
velocity 
Wet:  10 μm AMAD 
with a rain multiplying 
factor of 100 
Particles of 10 μm AMAD are considered, and 
for these a dry deposition velocity of 10-1 m s-1 
is assumed, in combination with a multiplying 
factor of 100 for wash-out.   
 
Dry deposition velocity  
 
137Cs: 
10-2 m s-1 to 10-4 m s-1  
131I: 
10-1 m s-1 to 10-3 m s-1 
An order of magnitude either side of the 
baseline deposition velocity is assumed.   
Precipitation and 
washout coefficient 
(a) Moderate rain 
(multiplying factor x10) 
(b) Heavy rain 
(multiplying factor 
x100) 
It is assumed that (a) there is moderate rainfall 
(about 1 mm h-1), increasing deposition by a 
factor of 10 compared to dry conditions, and 
(b) there is very heavy rainfall, increasing 
deposition by a factor of 100 compared to dry 
conditions.    
Terrain & building 
effects 
Peak concentration x 5 
 
It is assumed that concentrations over the first 
10km from a release point will be 5 times 
greater than predicted by a model which does 
not take terrain or building effects into account. 
 
No correlation between location specific effects and the other parameters 
considered in the study are thought to exist which would significantly increase 
the effect on the time integrated activity concentrations in air at ground level. 
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Table 3.5 summarises the influence of varying each of the parameters singly on 
the source term (defined here as the estimated release which gives rise to the 
same baseline activity concentration in air at 2 km), and also on the predicted 
downwind extent of countermeasures on the plume centre line, assuming an 
unchanging ‘measured’ activity concentration in air at 2 km, as described 
above, and using the simple R91 Gaussian dispersion model.     
It can be seen from Table 3.5 that some of the parameters influence the 
predicted effective release but not the downwind countermeasure extents, while 
others influence the countermeasure extents but not the corresponding effective 
release.  Most of the parameter variations which are of significance influence 
both endpoints.  At high deposition velocities and rainfall rates, the influence of 
plume depletion would be significant and the countermeasures estimated would 
not in reality extend as far as the simple model used here (which does not allow 
for plume depletion) suggests; this is discussed further below when the more 
complex NAME model is used.  The results obtained by considering several 
factors in combination show that combined effects do not significantly alter the 
results for the effects considered singly, which tend to be largely dominated by 
a single factor, notably plume rise or release duration.   
It can be seen that the results are in close agreement for both radionuclides, 
with the partial exception of the influence of rain; in this situation, the external 
doses for 137Cs are enhanced because of the greater levels of deposition but 
the same degree of enhancement is not seen for 131I because of the domination 
of the inhalation pathway for this radionuclide.    
Certain parameter alterations (for example, deposition velocity and wash-out 
coefficient) have no effect on the estimated release but do have an effect on the 
predicted extent of countermeasures.  This is because the alteration affects the 
amount of activity deposited on the ground, which alters the external dose from 
deposited activity and hence influences the countermeasures required. 
However the alteration does not affect the air concentration at 2km, and hence 
has no influence on the amount of activity assumed to be released.  
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Table 3.5 Effective release and extent of evacuation/sheltering at lower ERL predicted by R91 from anchor air concentration at 2 kma 
 Effective release 
of 137Cs (Bq) 
Extent of evacuation, 
sheltering on plume 
centre line at lower ERLb 
for release of 137Cs 
Effective release of 
131I (Bq) 
Extent of evacuation, 
sheltering on plume 
centre line at lower ERLb 
for release of 131I 
Baseline source term   1 1016 2 km, 10 km 1 1015 2 km, 10 km 
Release duration: 
0.5 hours 
4 hours 
 
8 1014 
6 1016 
<1 km, 2 km 
5 km, 30 km 
 
8 1013 
6 1015 
<1 km, 2 km 
5 km, 20 km 
Release height (stack): 
5 m 
20 m 
 
1 1016 
1 1016 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
 
1 1015 
1 1015 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
Plume rise (effective release height): 
200 m 
 
3 1017 
 
20 km, >30 km 
 
3 1016 
 
20 km, >30 km 
Pasquill stability category: 
C 
E  
 
2 1016 
4 1015 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
 
2 1015 
4 1014 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
Wind speed: 
2 m s-1 
8 m s-1 
 
5 1015 
1 1016 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
 
5 1014 
1 1015 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
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Wind direction: 
+/- 10º from assumed plume centre line  
+/- 20º from assumed plume centre line  
 
4 1016 
3 1018 
 
5 km, 30 km 
>30 km, >30 km 
 
4 1015 
3 1017 
 
5 km, 20 km 
>30 km, >30 km 
Particle size: 
10 μm AMAD (10-1 m s-1 deposition velocity) 
 
1 1016 
 
10 km, >30 km  
 
Not applicable for elemental iodine 
Dry deposition velocity: 
10-2 m s-1 for 137Cs, 10-1 m s-1 for 131I 
10-4 m s-1 for 137Cs, 10-3 m s-1 for 131I 
 
1 1016 
1 1016 
 
3 km, 20 km 
2 km, 10 km 
 
1 1015 
1 1015 
 
3 km, 20 km 
2 km, 10 km 
Precipitation and washout coefficient: 
Light rain 
Heavy rain 
 
1 1016 
1 1016 
 
3 km, 20 km  
10 km, >30 km 
 
1 1015 
1 1015 
 
2 km, 10 km  
3 km, 20 km 
Terrain and building effects: 2 1015 <1 km, 4 km 2 1014 <1 km, 3 km 
Combination effects: 
4 hour release, Cat C, 2 m s-1  wind speed 
4 hour release, Cat C, 8 m s-1  wind speed  
4 hour release, Cat E, 2 m s-1  wind speed  
4 hour release, Cat E, 8 m s-1  wind speed  
4 hour release, Cat D, 5 m s-1 wind speed,  10º 
off plume centre line 
200m effective release height, Cat D, 8 m s-1 
wind speed 
 
6 1016 
1 1017 
2 1016 
5 1016 
1 1017 
 
4 1017 
 
5 km, 20 km 
5 km, 20 km 
5 km, 30 km 
5 km, 30 km 
10 km, >30 km 
 
20 km, >30 km 
 
6 1015 
1 1016 
2 1015 
5 1015 
1 1016 
 
3 1016 
 
5 km, 20 km 
5 km, 20 km 
5 km, 20 km 
5 km, 20 km 
10 km, 30 km 
 
30 km, >30 km 
Notes: 
a. The baseline activity concentration in air at 2 km on the plume centre line is 1.1 107 Bq m-3 for 137Cs, and 1.1 106 Bq m-3 for 131I.  
b. The lower ERLs for sheltering and evacuation are averted doses of 3 mSv and 30 mSv effective dose, respectively.   
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While the approach used here is a simple Gaussian-based method, the results 
do give a clear indication of the parameters which separately have the most 
influence on the predicted downwind extent of countermeasures and hence 
which are most significant if inadequately known in a particular accident 
situation. These are: 
 the duration of the release, 
 the extent of plume rise, 
 an inaccurate wind direction (including changes with height), 
 a high deposition velocity (possibly as a result of large particle sizes), 
 the effect of heavy rain (in the case of 137Cs;  the effect is less marked for 
131I).  
The significant parameters can be subdivided into two categories, those which 
result from the nature of the accident itself (duration, plume rise, particle size) 
and those which result from or are influenced by the weather conditions in the 
area at the time (wind direction, rain, deposition velocity).  Imprecision in the 
parameters which relate to the accident itself is to some extent unavoidable in 
the early stages of an emergency; this lack of knowledge will only be 
significantly reduced when more information is available about the state of the 
plant and the nature of its discharges.  However, the imprecision which is 
related to the weather has the potential to be reduced through linkage between 
a radiological emergency assessment tool and high quality real-time 
weather/dispersion prediction tools, if results from the latter are available with 
sufficiently detailed resolution and on an adequate timescale.  In conclusion, the 
assessment with simple Gaussian dispersion has demonstrated that weather 
parameters are among the most significant in estimating the radiological 
consequences of releases in emergency response and that they have 
implications for decisions on emergency countermeasures in the local affected 
region.   
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3.4 Assessment of imprecision using a complex dispersion model  
This section re-evaluates the key imprecision parameters as derived above 
using the simple Gaussian plume model, using a more complex dispersion 
model, the UK Met Office’s NAME III (Numerical Atmospheric dispersion 
Modelling Environment version 5.2) dispersion model (Jones et al 2007; 
Thomson and Jones 2007), which is part of the Met Office’s real-time weather 
and dispersion prediction capability. The reassessment is important, to 
demonstrate that the findings above were not a consequence of the simple 
dispersion model used, and to show that the results obtained are robust despite 
the choice of dispersion model.   The imprecision is estimated on the basis of 
the same baseline input parameters as shown above in Table 3.2, and varying 
these parameters to their plausible minimum and/or maximum as shown above 
in Table 3.4.  Again, the result indicators used are the extent of the estimated 
sheltering and evacuation countermeasures, and the predicted source term. 
The reassessment with the NAME model also explores the impact on the 
results of considering a different location point for the assumed measurement. 
3.4.1 Differences between R91 and NAME dispersion predictions for a 
short-duration release 
Before discussing the results and considering how they compare to the results 
of the previous section, it is useful to first compare the underlying dispersion 
predictions as indicated by the R91 and NAME models, assuming the same 
source term and the same baseline input parameters.  Table 3.6 shows the 
plume centre-line activity concentrations in air obtained from R91 and NAME, 
for a release of 1 1016 Bq of 137Cs, and for a release of 1 1015 Bq of 131I.  A 
release duration of 1 hour and a release height of 10 m were assumed, together 
with Pasquill meteorological stability category D, a wind speed of 5 m s-1 and no 
rain.  The terrain assumed is typical rural land with no significant features to 
influence the dispersion.  NAME models explicitly the time taken for the plume 
to reach each grid point, and the average activity concentrations in air from 
NAME given here are those predicted to occur 50-60 minutes after the start of 
the release; the values are the time-averaged concentrations over this 10 
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minute period.  In contrast, R91 calculates the total eventual time integrated air 
concentration (TIAC) at each point, and the average activity concentrations in 
air from R91 given in Table 3.6 are obtained by dividing the TIAC by the 
numbers of seconds in one hour; these therefore represent an average over the 
total time of plume passage.  
It can be seen from Table 3.6 that for the same source term NAME predicts 
time-averaged activity concentrations in air which are somewhat smaller than 
those predicted by R91 but the difference decreases with distance (a factor of 
about 4 at 1 km, 3 at 2 - 5 km, and less than 2 at 10 - 20 km).  There is less 
difference if the time integrated concentrations are considered.   
Table 3.6 Activity concentrations in air predicted by R91 and NAME for a release of 
1 1016 Bq of 137Cs and 1 1015 Bq of 131I over 1 hour  
137Cs Time-averaged activity concentration in air at given down-wind distance on 
plume centre line, (Bq m-3)a 
 1km 2km 5km 10km 20km 
R91 4 107 1 107 3 106 9 105 3 105 
NAME 1 107 4 106 1 106 5 105 2 105 
 Time integrated activity concentrations (TIAC) in air at given down-wind distance 
on plume centre line (Bq s m-3) over total time of plume passage  
 1km 2km 5km 10km 20km 
R91 1 1011 4 1010 9 109 3 109 1 109 
NAME 4 1010 2 1010 5 109 2 109 8 108 
      
131I Time-averaged activity concentration in air at given down-wind distance on 
plume centre line, (Bq m-3)a 
 1km 2km 5km 10km 20km 
R91 4 106 1 106 3 105 9 104 3 104 
NAME  1 106 4 105 1 105 5 104 2 104 
 Time integrated activity concentrations (TIAC) in air at given down-wind distance 
on plume centre line (Bq s m-3) over total time of plume passage  
 1km 2km 5km 10km 20km 
R91 1 1010 4 109 9 108 3 108 1 108 
NAME 4 109 2 109 4 108 2 108 7 107 
a. The activity concentration in air in NAME given here is the average 50-60 minutes after the start of the 
release whereas the R91 value is the average over the time of plume passage. 
 
The results are not sensitive to assuming that the average activity 
concentrations in air occur 50-60 minutes after the start of the release, as there 
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is little variation with time in the NAME air concentrations at 2km on the plume 
centre line for all the times except those near the start and finish of the release.  
Figure 3.1 shows the time variation in activity concentrations in air at 2km 
downwind for the baseline release of 1 1016 Bq of 137Cs over 1 hour (Bedwell et 
al to be published). 
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Figure 3.1 Activity concentrations in air at 2km predicted by NAME for a release of 
1 1016 Bq of 137Cs over 1 hour 
 
The reasons for differences between the predictions of NAME and R91 are 
complex, being due to the way in which the two models apply meteorological 
data and the different approaches to modelling plume dispersion.  The issues 
have been explored and resolved, and are discussed in detail by Bedwell et al 
(to be published).  While R91 considers each input parameter independently 
(for example, atmospheric stability and wind speed are incorporated in separate 
parameters with no dependency or inter-relationship), in NAME the impact of 
one parameter on another is taken into account (for example, atmospheric wind 
speed impacts on stability).  Also, the treatment of wind speed with height 
above the ground is different in the two models as R91 assumes a single wind 
speed whereas NAME considers a continuous profile of wind speeds, wind 
directions and other meteorological parameters over the depth of the 
atmosphere, enabling more realistic modelling of turbulence and mixing.  Some 
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reduction in the ground level activity concentrations in air predicted by NAME 
compared to those predicted by R91 would be expected to result from this in 
typical situations.  Furthermore, in the particular examples considered in this 
study, differences between the two models in the standard deviation of the 
cross wind plume profile (σy) and vertical plume profile (σz) result in the NAME 
plume being somewhat wider and deeper than the R91 plume at 2km, and 
somewhat narrower but of similar depth at distances approaching 20km.  Again, 
the effect is that the activity concentrations in air close to the ground are 
predicted to be less by NAME than by R91 at short distances.   
 
Because NAME explicitly models the time taken for the plume to reach each 
grid point, unlike the calculation in R91 which assumes instantaneous travel, 
the NAME predictions for different distances reach a steady-state level at 
different times.  For example, the average activity concentration in air at 20km 
in the period 50-60 minutes after the start of the release is not yet a steady-
state value; the activity concentration in air predicted by NAME is about a factor 
of 50% lower than the levels reached about 20 minutes later.   
By scaling the results presented in Table 3.6 it can be seen that a release of 
3 1016 Bq of 137Cs would result in NAME predicting an instantaneous activity 
concentration in air of approximately 1 107 Bq m-3 at 2km on the plume centre 
line, for the 50-60 minute ‘measurement’ period, which approximates to the 
value used in the R91 assessment above as the baseline ‘measurement’.  
Similarly, for 131I, an instantaneous activity concentration in air of 1 106 Bq m-3 
at 2km on the plume centre line (approximately the value used in the R91 
assessment above as the baseline ‘measurement’ for 131I) for the 50-60 minute 
‘measurement’ would be predicted by NAME from a release of 3 1015 Bq of this 
radionuclide.  These values are relevant in explaining the results of the two 
models, as discussed below.    
Table 3.7 shows the countermeasure extents implied by NAME’s dispersion 
prediction for the 1 1016 Bq release (the source term for 137Cs used in the R91 
assessment above) and by the scaled 3 1016 Bq release (for which NAME 
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predicts the baseline 2km activity concentration in air ‘measurement’ for 137Cs 
used in the R91 assessment).  It can be seen that the predicted extent of 
countermeasures for the 3 1016 Bq release is similar to that obtained using R91 
but that the extent of sheltering is somewhat greater (15km compared to 10km).  
The equivalent results for 131I show that for this radionuclide, for the scaled 
3 1015 Bq release, the predicted extent of countermeasures is the same as that 
obtained using R91.  The difference in the predictions of the extent of 
countermeasures for the source terms used in the R91 assessment (1 1016 Bq 
for 137Cs and the 1 1015 Bq for 131I) is due to the fundamental difference in the 
model predictions as described above, namely the lower predictions by NAME 
in comparison to R91 of a factor of up to 3 for distances from 2 km outwards.  
For both radionuclides, R91 predicts larger activity concentrations in air at 
distances up to 20 km than those predicted by NAME for the same source term, 
and in this sense R91 is ‘conservative’.  However, for the same simulated 
measurement at 2km the opposite effect is seen on the predicted extent of 
countermeasures, because the same ‘measurement’ at 2 km implies a greater 
source term if NAME is used than if R91 is used.  The use of R91 to predict the 
extent of countermeasures based on a measured value therefore may well not 
be the conservative approach commonly assumed, being dependent on the 
location of the measurement. 
The differences between R91 and the NAME model are explained further in 
Appendix 1. 
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Table 3.7 Extent of evacuation and sheltering based on R91 and NAME dispersion 
predictions for the baseline calculation 
137Cs Extent of evacuation / sheltering for 
137Cs 
R91 
(1 1016 Bq total release and 1.1 107 Bq m-3 
average instantaneous activity concentration in 
air at 2km on plume centre line) 
2 km / 10 km 
NAME 
1 1016 Bq total release 
3 1016 Bq total release (giving 1 107 Bq m-3 
instantaneous activity concentration in air at 2km on 
plume centre line at 50-60 minutes) 
 
1 km / 5 km 
2 km / 15 km 
131I Extent of evacuation / sheltering for 
131I 
R91  
(1 1015 Bq total release and 1.1 106 Bq m-3 
average instantaneous activity concentration in 
air at 2km on plume centre line) 
2 km / 10 km 
NAME 
1 1015 Bq total release 
3 1015 Bq total release (giving 1 106 Bq m-3 
instantaneous activity concentration in air at 2km on 
plume centre line at 50-60 minutes) 
 
1 km / 5 km 
2 km / 10 km 
 
3.4.2 Key imprecision parameters based on NAME dispersion 
predictions 
As in the R91 analysis above, the NAME-based results assume a ‘measured’ 
activity concentration in air at a specific location in relation to the release point 
in the downwind direction; by holding unchanged the ‘measured’ activity 
concentration while changing a single parameter in the calculation, in effect an 
altered source strength is estimated and the NAME model is rerun with this new 
source strength to estimate concentrations elsewhere, which are then used to 
determine the extent of countermeasures.  The assumed ‘measured’ activity 
concentrations in air are the same values as used in the R91 assessment 
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above, being derived from the R91 model’s prediction of the activity 
concentration on the plume centre line from a release of the baseline source 
term.  The baseline R91 source term for 137Cs was 1 1016 Bq, and the baseline 
R91 source term for 131I was 10 times smaller to ensure a similar predicted 
extent of countermeasures for the two radionuclides. The ‘measurement’ period 
is assumed to occur between 50 – 60 minutes after the start of the release, at 
which point the activity concentration levels in air in the area of interest (2km on 
the plume centre line) are steady. As discussed above, the assumed source 
terms implied by these ‘measurements’ when the NAME model is used differ 
from those indicated by the R91 model, suggesting releases of 3 1016 Bq of 
137Cs and 3 1015 Bq of 131I.  This reflects the differences in the predictions of the 
two dispersion models at 2km downwind.  However, it can be seen from 
Table 3.7 that the predicted extents of countermeasures based on the NAME 
results are similar to those predicted using R91. 
Table 3.8 shows the results of the imprecision analysis based on the NAME 
dispersion predictions, in terms of the extent of evacuation and sheltering 
predicted from the single assumed activity concentration in air measurement at 
2km downwind on the plume centre line, this being the assumed measurement 
location used in the previous study.  However, Table 3.8 also shows the 
influence on the results of repeating the calculations for a baseline 
measurement at a different location, to investigate whether there are significant 
differences in the results obtained.   
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Table 3.8 Effective release and extent of evacuation/sheltering at lower ERL predicted by NAME from anchor air concentrations at 2 km and 
5 kma 
 
 
 
 
 
Effective 
release of 
137Cs (Bq) 
 
Extent of evacuation, sheltering 
on plume centre line at lower 
ERLb for release of 137Cs 
Effective release 
of 131I (Bq) 
Extent of evacuation, sheltering 
on plume centre line at lower 
ERLb for release of 131I 
Location of ‘anchor air concentration 
‘measurement’ 
2km 5km 2km 5km 2km 5km 2km 5km 
Baseline source term  3 1016 2 1016 2 km, 15 km 2 km, 10 km 3 1015 2 1015 2 km, 10 km 2 km, 10 km 
Release duration: 
0.5 hoursc 
4 hours 
 
- c 
1 1017 
 
- c 
8 1016 
 
- c 
5 km, > 30 km 
 
- c 
5 km, 30 km 
 
- c 
1 1016 
 
- c 
8 1015 
 
- c 
5 km, 30 km 
 
- c 
4 km, 25 km 
Release height (stack): 
5 m 
20 m 
3 1016 
3 1016 
2 1016 
2 1016 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
3 1015 
3 1015 
2 1015 
2 1015 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
Plume rise (effective release height): 
200 m 1 1017 4 1016 
 
3 km, > 30 km 
 
0 km, 15 km 1 1016 4 1015 
 
0 km, > 30 km 
 
0 km, 10 km 
Pasquill meteorological stability category: 
C 
E 
8 1016 
7 1015 
5 1016 
6 1015 
 
2 km, 15 km 
2 km, 10 km 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
9 1015 
8 1014 
5 1015 
7 1014 
 
2 km, 15 km 
2 km, 10 km 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
Wind speed (assuming stability category D): 
2 m s-1 
8 m s-1 
2 1016 
4 1016 
2 1016 
3 1016 
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 15 km  
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km  
2 1015 
4 1015 
2 1015 
3 1015 
 
2 km, 10 km  
2 km, 10 km 
 
2 km, 10 km  
2 km, 10 km 
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Wind direction: 
Plume centre line +/- 10º from direction 
assumed  
Plume centre line +/- 20º from direction 
assumed 
7 1016 
 
1 1018 
9 1016 
 
7 1018 
 
4 km, 25 km 
 
>30 km, >30 km 
 
5 km, 30 km 
 
>30 km, >30 km 
7 1015 
 
1 1017 
9 1015 
 
7 1017 
 
4 km, 20 km 
 
30 km, >30 km 
 
4 km, 25 km 
 
>30 km, >30 km 
Particle size: 
10-1 m s-1 deposition velocity 
 
4 1016 
 
4 1016 
 
10 km, 30 km 
 
10 km, 30 km 
 
Not applicable for elemental iodine 
Dry deposition velocity: 
10-2 m s-1 for 137Cs, 10-1 m s-1 for 131I 
10-4 m s-1 for 137Cs, 10-3 m s-1 for 131I 
 
3 1016 
3 1016 
 
2 1016 
2 1016 
 
3 km, 20 km 
2 km, 10 km 
 
2 km, 15 km 
2 km, 10 km 
 
4 1015 
3 1015 
 
4 1015 
2 1015 
 
3 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km  
 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km  
Precipitation and washout coefficient: 
Light rain 
Heavy rain 
 
3 1016 
3 1016 
 
2 1016 
3 1016 
3 km, 25 km 
10 km, >30 km 
2 km, 20 km 
5 km, >30 km 
 
3 1015 
3 1015 
 
2 1015 
3 1015 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
2 km, 10 km 
Notes: 
a. The baseline activity concentration in air at 2 km on the plume centre line is 1.1 107 Bq m-3 for 137Cs, and 1.1 106 Bq m-3 for 131I. The baseline activity 
concentration in air at 5 km on the plume centre line is 2.6 106 Bq m-3 for 137Cs, and 2.6 105 Bq m-3 for 131I. 
b. The lower ERLs for sheltering and evacuation are averted doses of 3 mSv and 30 mSv effective dose, respectively.   
c. NAME predicts zero activity in air concentrations at 2km and 5km in the 50-60 minute period, and therefore no corresponding source term or countermeasure 
extents can be predicted for this parameter value on the basis of an assumed measurement of activity concentration in air at 50-60 minutes after the start of the 
release.  
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The assumed ‘measured’ activity concentrations in air at 5km downwind on the 
plume centre line are for consistency also derived from the R91 model’s 
prediction of the activity concentration on the plume centre line in baseline 
conditions. This location was selected as being one of the further locations from 
which very early monitoring results are simulated in UK emergency exercises. 
The R91 predictions of the activity concentration in air at 5 km from a 1 1016 Bq 
release of 137Cs and a 1 1015 Bq release of 131I in the baseline calculations are 
2.6 106 Bq m-3 and 2.6 105 Bq m-3 respectively, and Table 3.8 shows the results 
for the scaling to these concentrations at 5km.  It can be seen from Table 3.8 
that changing the measurement location to 5km makes little difference to the 
extent of countermeasures based on the NAME dispersion results, for the 
baseline case.   
The results in Table 3.8 show that release height, Pasquill meteorological 
stability category and wind speed are not significant contributors to imprecision, 
as the parameter variations result in similar countermeasure extents to the 
baseline results for both measurement location anchor points (ie both 2km and 
5km).  The key parameters are discussed in turn below. 
For a release duration of 0.5 hours, NAME predicts zero activity concentrations 
in air at 2km and 5km in the period 50-60 minutes after the start of the release, 
as the plume has already passed these points.  Therefore no corresponding 
source term or countermeasure extents can be predicted for this parameter 
value on the basis of an assumed measurement of activity concentration in air 
at 50-60 minutes after the start of the release.  For a release duration of 4 
hours, a considerable increase in the extent of countermeasures compared to 
the baseline results is predicted.  Thus, release duration is concluded to be a 
significant contributor to imprecision if a duration considerably different to the 
actual duration is assumed in assessments based on an environmental 
monitoring result. 
For the elevated release height considered (200m), for the 2km measurement, 
there is little predicted requirement for evacuation, but sheltering is predicted to 
be required beyond 30km.  The difference from the baseline case is less if the 
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assumed measurement point is 5km, for which there is no predicted 
requirement for evacuation and a 10-15 km requirement for sheltering.  
Table 3.9 shows the time integrated activity concentrations in air for 137Cs and 
131I for the results normalised to 1.1 107 Bq m-3 at 2km on the plume centre line 
for 137Cs, and 1.1 106 Bq m-3 at 2km on the plume centre line for 131I.  Table 3.9 
also shows the time integrated activity concentrations in air for 137Cs and 131I for 
the results normalised to 2.6 106 at 5km on the plume centre line for 137Cs, and 
2.6 105 at 5km on the plume centre line for 131I.  These more detailed results 
show the doses as a function of distance and demonstrate why the extent of 
countermeasures shown in Table 3.8 for plume rise are predicted to occur, by 
showing where the predicted doses fall below the 30 mSv (evacuation) and 3 
mSv (sheltering) countermeasure criteria assumed in this study.  NAME 
predicts the peak activity concentration in air to occur at around 2-3 km.  In 
summary, the sensitivity of the results to errors in the estimation of an elevated 
effective release height of the order of 200m depends on the location, within the 
1km to 5km region, at which the scaling measurement is assumed to be taken. 
It is a potentially significant parameter, in particular in terms of its impact on the 
predicted extent of sheltering, for measurements in the vicinity of 2km, but 
appears to be less significant for measurements further away for the elevated 
release height considered here.  The differences between R91 and the NAME 
model in terms of plume rise are discussed further in Appendix 1. 
For wind direction, if the plume centre line is +/- 10º from the baseline direction, 
predictions of the required extent of countermeasures based on the NAME 
dispersion results show, for both the 2km and 5km measurement locations, a 
considerable increase in the extent of countermeasures compared to the 
baseline results.  In the case of the +/- 20º deviation in wind direction from the 
baseline direction, extensive requirements for countermeasures (> 30km) are 
predicted for both measurement locations.  In these results, the horizontal 
spread of the NAME plume is significant.  At 2km, NAME predicts a ratio 
between the 20º activity concentration in air and the plume centre line 
concentration of 40, and at 5km, the ratio is 250;  these points are relatively 
close to the ‘edge’ of the plume.  The very considerable increase in the 
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predicted extent of countermeasures indicates that this factor is a significant 
contributor to imprecision in assessments which are Gaussian based and 
require an assumed plume centre line wind direction. In a non-Gaussian 
assessment, the significant feature is plume direction fluctuations and spread 
rather than inaccuracies in the estimation of a plume centre line; the 
significance of this aspect is considered further below, and is also discussed 
further in Appendix 1. 
Table 3.9 Time-integrated activity concentrations in air (TIACs) for 137Cs and 131I from 
NAME for a 200m release height 
 
Release scaled such that instantaneous air concentration at 2km is 1.1 107 Bq m-3 137Cs    
 1km 2km 5km 10km 20km 30km 
NAME TIAC on plume centre 
line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (mSv) 
2 1010 
 
14 
4 1010 
 
30 
3 1010 
 
23 
2 1010 
 
14 
9 109 
 
6 
6 109 
 
4 
 
Release scaled such that instantaneous air concentration at 2km is 1.1 106 Bq m-3 131I   
NAME TIAC on plume centre 
line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (mSv) 
2 109 
 
12 
4 109 
 
27 
3 109 
 
21 
2 109 
 
12 
8 108 
 
5 
5 108 
 
3 
 
Release scaled such that instantaneous air concentration at 5km is 2.6 106 Bq m-3 137Cs    
 1km 2km 5km 10km 20km 30km 
NAME TIAC on plume centre 
line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (mSv) 
5 109 
 
4 
1 1010 
 
9 
9 109 
 
7 
6 109 
 
4 
3 109 
 
2 
2 109 
 
1 
 
Release scaled such that instantaneous air concentration at 5km is 2.6 105 Bq m-3 131I   
NAME TIAC on plume centre 
line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (mSv) 
5 108 
 
4 
1 109 
 
8 
9 108 
 
6 
5 108 
 
4 
2 108 
 
2 
2 108 
 
1 
 
For large particle size, modelled here for 137Cs by an enhanced deposition 
velocity of 1 10-1 m s-1, predictions based on NAME show a considerable 
increase in the extent of required countermeasures for both the 2km and 5km 
measurement anchor points, indicating that enhanced deposition velocity is a 
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significant contributor to imprecision for radionuclides where deposition 
pathways contribute substantially to dose.  A similar although less marked effect 
is seen for the deposition velocity of 1 10-2 m s-1 for 137Cs.  For the enhanced 
deposition velocity of 1 10-1 m s-1 for 131I, no significant effect is observed, as 
deposition does not significantly impact on the dose delivered by this 
radionuclide, for which the dominant exposure pathway is inhalation.  The 
results for the reduced deposition velocities of 1 10-4 m s-1 for 137Cs and 1 10-3 
m s-1 for 131I indicate that this is not a significant parameter at levels below the 
baseline values.  
For both light and heavy rainfall rates, for 137Cs, a considerable increase in the 
extent of countermeasures compared to the NAME baseline results is shown for 
both the 2km and 5km measurement anchor points, indicating that the presence 
and degree of rainfall are significant contributors to imprecision for radionuclides 
where deposition pathways contribute substantially to dose.  For 131I, no 
significant effect on countermeasure extents is observed as deposition does not 
significantly impact on the dose delivered by this radionuclide, for which the 
dominant exposure pathway is inhalation. 
Unlike in the R-91 based analysis, the effects of combinations of parameter 
changes in the NAME model were not explicitly considered.  The simplicity of 
R-91 enabled this to be done by simply setting combinations of input 
parameters to the given values.  In the case of NAME, this simple approach 
was not feasible because of the complexity of the model structure and its in-built 
inter-relationship between input parameters.  Through this fundamentally 
different approach, the impact of one parameter on another is already taken into 
account (as, for example, in the relationship between wind speed and stability, 
and in the continuous profile of wind speeds, wind directions and other 
meteorological parameters over the depth of the atmosphere).  Although in 
discussion with the developers of NAME it was possible to set up the model to 
do the baseline analysis in a manner consistent with that in R-91, the forcing of 
combinations of linked parameters into a system which already assumed a 
relationship between them would have been artificial and would not have given 
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meaningful results. However, the analysis with real meteorological data records, 
as discussed below in this section and in more detail in Section 5, does 
demonstrate predictions based on true interlinked meteorological and release-
based parameter values. 
The overall conclusion from the above analysis is that while there are some 
recognised differences in the predictions of the R91 and NAME models in the 
context of short duration releases, this does not significantly change the results 
of the previous analysis using the simple model, in that the relatively important 
contributors to imprecision in emergency response assessments remain the 
same.  The key parameters remain:  a prolonged release duration, wind 
direction (if the assessment requires an assumed plume centre line wind 
direction), enhanced deposition velocity and rainfall (for those radionuclides for 
which deposition contributes significantly to dose), and a significantly elevated 
release height such as might arise if there were substantial energy associated 
with the release.  The significance of the latter factor is shown here to depend 
on the distance from the release point of the measurement used as the basis for 
the assessment, being limited - at least for the effective release height 
considered here (200m) - to those distances, mostly in the 1km to 5km region, 
where plume rise significantly affects the dispersion pattern.  Assessments 
based on measurements from within this region may give rise to misleading 
results, particularly in terms of the predicted extent of sheltering, if plume rise is 
not taken into account.   
3.5 Impact of using real weather sequences from stored NWP files   
The previous section has used the NAME model to repeat the R91 assessment 
of the parameters important to imprecision by estimating the extent of 
countermeasures resulting from straight line, theoretical dispersion conditions.  
This section examines what countermeasures would be predicted for past ‘real 
weather’ meteorological conditions, in which those weather-related features 
which have been shown to significantly affect the predicted extent of 
 87
countermeasures (namely wind direction1 and rainfall rate) are variable but the 
other parameters are fixed (within narrow bands) to those specified in the 
baseline case as defined above.  Here, NAME has been used to assess the 
variations in sheltering areas resulting for alternative weather evolutions, 
resulting from a hypothetical release in real weather conditions occurring in 
2007 and 2008. 
The UK Met Office holds NWP data for past weather conditions.  Sequences 
have been extracted from 2 years of data (2007 and 2008), in which the 
weather features approximate to the hypothesised baseline weather, ie 
Category D and approximately 5 m s-1 wind speed.  From these two years of 
data, there were 51 data records lasting for 4 hours or more which are 
categorised in terms of the NAME model definitions as Category D and 
4.5 - 5.5 m s-1 wind speed.  Of these, 28 were dry conditions throughout the four 
hours considered and 23 showed at least one period of rain over the period.  
For each of these weather sets NAME was run to predict the dispersion of a 
plume of 3 1016 Bq of 137Cs with a release duration of 1 hour from a 10m 
release height.  A deposition velocity of 1 10-3 m s-1 was assumed.  For 
presentational clarity, to enable the extent of the plume spread to be clearly 
seen and also the effect of subsequent shifts in wind direction over the period to 
be shown, the results exclude the effects of the initial wind direction, and all the 
initial wind directions have been set as ‘from 270 degrees’, ie towards due East.   
The results presented here are for the sheltering countermeasure only, as this 
extends further than the evacuation countermeasure and therefore shows the 
impact of the weather conditions more clearly. Table 3.10 summarises the 
results from the real weather NAME runs and for comparison shows the NAME 
predictions for theoretical Gaussian dry weather conditions.  The average extent 
of the sheltering countermeasure in real weather conditions is around 15 to 
20 km, within a range of about 5km to 40km.  This encompasses the predicted 
extent of the straight-line Gaussian predictions for dry weather conditions of 
                                                          
1 In a non-Gaussian assessment, the significant feature here becomes plume direction fluctuations and 
spread rather than inaccuracies in the estimation of a plume centre line. 
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15 km.  The pattern and extent of the sheltering areas are influenced by the 
spatial distribution of doses in the region of 3 mSv, which is the criterion 
assumed here for the introduction of sheltering.  The dose distributions in the 
area vary widely even under the similar weather conditions considered here.  
The influence of rain is, as indicated by the sensitivity study above, one of the 
key reasons for this.  Two examples of the varying distribution of dose in 
different weather conditions can be seen in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b below.  The 
non-zero dose areas extend considerably beyond the area shown in the figures, 
but are truncated here to show the detail in the closer-in regions. 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
Figure 3.2a and 3.2b Effective dose to 2 days based on NAME dispersion predictions for 
a release of 3 1016 Bq of 137Cs  in alternative real weather conditions 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the overlaid sheltering countermeasure areas from all the 51 
weather sequences from 2007 and 2008 considered here, so that the density 
indicates the probability of a countermeasure being required (in terms of a total 
dose, as defined above, of 3mSv being exceeded).  It can be seen that the 
majority of sheltering areas overlay, assuming (as here) the same initial wind 
direction.  However, there are a minority of weather conditions which lead to 
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elongated or angled sheltering areas.  Several of the weather sequences lead 
to sheltering extending considerably beyond the area shown here, which again 
is truncated to show greater resolution in the area closer in.  These results 
demonstrate again the importance of linking emergency response assessment 
systems with real-time weather predictions. 
Table 3.10 Extent of sheltering for release of 3 1016 Bq of 137Cs, real weather conditions 
Weather conditiona Minimum extent 
of sheltering (km) 
Maximum extent 
of sheltering (km) 
Average extent 
of sheltering 
(km) 
Average peak 
TIACb at 2km 
(Bq s m-3) 
Dry 4 31 14 6 1010 
Wet 9 > 40 19 5 1010 
Total 4 > 40 16 6 1010 
NAME Gaussian Dry   15 5 1010 
Notes: 
a. The weather conditions were all Category D, 4.5 – 5.5 m s-1 wind speed, and the release duration was 
1hour from a 10m release height.  
b. Time integrated activity concentration in air. 
 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
Figure 3.3 Predicted extent of sheltering for release of 3 1016 Bq of 137Cs in 51 real 
weather conditions from 2007 and 2008, with colour density built up to reflect the 
likelihood of the area being affected 
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3.6 Section summary 
On the basis of the variability ranges estimated in Section 2, this section 
estimates the extent of the imprecision typically associated with emergency 
response calculations.  The focus is on the imprecision associated with 
assessment support for decisions on countermeasures in the area beyond that 
covered by the emergency planning zone (ie extendibility).  The imprecision 
evaluated is that which is associated with predictions of air concentrations, 
ground deposition levels, and the resulting predicted extent of evacuation and 
sheltering areas, based on a few off-site measurements at early times.  
The results summarised in this section have demonstrated the key parameters 
contributing to imprecision in emergency response assessments.  The two 
analyses, using the R91 and NAME dispersion models, have indicated 
consistent results; the key parameters for both are the release duration, wind 
direction (where an assumed plume centre line wind direction is required), 
enhanced deposition velocity and rainfall, and a significantly elevated release 
height.  The results demonstrate the importance of a radiological emergency 
assessment tool being linked to an appropriate real-time weather/dispersion 
prediction tool, and in particular for UK application with the NAME/NWP models 
of the UK Met Office.  The section also shows the influence of real weather 
conditions, linked to NAME plume predictions, on the predicted extent of 
countermeasures, using real meteorological sequences from 2007/2008, and 
demonstrates the potential impact of variation in weather on the estimated 
location and extent of sheltering areas, even for weather conditions which are 
similar. 
The section shows that the imprecision due to lack of knowledge in the early 
stages of an emergency has potentially significant implications.  It is therefore 
concluded that it is important to have techniques which display the 
consequences of imprecision in a way that is easily understandable in the 
context of emergency decision making.  This includes combining the effect of 
weather uncertainty with lack of knowledge on other key parameters. The 
specification of a tool which will use NAME dispersion input to predict and 
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display areas where countermeasures may be required is therefore developed 
in the next section. 
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4 SPECIFICATION OF NEW GIS-BASED EMERGENCY 
ASSESSMENT TOOL  
4.1 Introduction 
It has been concluded in Section 1 that it is vital, when decisions are being 
based on assessment results in emergencies, for the decision maker to be fully 
aware of any significant imprecision or uncertainty associated with the results.  
In Section 3 the importance of weather parameters in assessing the 
consequences of a release has been demonstrated.  This, in conjunction with 
the availability of increasingly detailed weather data on a three dimensional grid 
for the UK, means that it is now appropriate to develop radiological emergency 
response tools for application in the UK which include both real-time weather 
predictions and imprecision analysis.   
This section describes a proposed new tool which would link radiological 
emergency assessment models to the predictions of the UK Met Office’s 
NAME dispersion model.  The aim of the new tool is to minimise lack of 
knowledge of the significant weather-related parameters through using the best 
and most up to date dispersion predictions available, while also taking into 
account any lack of knowledge in the key non-weather parameters, by reflecting 
the significance of possible variation in these on the endpoints produced.  
It was concluded in Section 1 that for decision making in the UK in the very 
early stages of an emergency (within, say, 12 hours of a release starting) it is 
important that the tools used are transparent, with the technical basis easily 
explainable to decision makers.  Ideally, they should be based on simple 
calculational assumptions which would permit approximate checking to be 
feasible through hand calculations.  Complex models used at early times may 
generate overconfidence through their apparent sophistication and possibly 
hidden uncertainties (as discussed, for example, by French and Niculae 2005).  
For this reason, undue complexity in the new tool’s design has been avoided.  It 
is also important to retain calculational simplicity to reduce the chance of 
inadvertent user errors through incomplete understanding of what the tool is 
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doing.  The inclusion of imprecision due to lack of knowledge and the display of 
results which demonstrate this is a fundamental part of the new tool’s design.  
The approach taken to these issues is summarised in this section. 
The new tool predicts areas where countermeasures may be required and other 
radiological endpoints through the display of spatial data in a Geographic 
Information System (GIS).  The UK Met Office generated NAME predictions of 
atmospheric dispersion and deposition levels are also based on spatial data.   
The analysis and presentation of information in a spatial format is important in 
emergency response systems unlike, for example, probabilistic risk assessment 
systems where results can meaningfully be presented by using percentile 
distributions and expectation values.  The prediction and display of areas where 
emergency countermeasures may be required, together with other endpoints 
relevant to emergency response such as the distribution of predicted doses, 
may be shown using, for example, the ArcMap system as developed by 
ESRI(UK); this is a comprehensive mapping application for ArcGIS Desktop, 
with the ability to combine calculations with map-based displays.  A GIS 
framework has the advantage of being able to display a wide range of features 
in the affected area, such as population, schools, hospitals and roads, in 
addition to the assessments endpoints.   
The tool described in this section has been partially implemented as a 
spreadsheet which is then linked manually with ArcMap. This is a limited 
prototype version for research purposes, rather than a fully functioning system 
which would link in real time with Met Office predictions.  This combination of a 
spreadsheet linked to the ArcMap system was the tool used in the previous 
section to show the impact of the NAME model predictions on the sources of 
imprecision.   
4.2 Atmospheric dispersion modelling in UK emergency response 
In emergencies (which would include radiological emergencies, but also other 
emergencies such as chemical releases such as that from Buncefield in 2005 
and emissions of volcanic ash such as the Eyjafjallajökull release in Iceland in 
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2010) the Met Office’s NAME dispersion model is run by the Met Office with 
input from their Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP) model.  NAME is linked to 
the Met Office’s Unified Model (UM), a unified Numerical Weather Prediction 
(NWP) meteorological model which is used for both weather prediction and long 
term climate modelling (Cullen 1993, Staniforth and Wood 2008).  NAME can 
also utilise radar data on current and past rainfall.  The resolution of the 
underlying NWP data is now on a grid size of 1.5 km2, which is adequate for the 
estimation of early countermeasure areas (which may potentially extend up to a 
few 10’s of kilometres in distance from the release point, but more likely only to 
a few kilometres).  The use of the Unified Model in conjunction with radar data 
enables regularly updated NAME dispersion predictions to be made of the 
instantaneous and time integrated activity concentrations in air, and wet, dry 
and total ground depositions of radionuclides, at all grid location points and on a 
suitably defined temporal grid.  These predictions may be used as input into 
radiological dose assessments.  NAME incorporates both radioactive decay 
processes and estimates of external dose (‘cloud gamma’) from the radioactive 
plume, and is therefore a model with appropriate capability for radiological 
assessments. 
The projection of weather conditions into the future is influenced by the chaotic 
nature of the atmosphere.  There is also considerable uncertainty associated 
with predictions of future weather details, such as rainfall rate and location.  
Major international meteorological organisations, including the Met Office, 
therefore use ensemble forecasting to enable the uncertainty in meteorological 
forecasts to be estimated.  This entails the repeated running of forecast models 
many times, with slight perturbations in starting conditions. Ensemble 
meteorological forecasting can be continued into dispersion predictions, through 
the generation of an ensemble of dispersion scenarios associated with multiple 
forecasts of the meteorology. The uncertainty associated with ensemble 
predictions can therefore arise both from the uncertainty in the meteorology and 
the uncertainty in the dispersion aspects. Ensemble forecasting and its use in 
emergency response applications is a current research area both in the Met 
Office and elsewhere.   
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Ensemble predictions and their associated probabilities may be used as input 
into radiological consequence assessments. Ensemble modelling is being 
introduced in the UK Met Office’s use of the NAME model.  Runs of the 
dispersion model NAME can therefore generate not only single ‘best estimate’ 
predictions of plume dispersal and deposition but also alternative plausible 
dispersion patterns, taking into account possible variations in the development 
of future weather conditions.  This developing capability fits in well with the 
proposal in this work of developing a tool which takes into account lack of 
knowledge and alternative possibilities in multiple input parameters and data.  
4.3 Outline of assessment tool 
The main stages of the new ArcMap tool are shown in Figure 4.1. 
The starting point for the calculations is NAME predictions of activity 
concentrations in air and ground depositions, in combination with either an 
estimated source term or environmental measurements.  The measurement 
most likely to be useful is an activity concentration in air.  These are measured 
by air sampling, with a measured air sample being reported typically in units of 
Bq s m-3.  This quantity divided by the number of seconds in the measurement 
period gives an instantaneous activity concentration in air in Bq m-3.  In the 
absence of radionuclide breakdown information, this measurement can be 
assumed to be the measurement for either a particular radionuclide, or a group 
of radionuclides.   
In the early stage of a release, the Met Office’s NAME predictions of activity 
concentrations in air and ground depositions will be for unit release of key 
radionuclides, due to lack of knowledge at this stage about the source term1.  
The NAME prediction of the activity concentration in air for unit release of the 
appropriate radionuclide (or combination of radionuclides), at the time and 
location of the measurement, may be compared to a measured value of the 
actual quantity.   
                                                          
1 The Met Office would aim to rapidly generate NAME runs, for the release site and the estimated start 
time, after being notified of an accident; at such short times, the source term is very unlikely to be known. 
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Figure 4.1 Stages of the ArcMap tool 
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This comparison enables a ratio to be calculated between the measured value 
and the predicted value for the ‘unit release’ run of NAME, and with this ratio all 
the NAME predictions of activity concentrations in air and depositions, both 
spatially and temporally, may be scaled to the size of the release indicated by 
the ratio. Through this scaling, new NAME-based spatial and temporal 
predictions of activity concentrations in air and deposition may be produced; 
these scaled results will include a predicted activity concentration in air which is 
in agreement with the measurement at the appropriate time and spatial location.  
In effect, this scaling process estimates a source strength on the basis of the 
single measurement and this estimated source strength is then used to estimate 
concentrations elsewhere.  This scaling process may also be done on the basis 
of a comparison between NAME predictions of total deposition at a point and 
measurements of total deposition at the same location, but because these 
deposition quantities are integrals over the period of time from the start of 
deposition to the time of measurement, this is likely to be of more limited value.  
As the new tool is ArcMap-based, the modified NAME predictions derived by 
scaling to each measurement may be stored as new layers of data, in addition 
to the base ‘unit release’ layer of the NAME predictions of activity 
concentrations in air and deposition.  Each layer, both original and modified, 
may be subdivided into further sublayers to reflect radionuclide composition, 
which may be either measurement-based or user-assumed.  On the basis of 
this multiple layer information, dose and countermeasure calculations are 
undertaken, as described below.     
A key feature of the tool is the input of a range of values for key parameters 
which affect the calculated consequences, and the treatment of the predicted 
results in a probabilistic framework.  The endpoints of dose and 
countermeasure consequences are therefore presented in a way which 
demonstrates the influence of imprecision. 
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4.4 Method 
The NAME ‘unit release’ datasets which are input into the tool are in the form of 
spatial grids containing air concentrations and ground depositions.  The air 
concentrations will be in the form of Bq m-3 as a function of time.  These will be 
for pre-specified time intervals, most likely of around 15 minutes duration as a 
compromise which gives sufficient representation of fluctuations in activity 
concentrations with time while not requiring data sets which are too large to 
store and manipulate.  The ground depositions will be the total deposition at 
each location up to each time (again probably every 15 minutes) in Bq m-2.   
As described above, by comparison between measured activity concentrations 
in air and the NAME predictions for the appropriate time and location, modified 
grids can be calculated.  In ArcMap this will produce for measurement M a new 
layer of predicted activity concentrations in air (in Bq m-3) called AM(tx) where tx 
is the time in 15 minute intervals, and a new layer of predicted total depositions 
to each time period (in Bq m-2) called DM(tx), again where tx is the time in 15 
minute intervals.   
Each AM(tx) and DM(tx) layer may be subdivided into further sublayers to reflect 
radionuclide composition (either actual or user-assumed).  These layers are 
essential before dose and countermeasure calculations can be undertaken, as 
dose is dependent upon the radionuclide.  Although in the early stages of a 
release the measured activity will probably be assumed to be a particular 
radionuclide or group of radionuclides, as time progresses a fuller radionuclide 
breakdown can be expected.  Radionuclide spectrum data will not normally 
apply equally to both the activity in air concentration data and the deposition 
data, due to different deposition velocities for some radionuclides (notably 
iodine).  Scaling factors between activity concentrations in air and ground 
depositions will enable approximate values to be calculated, and this approach 
will be essential to enable calculations to be performed before revised NAME 
runs based on new source term information become available from Met Office, 
although these factors would not be equally applicable at all distances from the 
release point due to phenomena such as plume depletion.  Accurate use of 
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radiospectrum data for both deposition and air concentration grids would require 
revised, radionuclide-specific results to be obtained directly from the NAME 
model. 
The tool may alternatively operate on the basis of an input source term (eg 
1016 Bq of 137Cs and 5 1015 Bq of 90Sr), rather than on ratioing to a 
measurement.  This is just another way of obtaining the multiplying factors to 
produce the AM(tx) and DM(tx) layers.  
Table 4.1 shows the radionuclides most likely to have a significant effect on 
doses in the event of a reactor accident or an accident involving a major nuclear 
transport facility (see for example Charles et al 1983).   Additional radionuclides 
to cover the noble gases should be added when these have the potential to be 
released, to enable the external doses from cloud to be calculated. However, 
the prototype version created for the analyses in this study includes only 137Cs 
and 131I. 
Table 4.1 Significant radionuclides for ArcMap tool 
Cobalt-60 (60Co) 
Strontium-89 (89Sr) 
Strontium-90 (90Sr) 
Ruthenium-103 (103Ru) 
Ruthenium-106 (106Ru) 
Tellurium-132 (132Te) 
Iodine-131 (131I) 
Iodine-132 (132I) 
Iodine-133 (133I) 
Iodine-135 (135I) 
Caesium-134 (134Cs) 
Caesium-137 (137Cs) 
Barium-140 (140Ba) 
Lanthanum-140 (140La) 
Cerium-144 (144Ce) 
Uranium-234 (234U) 
Uranium-235 (235U) 
Uranium-238 (238U) 
Plutonium-238 (238Pu) 
Plutonium-239 (239Pu) 
Americium-241 (241Am) 
 
 
4.5 Inclusion of imprecision 
As discussed in previous sections, the inputs into an emergency assessment 
tool will often not be well-defined in the early stages of an emergency.  
Section 3 has concluded that the key categories where early information will not 
be readily available and where there will be a number of plausible alternatives 
are: 
 Multiple predictions from the weather/dispersion model, of alternative 
weather and dispersion evolutions, including uncertainty in the wind 
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direction and the rainfall rate. Each of these would lead to different 
projected patterns of activity concentrations in air and ground depositions 
for input to the emergency assessment.   
 Multiple environmental measurements, varying in location point and 
sampling time, each potentially suggesting a different estimated release 
quantity, together with a lack of information on the radionuclide 
composition of each radiological measurement (measurements may, for 
example, be reported as total beta or total gamma).   Even in the early 
stages of an accident it is likely there will be a number of off-site 
measurements, and eventually there will be many.   
 Uncertainty regarding aspects of the release, including the degree of 
associated energy (heat content and plume rise), the particle size 
distribution and associated dry deposition velocity, and the assumed 
release duration.  The emission rate of radionuclides is likely to vary with 
time, and also with radionuclide.  
Specifically, the results presented in Section 3 show that key contributors to the 
imprecision are:  
 release duration,  
 deposition velocity 
 weather factors, particularly wind direction and rainfall rate,  
 a significantly elevated release height. 
All of these factors, considered separately and in combination, will lead to 
different spatial and temporal predictions of dose distribution and hence 
different locations and extents of areas in which countermeasures may be 
required.  While some of these will more accurately represent reality than 
others, early stage assessments cannot ignore the full spectrum of possible 
outcomes, in so far as these can realistically be estimated.  The approach 
suggested in the new tool is therefore to consider a wide spread of possible 
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combinations and to present estimates of the confidence associated with each 
combination. 
As an example, consider first only the weather and measurement aspects of 
imprecision.  Assume there are four different measurements of activity 
concentration in air (m1, m2, m3, m4) of radionuclide r.  Also assume there are 
three alternative weather predictions (w1, w2, w3), and for each of these there is 
a separate NAME dispersion prediction.  For weather w1, NAME will predict for 
a unit release of radionuclide r spatial and temporal grids of activity 
concentrations in air and total ground deposition.   
Measurement m1, which was taken at a particular location and time, can be 
compared to the NAME unit release prediction of activity concentration in air for 
the same location and time, for weather w1.  Ratioing these values provides a 
scaling factor which can then be applied to the entire NAME activity 
concentration in air grid for w1, such that the scaled grid shows measurement 
m1 at the correct spatial and temporal location and similarly scaled activity in air 
concentrations at all other points and times.  However, for the locations and 
times of measurements m2, m3 and m4, this new grid may well not predict the 
values measured at these locations and times. 
For measurements m2, m3 and m4 new scaled NAME grids can also be 
generated for each, respectively showing measurements m2, m3 and m4 at the 
correct points and times, but values which do not necessarily agree with the 
measured values at the other locations.  Using these four sets of new grids, 
assessment results can then be generated separately for each.   
As an example, four alternative areas predicted to require sheltering may be 
produced, one for each measurement, and all applying to the plume prediction 
for weather w1.  Examination of each of these alternative outputs is of interest to 
the decision maker.  For example, similarity between the predicted sheltering 
areas would suggest that for weather evolution w1 the measurements are 
broadly consistent with each other, whereas similarity between three zones but 
not the fourth would suggest that one measurement is inconsistent with the 
others, at least for this weather evolution and the sheltering area endpoint.   It is 
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also of interest to combine these four predicted sheltering areas (or other 
endpoints) for weather evolution w1, which may be done by a simple arithmetic 
mean or by weighting the four measurements according to the confidence 
considered to apply to each in such a way that the weighting sums to one.  
Repeating this process for the weather sequences w2 and w3 will result in five 
sheltering areas for each weather evolution, four of which correspond to a 
single measurement with the fifth being representative of the average, or the 
weighted average, across all four measurements.   
Alternatively, each weather evolution can be considered in turn, in the context of 
a single measurement.  For measurement m1, NAME’s ‘unit release’ grids of 
activity concentration in air and ground deposition corresponding to each of the 
weathers w1 to w3 can be scaled to give three alternative grids for each, all with 
measurement m1 at the correct location and time. As above, a sheltering zone, 
for example, based on measurement m1 can be predicted for each weather, 
demonstrating the impact of the different weathers on the endpoint and a simple 
arithmetic average or a weighted average across weather evolutions can also 
be shown.  Again, the information is of significance in terms of decision making, 
in that it clearly highlights the possible impact of each weather evolution, 
possibly giving early warning of particular weather developments to be alert to. 
The approach described above for alternative weathers and measurement data 
may be extended to the other contributors to imprecision, such as alternative 
dry deposition velocities (eg v1, v2) and durations of release (eg d1, d2, d3). 
Each of the different variable values is given an estimated likelihood or 
confidence weighting by the operator of the assessment system.  In the case of 
the weather/dispersion combinations the estimated likelihood would be provided 
by the Met Office, on the basis of their expertise.  The likelihoods are attached 
during the analysis, based on the situation at that time and for the particular 
emergency.  It is likely that both values and likelihoods will change as the 
accident progresses.  For example, initial estimates of release duration may be 
set at 1 hour, 3 hours and 5 hours but if the release is not stopped then later 
runs may take this ongoing release into account by using 6 hours, 8 hours, 10 
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hours as the possible durations.  The sum of the likelihood weightings applied to 
each uncertain parameter should sum to unity.   
A scheme has therefore been developed to estimate the likelihood associated 
with imprecision alternatives, as additional information for the decision maker.  
Figure 4.2 shows an example structure of the scheme used to generate 
alternative outcomes of results; different input parameters for all four variables 
shown here are used in all possible combinations (in the example shown in 
Figure 4.2, there are 4 x 3 x 2 x 3 = 72 combinations). It should be noted that 
the alternative weather/dispersion alternatives include a number of the elements 
identified previously as having a significant bearing on the outcomes of the 
accident, for example wind fluctuation, wind speed and rain presence/intensity.  
The dry deposition velocity options may be regarded alternatively as options on 
particle size.   
Table 4.2 shows a possible application of the scheme.  The entries in the table 
are examples only; in a particular emergency, specific values appropriate to the 
emergency would be selected at the start and would be altered and updated 
according to improved understanding as the emergency develops.  Each of the 
columns in Table 4.2 represents a different variable, and an estimated 
probability.  The first column contains the key measurements (or sets of similar 
measurements) taken after the release has started, each of which can be used 
to scale the NAME ‘unit release’ predictions. The second column contains the 
key alternative weather and dispersion evolutions for a unit release of each 
radionuclide, each of which will give rise to a different pattern of activity in air 
concentrations and deposition predictions over space and time.  The third 
column is the likely release duration in hours, and the fourth column contains 
the particle size and deposition velocity options.  The probabilities are attached 
during the analysis, as the most likely probabilities based on the situation at that 
time and for the particular emergency.  It is likely that they will change as the 
accident progresses.  The probability weightings applied to each uncertain 
parameter must be selected such that the total probability in each column sums 
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to unity.  User input through manual dragging of a probability curve may be a 
feasible way of inputting the probabilities.   
  
Figure 4.2 Structure of imprecision calculations 
 
The fifth column is different in nature.  A significant difference in 
countermeasure zones may be seen if the effective release height is low to 
medium (around 10m to 30m in height) as compared to high (100m to 200m) 
but there is relatively little difference around these two assumptions.  For this 
parameter two entirely separate analyses are required, each giving rise to 
separate sets of assessment results.  Both of these analyses are only required 
while both scales of release height remain a possibility, for a particular accident.   
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 105
Table 4.2 Example of possible variables and probabilities in a particular emergency  
Environmental 
measurements 
set 
Weather 
evolutions 
Likely release 
duration 
Particle size and deposition velocity  
(µm and m s-1) 
Release 
height1 
(m) 
m1 
Confidence 
weighting 0.2 
 
m2 
Confidence 
weighting 0.3 
 
m3 
Confidence 
weighting 0.3 
 
m4 
Confidence 
weighting 0.2 
w1 
Probability 
20% 
 
w2 
Probability 
50% 
 
w3 
Probability 
30% 
d1   3 hours 
Probability 
25% 
 
d2   6 hours 
Probability 
50% 
 
d3  10 hours 
Probability 
25% 
 
v1  
Nuclides except iodine: 1μm & 10-4 m s-1 
Iodine nuclides:  1μm & 10-3 m s-1 
Probability 40% 
 
v2  
Nuclides except iodine: 1μm & 10-3 m s-1 
Iodine nuclides:  1μm & 10-2 m s-1 
Probability 60% 
10m 
150m 
1 Release height is not to be treated as a weighting, the alternatives are ‘either/or’ and will each produce 
two different countermeasure zone sets which are alternatives and cannot be combined. 
 
To use this structure as a basis for assessments in the new tool requires the 
generation of a series of real-weather dispersion predictions, with associated 
estimates of likelihood.  In the UK such predictions would be produced by the 
Met Office, for the release location and the estimated release start time as 
appropriate for the particular incident, and so the requirement is for a series of 
NAME weather evolutions to be provided by Met Office.  In the examples in 
Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2, three weather evolutions are assumed.  However, 
because release duration, particle size (or deposition velocity) and release 
height are also required inputs to NAME, the requirement for the NAME runs to 
be supplied from the Met Office includes the alternative values for these 
parameters as well.  NAME ‘unit release’ runs for a series of weather 
evolutions, a pre-specified set of release durations, a set of particle sizes (or 
deposition velocities) and maybe two alternative release heights are required, 
hence in an emergency the Met Office may automatically generate around 50 
alternative NAME runs for HPA.  For each of these runs, the release location 
and the release start time will be as required for the particular incident, and 
each will include a default set of radionuclides, all of which are assumed to be 
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released in unit quantities.  An experienced assessment analyst will then pick a 
set of key measurements and will select appropriate probabilities for the release 
durations and particle size/deposition pairings.  The analyst will also judge the 
confidence weightings to be applied to each of the key measurements.  This 
may be done on the basis of information received from monitoring teams, which 
are co-ordinated in the event of a nuclear site incident by HPA.  It is likely that 
equal weighting may be given to the different measurements, but the possibility 
of attaching a reduced confidence to one or more is available for use if 
considered appropriate to the circumstances. 
On receipt of these NAME runs from Met Office, every combination of the above 
with the associated probabilities is automatically passed through the new 
system and at every point, for every combination, doses (inhalation, external 
and total) in the absence of countermeasures are calculated.  Possible 
countermeasure zones can then be estimated by comparing the predicted dose 
at each point against the chosen dose criterion for each countermeasure.  As 
there are multiple combinations of input parameters, there will be, for each 
location, multiple countermeasure on/off indicators, each corresponding to a 
different combination of assumptions.  As the likelihood of each combination is 
also passed through the system, each result will have an associated estimate of 
probability of occurrence.  These probabilities may then be used to generate 
probability maps of predicted countermeasure zones and also probabilistic dose 
maps.  As more information is gained, as the emergency progresses, individual 
measurements may be replaced by assumed source terms. 
As a particular example, consider two points, A1 and A2, to determine whether 
there should be evacuation at those points.  Assume there are two weather 
evolutions (both equally plausible), two environmental measurements of activity 
concentrations in air in the affected area, which can be from points elsewhere 
than points A1 and A2 (there is equal confidence in each), two release 
durations (both thought equally plausible) and 2 particle size and deposition 
velocity combinations (both thought equally plausible).  In this example, there 
are therefore 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 16 dose calculations at point A1 and the same 
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number at point A2.  If at point A1 there are 4 of the calculated doses which are 
in excess of the chosen ERL, then there is a probability of 25% of there being a 
need for evacuation at that point.  If at point A2 there are 8 of the calculated 
doses which are in excess of the chosen ERL then there is a probability of 50% 
of there being a need for evacuation at that point.  
The system will treat each component of the uncertainty separately by ‘holding’ 
one or more constant to demonstrate how these elements affect the results.  
For example, probability maps of endpoints may be generated for each 
measurement separately, or for each weather evolution separately, or for each 
release duration separately, with the other components varying.   The user may 
wish to view several alternative presentations of the available results 
information, for example those for: 
 weather w1 + measurement m2 + duration d3 + deposition velocity v2  
or 
 average over all weathers wa  + measurement m2 + duration d1 + deposition 
velocity v1  
or 
 weather w2  + average over measurements ma + duration d2 + deposition 
velocity v1 
or 
 average over all weathers wa  + average over all measurements ma + duration d2 + 
deposition velocity v2  
or 
 average over all weathers wa  + average over all measurements ma + average over 
all durations da + average over all deposition velocities va  
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4.6 Input 
a) NAME predictions from Met Office.  
These will either be for unit release of a set of pre-defined radionuclides, or will 
be for a specific source term. 
For a unit release of each of the pre-defined radionuclides, assuming a release 
in a particular location (the known location of the accident), for an assumed 
release start time and for a series of default assumptions (eg release duration) 
described further below, the NAME output is in the form of spatial and temporal 
grids containing activity concentrations in air and ground deposition data.  The 
underlying spatial grid is based on UK National Grid co-ordinates, at an 
approximate resolution of 100m x 100m. The default temporal grid time periods 
are 15 minute intervals from time 0 (the start of the release) up to the time at 
which the plume leaves the area being considered, up to a maximum of 2 days.  
However, to reduce run times the use is proposed of a set of nested grids of 
increasing coarseness both spatially and temporally from the location and start 
time of the accident.  
Specifically, the NAME output used as the basic input data is of the following 
form, for each radionuclide: 
 the average instantaneous activity concentration in air for a sequence of 
15 minute periods, in Bq m-3, 
 the time integrated activity concentration in air from time 0 to the end of 
each 15 minute period, in Bq s m-3, 
 the wet deposition from time 0 to the end of each 15 minute period, in 
Bq m-2, 
 the dry deposition from time 0 to the end of each 15 minute period, in 
Bq m-2,  
 the total (wet plus dry) deposition from time 0 to the end of each 15 
minute period, in Bq m-2. 
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For a specific source term, the NAME files will be in the same form as above 
but the scaling to measurements as described in the next step is not required. 
Table 4.3 shows an example of NAME output.  The release assumed here was 
1 1016 Bq of 137Cs released uniformly over 1 hour, and for simplicity the results 
shown are only the integrated activity concentrations in air and the dry, wet and 
total depositions to the end of 12 hours after the start of the release.  
The new tool requires a series of Met Office files to be provided as input.  The 
precise details of these will be determined by a pre-established agreement.  
Each will correspond to a different set of assumptions regarding weather 
development (ie alternative plumes), release duration, particle size (or 
deposition velocity), and also high/low release heights.  All of these except 
weather will be pre-agreed.  It would also be necessary for the Met Office to 
provide indicators of the confidence/likelihood associated with the weather. 
b) Measurements 
For each measurement to be used, the measurement itself (eg the 
instantaneous activity concentration in air in Bq m-3), the time the measurement 
was taken, its location in terms of UK national grid co-ordinates, and an 
indication of user confidence is required.  Each measurement is (or is assumed 
to be) either for a specific radionuclide, or the sum for more than one 
radionuclide (possibly the total).  The user will specify the assumption made, 
including the ratioing of the activity across radionuclide, so the subsequent 
calculation knows how to combine over radionuclide.  Defaults can be supplied 
for this (eg 50% 137Cs and 50% 131I). 
c) Dose coefficients 
There are two types of dose coefficient required as input to the system:  
 Inhalation dose coefficients (Sv Bq-1) for each default radionuclide, for four 
age groups (adult, 10 year old child, 1 year old child, fetus) and for effective 
dose and three organs (lungs, thyroid and bone surface).  The information 
should also include the associated chemical form and absorption type. 
 External dose coefficients for each deposited radionuclide (for example, 
using GRANIS results as obtained by Kowe et al 2007, which include decay, 
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ingrowth of daughter products, and redistribution through the underlying soil 
following a single instantaneous deposition).  These are doses per unit 
deposit to a series of times after deposition in Sv per Bq m-2.  
d) Breathing rates 
These are required for the three age groups of adult, 10 year old child and 
1 year old child. 
e) Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs) 
Current ERL values are required as input, these are both the upper and lower 
levels, for evacuation, sheltering, stable iodine, and also the user’s choice of 
which criterion they wish to use for each, in the current run. 
f) EC maximum permitted levels in foodstuffs. 
The current CFILs (Community Food Intervention Levels) are required as input. 
g) Concentrations in milk and green vegetables per unit deposit  
Data on the peak radionuclide concentrations in milk and green vegetables for 
unit deposit of each radionuclide may be pre-calculated using the FARMLAND 
(Brown and Simmonds 1995) model.  These peak concentrations from a unit 
deposit, in units of Bq kg-1 per Bq m-2 or Bq l-1 per Bq m-2, are scaled within the 
tool to the predicted ground deposition and the result compared with the EC 
intervention levels to determine the required food intervention area for each 
foodstuff.  For green vegetables the peak concentration occurs immediately 
after deposition, whereas for milk the peak occurs at different times depending 
on the isotope, because of the time taken for the activity to be metabolised 
through the cow and transferred to milk.   
h) Confidence/probability estimates for imprecision parameters 
These are user input values for the probability/confidence estimates for the 
release durations and particle size and deposition velocity pairings, and the 
confidence weighting to be applied to each of the key measurements.   
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Table 4.3 Example of start of NAME output file 
NAME III (version 5.3)                          
 Run name:                   HPA_RPD_dry_dd1_1hr      
 Run time:                   28/10/2009 09:36:14.693 UTC      
 Met data:                   Single Site Flow.Met Station      
 Start of release:           21/02/2008 15:00 UTC      
 End of release:             21/02/2008 16:00 UTC      
 Source strength:            2.7777780E+12 Bq / s      
 Release height:             10.000m agl +/- 0.000m      
 Run duration:               12hr 0min      
 X grid origin:                 430267.0          
 Y grid origin:                 82766.00          
 X grid size:                         801      
 Y grid size:                         801      
 X grid resolution:             100.0000          
 Y grid resolution:             100.0000          
 Number of preliminary cols:            4      
 Number of field cols:                  4      
       
 Fields:      
                                               
              
RADIONUCLIDE 
              
RADIONUCLIDE 
              
RADIONUCLIDE 
              
RADIONUCLIDE 
                                               Air Concentration Dry deposition Wet deposition Deposition 
                 CAESIUM-137  CAESIUM-137  CAESIUM-137 
             
CAESIUM-137 
                                                     Bq s / m^3        Bq / m^2        Bq / m^2      Bq / m^2 
                                               All sources All sources All sources All sources 
                                               
No ensemble 
averaging 
No ensemble 
averaging 
No ensemble 
averaging 
No ensemble 
averaging 
                                               
12hr 0min 
integral 
12hr 0min 
integral 
12hr 0min 
integral 
12hr 0min 
integral 
                                               
No horizontal 
averaging 
No horizontal 
averaging 
No horizontal 
averaging 
No horizontal 
averaging 
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X (UK 
National 
Grid (m)) 
Y (UK 
National 
Grid (m))                                                                                                             
470167 122666 2.98E+07 149478.2 0.00E+00 149478.2 
470167 122766 1.19E+08 238898.8 0.00E+00 238898.8 
470167 122866 0.00E+00 29721.74 0.00E+00 29721.74 
470267 122566 2.97E+07 29775.06 0.00E+00 29775.06 
470267 122666 5.66E+08 2777190 0.00E+00 2777190 
470267 122766 5.02E+11 1.09E+09 0.00E+00 1.09E+09 
470267 122866 9.53E+08 3555199 0.00E+00 3555199 
470267 122966 5.95E+07 89421.51 0.00E+00 89421.51 
470367 122466 0.00E+00 29695.47 0.00E+00 29695.47 
470367 122566 1.19E+08 443779.6 0.00E+00 443779.6 
470367 122666 9.01E+09 3.54E+07 0.00E+00 3.54E+07 
470367 122766 7.20E+11 2.11E+09 0.00E+00 2.11E+09 
470367 122866 1.45E+10 5.28E+07 0.00E+00 5.28E+07 
470367 122966 2.67E+08 983646.6 0.00E+00 983646.6 
470367 123066 2.95E+07 59238.16 0.00E+00 59238.16 
470467 122366 0.00E+00 29589.79 0.00E+00 29589.79 
470467 122466 0.00E+00 267361.7 0.00E+00 267361.7 
470467 122566 6.53E+08 3217956 0.00E+00 3217956 
470467 122666 4.41E+10 1.79E+08 0.00E+00 1.79E+08 
470467 122766 4.85E+11 1.87E+09 0.00E+00 1.87E+09 
470467 122866 6.91E+10 2.84E+08 0.00E+00 2.84E+08 
470467 122966 1.43E+09 6077089 0.00E+00 6077089 
470467 123066 0.00E+00 207632.3 0.00E+00 207632.3 
470467 123166 0.00E+00 29618.5 0.00E+00 29618.5 
470567 122366 2.97E+07 29740.79 0.00E+00 29740.79 
470567 122466 2.37E+08 414824.4 0.00E+00 414824.4 
470567 122566 1.78E+09 1.07E+07 0.00E+00 1.07E+07 
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4.7 Calculations and output 
If the calculations are measurement-based rather than source-term based, each 
measurement is compared to the nearest (in space and time) corresponding 
unit prediction in the NAME unit release calculations.  One measurement may 
be assumed to be either one radionuclide or a sum of radionuclides in a 
specified ratio.  If the latter, this needs to be turned into ‘sub-measurements’ eg 
half of the measurement goes to a 131I calculation and the other half goes to a 
137Cs calculation (with the subsequent doses added together later).   
For each radionuclide, on the basis of the ratio between the measured value 
(after the modification to take into account the assumed radionuclide split of the 
measurement) and the predicted value for the ‘unit release’ run of NAME, the 
remaining NAME data of activity concentrations in air and depositions for that 
radionuclide, both spatially and temporally, are scaled to the size of the release 
indicated by the comparison, to produce - again for each measurement and for 
each radionuclide - modified surfaces for activity concentrations in air and 
deposition.  The dose and countermeasure calculations are undertaken on the 
basis of these new layers.   
There will a number of alternative NAME output files produced by Met Office 
rather than just one, reflecting alternative weathers, release duration, and 
particle size and deposition velocity.  This will be dealt with by a high level 
layering structure, with the top-most layer containing the 50 or so subdivisions 
for each of the Met Office assumption sets, with the subsequent measurement 
and radionuclide breakdowns being below these.  However the layers are 
structured, the following dose calculations need to be done for each result set, 
each for a single radionuclide and spatial point.    
The two dose end-points in the prototype version are: 
1. The dose from inhalation of the airborne plume, at each location, for 
each radionuclide, from time 0 to the removal of the plume from that location. 
The committed inhalation dose is based on the NAME predictions of the total 
time integrated activity concentration in air applicable to that location, for each 
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radionuclide, and is calculated for each age group and for effective dose and 
three organs (lungs, thyroid and bone surface).   Doses are required showing 
contributions to effective, thyroid, lung and bone surface dose from each 
radionuclide. 
Calculation performed 
For a particular radionuclide, Ip (the total dose from inhalation of the plume at 
point p in mSv) is determined by:   
time integrated air concentration of the radionuclide over the period the plume 
passes location p (Bq s m-3)   
 x  inhalation dose coefficient for the radionuclide (Sv Bq-1)    
 x  inhalation rate (m3 s-1)   
 x  1000 (mSv Sv-1) 
 
Example calculation for 137Cs: 
For a release of 1 1016 Bq released over 1 hour, assume the time integrated air 
concentration at 2km is 4.1 1010 Bq s m-3 for a release 10 metres above the 
ground.   
Multiply by the inhalation dose coefficient for a 10 year old child 
(3.7 10-9 Sv Bq-1) 
Multiply by inhalation rate for a 10 year old child (1.8 10-4 m3 s-1) 
Hence, inhalation dose to a 10 year old child at 2km is 2.7 10-2 Sv, or 27 mSv. 
2. The deposited gamma dose (whole body) at each location for each 
radionuclide, to a series of times.  The external gamma dose arising from 
radioactivity deposited on the ground is calculated on the basis of the NAME 
predictions of the total deposited activity at that location, for each radionuclide.  
This calculation also includes the modelling of the subsequent environmental 
transport.  External dose from unit deposit of a range of radionuclides is pre-
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calculated using a model which represents radioactive decay, including 
ingrowth of daughter products, and redistribution through the underlying soil 
following a single instantaneous deposition (Kowe et al 2007); as the downward 
migration through soil is assumed in this calculation, the long term doses 
represent exposures in a rural location rather than an urban one.  While 
distinction can be made between age group, it can also be assumed for 
simplicity that the external dose is the same for all organs and age groups.  
Calculation performed 
For a particular radionuclide, Ep the external dose integrated to time t from the 
deposited activity at point p in mSv is determined by: 
 Total predicted deposit of the radionuclide at location p (Bq m-2)  
x  external dose per unit deposit of the radionuclide integrated to time t 
(Sv per Bq m-2)  
 x  1000 (mSv Sv-1) 
 
Example calculation for 137Cs: 
For a release of 1 1016 Bq released over 1 hour, assume the total deposition at 
2 km is 4.1 107 Bq m-2 for a 10 m release.   
Multiply by external dose per unit deposit for 137Cs integrated to 2 days 
(6.4 10-11 Sv per Bq m-2) 
Hence, external dose to a 10 year old child to 2 days at 2km is 2.6 10-3 Sv or 
2.6 mSv. 
These inhalation and external doses may then be summed for each location, for 
each radionuclide and for the sum over radionuclides, from time 0 to a series of 
times.  Doses can be presented showing the totals summed across 
radionuclides and the percentage contribution made by each radionuclide to the 
total.   
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The pathways of external dose from cloud and the inhalation dose from 
resuspension were not included in the prototype tool as the calculation of cloud 
gamma doses was not then fully incorporated into NAME, and the resuspension 
pathway is not of significance at short times when compared to the inhalation of 
the plume pathway for principle radionuclides released in a reactor accident 
(and in particular for 137Cs and 131I which are the radionuclides considered in 
section 3).  However, a full version of the tool would include:  
 Doses from gamma or beta emitting airborne radionuclides, inhalation 
dose from resuspension, individual doses arising from consumption of 
contaminated foodstuffs and doses from deposition onto the skin.  
 The collective dose to the UK population for each radionuclide and for 
the sum over radionuclides, which can be calculated on the basis of the 
above doses, to a series of times.  This requires the UK population data 
to be stored as a layer in ArcMap. 
 The concentrations (peak and to a series of times) of each radionuclide 
in food, as a function of time after deposit.  The foods to be considered 
will be cow's milk and leafy green vegetables, as these are the foods 
which require urgent consideration in terms of countermeasures. This 
uses the prediction of total ground deposition levels from NAME (when 
scaled to measurements), and pre-calculated concentrations in each 
foodstuff at a series of times following the release (ranging from a few 
days to one year) and the peak concentrations, from the FARMLAND 
model (Brown and Simmonds 1995), for unit deposit of each 
radionuclide.   
All doses may be calculated and output either with or without countermeasures. 
 
Calculations of early emergency countermeasures (evacuation, sheltering, 
stable iodine) are required at each location, based on a comparison between 
predicted dose and the user-selected dose criterion for each countermeasure.  
The dose measure used to estimate countermeasure areas in the prototype 
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version is the sum of the predicted effective inhalation dose to a 10 year old 
child from the cloud and the effective external dose to a 10 year old child from 
deposited activity integrated to 2 days.  A time period of 2 days is applied 
because this is a typical assumed duration of sheltering and evacuation and it 
therefore approximates to the dose averted by the countermeasure as currently 
required for comparison with a dose criterion within the ERL range (NRPB 
1990, NRPB 1997b). The dose used in the prototype is the total predicted dose 
from time 0 to 2 days rather than the dose averted, which is the measure of 
dose that should be used for comparison against ERLs in emergency planning, 
but in emergency response the data required to start the dose integration period 
from the time the countermeasure actually commences are unlikely to be 
available on the timescale required.   
If the sum of the inhalation and external doses exceeds the selected dose 
criterion then the countermeasure is indicated to be required at that location. 
This information is stored as a 0 or 1 on the spatial and temporal grid, for the 
particular set of assumptions.  In the prototype version, the dose is compared 
against the criteria of the lower ERL for sheltering and evacuation (which are 
averted doses of 3 mSv and 30 mSv effective dose, respectively).   
From the examples of inhalation dose and external dose calculated above, the 
sum of inhalation dose Ip and external dose Ep at the point considered is 
27 mSv plus 2.6 mSv, ie 29.6 mSv.  Comparing this to the lower ERL for 
sheltering (3 mSv) and the lower ERL for evacuation (30 mSv) it can be seen 
that sheltering extends beyond this point but that 2 km is about at the furthest 
extent of the evacuation zone (assuming the decision is made purely on the 
lower ERL as a criterion). 
To display areas where EC Food Intervention Levels are exceeded (Council 
Regulation (EC) 1989), the predicted peak radionuclide concentrations in milk 
or leafy green vegetables at each location from the estimated total deposition, 
are compared with the EC intervention levels after an appropriate summation 
over radionuclide category. This provides an indication of the areas where food 
restrictions may be required.  The calculation could also be done as a function 
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of time, to indicate food restriction areas by time, but in practice such longer 
term decisions would be based on measurements rather than model predictions 
and the calculations are therefore not really required for response purposes. 
The current understanding of the extent of the plume and the levels of 
deposition in the affected area are also of key significance to the decision 
maker, in addition to being input to the tool’s calculations.  To provide visual 
information on the best estimate of activity concentrations in air across the 
affected area, the AM(tx) layers can be combined (for any specific time period) 
either by averaging all the predictions for each location, or by a weighted 
average if more credibility is attached to some measurements than to others, by 
weighting to a user-input confidence scale.  This process can be done also for 
deposition using the DM(tx) layers, where, in addition to the information being 
presented in terms of the total deposition to a specific time period, the total 
deposition anticipated as a result of the full release can be shown by using a 
NAME run for the best estimate of release duration and assuming a time a 
number of hours beyond this to allow for recirculation of air and longer term 
depositions.   
Finally, the tool should have the ability to interrogate each gridpoint for detailed 
data by hovering over the point with the mouse; this would provide a breakdown 
of dose information by total, pathway, radionuclide percentage etc, with more 
information provided in detailed tables. 
4.8 Technical issues and possible future developments 
4.8.1 Discrete input parameters 
The simple technique described above assumes a series of pre-specified 
alternatives for the parameters being varied, namely the release duration, dry 
deposition velocity and release height. To enable a limited number of 
calculations to be performed within a reasonable time, these will be discrete 
values rather than probability distributions on each parameter, and as a 
consequence the results obtained will also be discrete endpoints rather than a 
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continuous probability distribution, of the type typically output from an 
uncertainty analysis which results from the sampling, in uncertainty 
assessments, from a distribution of possible inputs.  There are several reasons 
for the discrete approach proposed here.  Firstly, the probability distribution of 
the input parameter ranges, in a specific accident, is unknown, and 
superimposing one is likely to increase the imprecision.  Secondly, the process 
will be more transparent in terms of the likelihoods allocated to the different 
input parameter options than would be the case with the use of probability 
distributions.   Thirdly, the run times associated with sampling from multiple 
distributions are unlikely to be feasible at present in a system which must run 
rapidly.   
The consequence of the use of discrete values is that the results do not fully 
represent the actual results distributions, as they are based on only a selection 
of values from the possible true range.  However, if the values of the input 
parameters selected roughly spread across the possible ranges the discrete 
results will indicate the possible spread in endpoints. The user would need to 
ensure that the values do not just scope the spread but also include at least one 
intermediate value, so that the probability mappings generated do reflect the 
range.  For example, release durations of 0.5 hours, 4 hours and 8 hours could 
be used rather than just 0.5 hours and 8 hours.  The latter would be satisfactory 
if only the impact of separate options was required, but at least one 
intermediate value would be needed to obtain probability shadings. 
There are mathematical techniques which combine and integrate multiple 
causes of uncertainty, for example, fuzzy sets and the Dempster-Shafer method 
for handling imprecise probabilities (see, for example, Ducey 2001).  However, 
a mathematical process which results in a complex and processed result being 
given to the decision maker who would then be unaware of its derivation is not 
the transparent tool thought necessary for this application.   
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4.8.2 Use of monitoring data and data assimilation 
It is important to be able to view the impact on the predictions of the first few 
key measurements – including the possible alternative radionuclide composition 
assumptions, if the composition is not known – individually.  The use of data 
assimilation techniques, such as Bayesian analysis, which generate smoothed 
surfaces of air concentrations and depositions for input into assessments may 
be misleading in the early stages of an accident, as key information may be lost 
through over-processing of limited raw data, and incorrect information 
generated through inappropriate interpolation between a small number of data 
points. In the interim phase, once the key information from consideration of 
individual measurements separately is understood, these measurements can be 
combined into consistent sets.  The remaining calculations in the early phase 
would then be undertaken on scaled grids of activity concentrations in air and 
deposition levels, averaged on the basis of the measurements in each of these 
sets.  As the hours pass the generation of air and deposition surfaces through 
manipulation of a larger number of measurement data in combination with 
modelling results becomes more appropriate, and the approach described 
above can then be extended to use such surfaces.   
A further extension to evaluating the implications of measurement uncertainty 
may be introduced by considering a probability distribution around the actual 
measured value, and propagating such a distribution through the calculations.  
This distribution may take into account the imprecision associated with the 
measurement itself, as a reflection of the true level of activity at that specific 
time and location.  The measurement is imprecise due to the limitations of the 
monitoring equipment, localised features such as tree canopies or roads 
(although measurements should not ideally be taken in such locations), error by 
the operator, and also because there is lack of knowledge as to the radionuclide 
mix of the release, both in general and also at the specific location of the 
measurement.  The distribution could also be broadened to consider the 
potential variation in the measurement in the local spatial and temporal fields, 
although an appropriate spread on this localised variation would need to be 
carefully established, through a research project, to avoid introducing the data 
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assimilation problems discussed above.  This use of a measurement distribution 
is clearly more complex calculationally than the use of single values, and would 
require an additional stage within ArcMap which may slow the running time of 
the tool when undertaken in combination with the treatment of multiple input 
parameters as proposed here; for this reason it is regarded as a potential future 
development rather than an intrinsic feature of the proposed tool.   
After the first few hours following an accident, the incoming measurement 
information can become complex, and difficult to interpret and keep track of 
without the aid of a database.  Even a simple GIS system will offer useful 
visualisation tools.  A mapping system can display the available data in different 
ways, showing for example only activity concentrations in air, or only 
measurements taken in a particular time period or in a particular location.  This 
simplification of the total information makes it easier to spot trends and 
inconsistencies.   
4.8.3 Possible future extensions 
Later developments are possible for the tool, based on developments in NAME 
and NWP at the Met Office.  The current NAME/NWP modelling capability does 
not have the resolution or the urban modelling capability to predict complex 
urban dispersion; this is a possible refinement for the future, as is the 
introduction of varying deposition velocities to different surface types and 
resuspension processes (including modelling possible return to atmosphere and 
subsequent transport/re-deposition). 
4.9 Section summary 
This section describes the design and the methodology for the development of 
a new tool which links to real time plume predictions, to enable enhanced 
response calculations and visual display of information relevant to 
countermeasure decisions. This has application in UK emergency response.  It 
also has application in UK emergency exercises and planning by enabling 
exercise data generation to be based on real (archived) meteorological results 
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for the site in question, thereby increasing realism and providing enhanced site-
specific details. 
The tool includes a proposed approach to assessing the imprecision associated 
with dose and emergency countermeasure predictions in the early phase of an 
accident.  The display of imprecision associated with the estimates of 
emergency countermeasure zones and on dose endpoints is a fundamental part 
of the new tool’s design.  The approach retains an essentially simple 
assessment capability while enabling lack of knowledge to be taken into 
account and reflected in the information supplied to decision makers. It will 
enable a range of calculations to be made based on radiological monitoring 
data or, when it becomes available, on source term information.  A number of 
possible future developments and extensions to the tool outlined are also 
discussed. 
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5 VISUALISATION AND COMMUNICATION OF 
IMPRECISION 
5.1 Introduction 
The review in Section 2 concluded that the imprecision inherent in any 
predictions made in the early phase of a radiological emergency should be 
indicated in the output so that it is remembered during decision-making.  The 
output from a response system should also be clear, unambiguous and 
straightforward, with the key assumptions clearly presented. The presentation of 
clear information regarding the imprecision associated with emergency 
predictions is an area where little work has been done. This section develops 
approaches to the display of imprecision associated with predictions from early 
emergency response calculations based on a limited number of off-site 
measurements and incomplete information about the nature of the release.   
The first part of this section reviews the published literature on the presentation 
and understanding of data in emergency response and other environmental 
health/pollution situations.  The prototype version of the tool described in the 
previous section has then been used to explore ways in which imprecise or 
uncertain information can be presented to decision makers, considering the 
alternative outcomes which may arise from possible alternative weather and 
dispersion situations, different release types, and the use of alternative 
measurement information.  Maps are presented showing projected 
countermeasure areas for combinations of possible scenarios weighted by 
estimated probabilities.  Alternative ways in which the information can be 
presented visually to decision makers to illustrate the range of consequences 
and the associated imprecision are explored.  In developing this, opinions have 
been sought from those with emergency response roles in HPA as to the visual 
approaches they find most useful.  
A key reference consulted as general background to visualisation techniques 
has been Tufte (1983). 
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5.2 Review of risk communication and visualisation techniques  
5.2.1 Communication of emergency information  
The first aspect briefly considered has been communication of imprecise 
information regarding risks.  A key reference for this is Lundgren and McMakin 
(2004).  The presentation of imprecise information is an issue for areas wider 
than emergency response, as for example in intelligence forecasts (Dieckmann 
et al 2010); in this paper it is stated that ‘How to assess and present analytic 
uncertainty to policymakers has emerged as an important topic in risk and 
policy analysis’.  This paper distinguishes between probability assessment that 
is based on available probabilistic input data, and ‘second-order’ ambiguity that 
is ‘primarily about the weight of the available evidence and the amount of 
missing information that is relevant to the problem under study’. 
It is human nature to believe that visual evidence and information is reality and 
‘true’ (see for example Gershon 1998, Mark and Csillag 1989, Lundgren and 
McMakin 2004).  As computer graphics become increasingly sophisticated and 
convincing, and the associated uncertainty either ignored or hidden, there are 
challenges in the presentation of information and data which are imprecise and 
uncertain.   
Mapped output is now the expected form of emergency data, as for example in 
the CHEMET forecasts of Met Office, which also use the predictions of the 
NAME model.  The availability of mapping systems such as ArcGIS encourages 
still more use of mapped data, and there is considerably more familiarity with 
GIS systems now than there was 10 years ago.  The previous style of 
radiological emergency response results, of the type of ‘countermeasures 
extend to about 5km from the site of the release’ is unlikely to be regarded as 
sufficient; decision makers have become used to receiving maps.  However, in 
some ways the extent of the imprecision associated with simple statements of 
this type is easier to communicate than with more complex results.  The level of 
detail provided by mapped results, presented on a grid which suggests detailed 
spatial resolution, implies clarity and certainty in the data that are mapped to a 
far greater extent than rounded numbers on a table.  It is therefore necessary to 
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present, simultaneously with the basic results, an indication of imprecision to 
avoid unwarranted conclusions being drawn.  Although the underlying degree of 
precision may be similar to that presented in tabular form, I would regard the 
need for the representation of imprecision to be greater if a GIS system is used 
than it was previously when results were more simplistic, despite the degree of 
imprecision being much the same in both cases if the same approach to 
calculational endpoints such as dose is applied in both. 
Methods of representing uncertainty in emergency response situations need to 
be clear and intuitively easy to grasp, as they will be used in pressured 
environments where decisions have to be taken quickly.  It is therefore an 
important part of emergency system development that imprecision and 
uncertainty is displayed along with the basic results and that the decision maker 
understands both components, and that this is done in a way that is helpful to 
decision makers and not overly complicated or time-consuming as ‘decision 
makers need to know if something is, or is not, a problem …. they have little 
time for pondering confidence levels in data’ (Cliburn et al 2002).    
Uncertainty or imprecision should be displayed in a way that is integral to the 
results, which can be interpreted easily and clearly, and which does not allow 
significant misinterpretation.  The users may well only see the representations 
intermittently (for example, in occasional emergency exercises), as real 
radiological accidents are very infrequent.  They need, for example, to be able 
to appreciate that ‘probability of a countermeasure being required’ (for example, 
in 10% of the scenarios considered 100% of the population in area A need to be 
evacuated) is not the same as ‘severity of a countermeasure’ (for example, only 
the most vulnerable 10% in the population in area A need to be evacuated).  
A key part of risk communication is pre-emergency training.  Those making 
decisions should be aware of the general nature of, for example, the risks 
associated with countermeasures to avert dose as well as the risks from 
delivered doses, and that decisions appropriate in one accident may not be 
appropriate in another accident of a different scale or at a different location or in 
different weather conditions.  For example, in small accidents countermeasures 
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may be based on averted doses towards the lower end of the ERL scale 
whereas the upper end may be more appropriate in larger accidents.  Education 
and training of decision-makers is therefore needed.  The concept of the tool 
outlined in Section 4 is that it forms the basis for decisions.  It does not provide 
the decision itself; for that, additional judgement and the consideration of the 
wider context are necessary.  The need is therefore for familiarity with the 
underlying issues to be encouraged through training and exercises.  The use of 
the tool in exercises would also give familiarity with the style of presentation of 
results in an incident. 
Finally, as the output of an emergency system may be used after the event as 
an explanation and justification of emergency decisions, it needs to be based on 
the best information currently available, and produced in a rigorous and 
defensible way.  The actions taken in response to the Icelandic volcanic ash 
release in Spring 2010, for example, were closely analysed by both government 
and those with commercial interests both during and after the release, with 
particular attention being focused on the dispersion predictions and the 
estimates of risk.  It is likely that the predictions made in the event of a 
radiological release would be scrutinised after the event in the same way, 
particularly if decisions taken had significant health or economic consequences. 
5.2.2 Methods to aid visualisation 
There are techniques which combine and integrate multiple causes of 
uncertainty, for example fuzzy sets (see, for example, Regan and Colvan, 2000) 
and the Dempster-Shafer method for handling imprecise probabilities (see, for 
example, Ducey 2001).  However, the difficulties arising from only having a part 
of the ‘true’ set of countermeasure zones, and the fact that the set which is 
known may not evenly represent the true set, suggest that mathematical 
techniques to combine countermeasure areas may be inappropriate and 
misleading.  A combination of results which is based on the judgement of the 
modeller and which results in a processed result being given to the decision 
maker who would then be unaware of the judgements involved in its derivation 
is not transparent.  However, a certain amount of ‘processing’ may aid the 
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decision maker’s understanding and may also be necessary to reduce over-
complication and the presentation of too much information.  Several studies, for 
example Cliburn et al 2002, have indicated that users find a display that 
becomes cluttered with uncertainty information to be counterproductive. 
Fan charts can be used to demonstrate the uncertainty associated with 
predictions and projections into the future.  They have been used to 
demonstrate mortality predictions and future temperature increases. The Bank 
of England uses fan charts to visualise the uncertainty associated with inflation 
in the future1.  Fan charts show a central projection with adjacent series of 
prediction intervals at various levels of probability.  In the case of the Bank of 
England charts they show predictions in intervals from 10% to 90%.  The 
shading of the intervals reflects the confidence associated with the predictions.  
The charts are termed fan charts because the forecasts spread out and 
resemble a fan as the project extends further into the future.    
The concept has been extended by Jackson (see http://www.mrc-
bsu.cam.ac.uk/personal/chris/papers/denstrip.pdf) with the introduction into the 
fan chart of shading to represent cumulative confidence, which leads to 
increasingly lighter shading as the predictions extend into the future.  Jackson 
also proposes the use of a ‘density strip’ for 2-dimensional presentation of 
uncertain information, ‘a shaded strip with darkness proportional to the density’ 
(Jackson 2008).  
Both of the above methods, the fan chart and the density strip, are of potential 
help in displaying the imprecision associated with tabulated or diagram-based 
results from an emergency assessment.  However, they are not considered 
further here as the emphasis of this section is on the visualisation of spatial 
data, where they do not have an obvious application.  
Developing methods to aid the visualisation of uncertainty in spatial data is a 
relatively new area of research; see discussions, for example, in Fairbairn et al 
                                                          
1 See for example http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/cris/papers/2007-6.pdf, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/inflationreport/ir08feb.pdf, and  
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2592). 
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2001, MacEachren et al 1998, Zhang and Goodchild 2002, MacEachren et al 
2005.  It is recognised that the visualisation of uncertainty is significant in aiding 
the correct decisions to be made based on mapped data but also that the 
results of many of the possible techniques have not yet been assessed, and 
furthermore that it is not well understood what effects the presentation of 
uncertainty information has upon the recipient and how it aids (or otherwise) 
analysis of the data.  MacEachren et al (2005) considers that ‘we have only 
scratched the surface of the problem’ and ‘nor do we understand the impact of 
uncertainty visualisation on the process of analysis or decision making’.  It is, 
however, clear that presenting information in a way which suggests false 
precision may lead to over-confidence and inappropriate decisions. 
A number of possible techniques for representing uncertainty in visual data 
have been proposed.  These include: 
 Hue and saturation of colour (for example, McEachren 1992, Schweizer 
and Goodchild 1992, Brewer 1994).  Hue is the colour category (eg, red, 
blue, yellow) and saturation is the amount of hue in a colour.  Hue can be 
used to represent a type of data, and saturation used to visualise 
uncertainty. The more saturated (richer) the colour representing a 
particular type of data, the more certain the information is on that data. 
Hence colour can be used to represent data in two ways on the same 
map (Hengl et al 2002).  Colour, including light/dark variations, has been 
found to be one of the most effective ways of communicating uncertainty, 
see, for example, Leitner and Buttenfield 2000. 
 Alterations in focus and resolution (McEachren 1992), possibly including 
fog at varying degrees of density to obscure information which is 
uncertain, with the thickness of the fog representing the degree of  
uncertainty in that part of the map. 
 Broken lines or lines of varying thickness to suggest uncertainty in 
contour information, or symbology (for example, the use of question 
marks in varying densities) (Monmonier 1994). 
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 Sharpness of pattern, in either areas or at boundaries, where the clarity 
of an area or boundary is used to define the uncertainty of the spatial 
data via the use of a scale of sharp patterns through to fuzzy patterns to 
indicate the degree of associated uncertainty (MacEachren 1992). 
 Overlaying of information, where a single map can be used to show the 
basic information with an overlay of the uncertain information shown as 
texture over the top. 
 Adjacent maps, one showing the basic information and another the 
uncertainty associated with it (McEachren 1992 and McEachren et al 
1998).  As an example, under ESRI GIS systems, a map showed on the 
screen can be scrolled down to reveal another map of the same area 
showing different details.  This could, for example, show the underlying 
map with superimposed dose distributions, with the overlayed map 
showing best-estimate countermeasure areas, and further overlayed 
maps showing the 5% and 95% countermeasure areas. 
 Animation techniques, for instance a computerised display alternating 
(toggling) between several possible outcomes (Fisher 1994, and Hengl et 
al 2002), or uncertain areas blinking to indicate high uncertainty.  
Animation can be used to show in sequence a series of alternative 
outcomes in a GIS framework.  Such animation techniques have been 
used, for example in relation to meteorological forecast modelling 
(Fauerbach et al 1996).  However, Aerts et al (2003) concluded that 
users have some preference for static displays rather than toggling. A 
particular type of animation is a draggable slider scale. The user can 
drag a slider across a range that can be linked to a particular parameter.  
In this instance, it can alter the mapped information across the 
uncertainty range, and the user can drag the slider to change the value 
of a parameter across its range, or the slider can be used to show the 
areas which are more uncertain by fading these out of the picture as the 
slider is moved to one end of the range (Drecki 2002).  The central 
position on the slider could be the best estimate of countermeasure area, 
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with – for example – the extreme end at the left showing the ‘uncertain – 
smallest areas’ countermeasure information and the extreme end at the 
right showing the ‘uncertain – largest areas’.  Alternatively, the slider 
could be used to move the estimated countermeasure areas from those 
corresponding to the lower ERL to those for the upper ERL.   
 Sound, where the cursor moving over the map can suggest a level of 
uncertainty at a particular location through variable pitch, for example a 
low pitch sound for low uncertainty rising to a high pitch sound for large 
uncertainty (Fisher 1994, Krygier 1994). 
 Touch techniques for enabling interrogation of the basic data for details 
of supplementary data on the associated uncertainties (Fairbairn et al 
2001). 
Of the above, colour (including light/dark variations) has been found to be one 
of the most effective ways of communicating uncertainty (see, for example, 
Leitner and Buttenfield (2000)).  Animation and sound/touch techniques are not 
the first choice for the issue addressed here, as the countermeasure maps will 
not always be displayed on computers; decision makers and others will need to 
take paper copies to meetings, for example.  But other techniques may be of 
value in displaying particular results.  For example, to view the impact on the 
predictions of the first few key measurements individually, a simple technique 
would be to view computerised visual displays of the countermeasure areas or 
dose zones generated on the basis of each measurement in rapid sequence 
(see, for example, Howard and MacEachren (1996) in which techniques for the 
comparison of multiple surfaces is discussed).   
An alternative technique is a method demonstrated by Fauerbach et al (1996), 
in which the output of three alternative meteorological forecasting models was 
combined in an animated display.  In this work, the uncertainty associated with 
the model predictions was represented by the standard deviation among the 
three models at each location and time.  Where predictions differed 
considerably the uncertainty in the modelled endpoint (which in this case was 
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forecast pressure) was large, while it was small in the areas where the models 
were in close agreement. 
Both the UK Met Office and Professor David Speigelhalter of Cambridge 
University have identified the potential usefulness of relating the size of a risk to 
the font size used to communicate information, but a direct application for this 
technique in the spatial presentation of assessment results is not obvious.   
5.2.3 How can spatial mapping be visualised to show uncertainty? 
One option for the spatial display of probabilistic information is to augment the 
colour density at each location for every calculation which indicates, for 
example, a countermeasure at that point, by a degree which is dependent on 
the increased probability.  The colour densities would then correspond to a 
legend showing the graduation of shading against probability.   
ArcMap has the capability to show areas in partial shades, building up density in 
multiple layers.  Through multiple overlays of alternative areas, colour or shade 
gradients can be built up for each alternative countermeasure zone, leading to 
increasing strength of colour/shade in those areas where the most zones 
coincide, hence providing a visual indicator of likelihood.  Further development 
of this leads to alternative pictures of the countermeasure zones; for example, 
the ‘best estimate’, an estimate of the largest countermeasure area (for 
example, the area which is only exceeded in 5% of possible outcomes), and an 
estimate of the smallest countermeasure area (for example, the area which is 
exceeded in 95% of possible outcomes).  This is similar to a recommendation in 
Lundgren and McMakin (2004), which is to make clear to decision makers the 
maximum action, the recommended 'middle' action and the minimum action 
(which can be considered as corresponding to 'you must do X, you should do Y, 
you can do Z'), although in this situation the smallest countermeasure zone 
does not correspond to the minimum possible action.   
A particular aspect is the use and overlay of colour combinations.  This can 
utilise the properties of colour combinations.  For example, red, green and blue 
can be used to represent three alternative dimensions.  Then, the areas of 
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overlap can be illustrated using red-green (combination of red and green), 
purple (combination of red and blue), turquoise (combination of green and blue) 
and brown (combination of all three) (see for example, Goodchild et al 1994).  
The difficulty is that this approach is primarily useful for illustrating only three 
dimensions, as the introduction of a fourth colour such as yellow leads to a 
colour combination (such as green) which corresponds to more than one 
dimension combination. 
Colvile et al (2002) have suggested probabilistic colour mapping as a method of 
presenting emergency data, in the setting of air quality management.  The 
technique proposed is a method for describing the need for action in regard to 
environmental quality measured against a relevant standard, for example ‘air 
quality objective possibly will be achieved with action’ or ‘air quality objective 
probably will not be achieved without action’.  The Colvile study uses the 
colours red (definitely dangerous), yellow/green (possibly problematic) and blue 
(unpolluted).  This is consistent with the view of Davis and Keller (1997) that 
green/red are the obvious choice of colour to represent hazard.  In the context 
of this study, a variation on this would be to define colours on a map showing 
the likelihood of the need for action, for each radiological countermeasure.  For 
example, for evacuation, and retaining here the colour choices of the Colvile 
study, the probabilistic colour mapping could be: 
Red:  evacuation almost certainly needed (probability > 90%) 
Yellow:  evacuation likely to be needed (probability < 90% but > 50%)  
Green:   evacuation may be needed (probability < 50% but > 10%)  
Blue:  evacuation unlikely to be needed (probability <10%). 
Here, ‘probability’ is not exactly the ‘probability of a countermeasure at that 
point’ but shows that percentage of scenario combinations as considered in the 
study that indicate a countermeasure is required at that point.  This is a 
surrogate for the probability but is not exactly the same.  This option for display 
is explored further below.   
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5.3 Examples of visualisation techniques 
The extent of countermeasures based on past real weather sequences from 
stored NWP files has been presented in Section 3.  These results demonstrate 
the significant influence on the predicted endpoints of emergency assessments 
arising from the weather, which is only one element of imprecision.  The 
visualisation of the output of emergency systems is therefore clearly important, 
and is likely to become still more important when further sources of imprecision 
are included in the analysis.   
To illustrate alternative visualisation techniques, an example emergency 
assessment has been undertaken using the prototype system outlined in 
Section 4.  To examine the doses and countermeasure predictions for a 
hypothetical release in ‘real weather’ meteorological conditions, the NAME 
model has been run at the Met Office for three sets of real NWP data from 2007 
and 2008, obtained from the Met Office archives. The NAME runs were 
undertaken specifically for this study.  In these three weather sequences, the 
stability category is Category D with a wind speed between 4.5 - 5.5 m s-1 
throughout the time period of interest.  The period was defined as up to 12 
hours after the start of the release, to permit the plume to leave the area 
potentially affected by countermeasures.   
All three weather sequences have some degree of rainfall at some location 
during the period of plume dispersion, ranging from very light to heavy.  For 
each of these weather sets NAME was run to predict the dispersion of a plume 
of 137Cs from a 10m release height.  The initial wind direction in all three 
sequences was constrained to be from 270º, ie towards due East, with a 
possible variation of up to 10 degrees either side.  The NAME runs were 
repeated with three alternative release durations (of 1 hour, 4 hours and 
8 hours) and two alternative dry deposition velocities (of 1 10-3 m s-1 and 
1 10-2 m s-1).  There were therefore 18 sets of calculations undertaken, for all 
combinations of 3 weathers, 3 release durations and 2 dry deposition velocities.  
Variations in weather conditions (eg rainfall rate, atmospheric stability) were 
included through the use of the three real alternative weathers sets.   
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For simplicity here, only a single instantaneous measurement of activity 
concentration in air was considered.  This was assumed to be 2.6 105 Bq m-3 at 
5km due east of the release point, measured 1 hour after the start of the 
release; the NAME results were all scaled to show this value at this time and 
location.  Table 5.1 summarises the furthermost predicted extent of the 
sheltering countermeasure, determined on the basis of the lower ERL of 3 mSv 
effective dose, for each of the 18 sets of calculations. 
Table 5.1 Furthermost extent of sheltering for the 18 combinations 
Description Furthermost extent of 
sheltering, km1 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 1 hour, 
deposition velocity 10-2   
4.6 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 4 hours, 
deposition velocity  10-2   
11.4 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 8 hours, 
deposition velocity  10-2   
17.9 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 1 hour, 
deposition velocity 10-3  3.0 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 4 hours, 
deposition velocity  10-3   
8.0 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 8 hours, 
deposition velocity  10-3  
13.6 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 1 hour, deposition 
velocity 10-2   
2.6 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 4 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-2   
8.3 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 8 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-2   
14.3 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 1 hour, deposition 
velocity 10-3  
1.7 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 4 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-3   
5.1 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 8 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-3  
9.9 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 1 hour, deposition 
velocity 10-2   
3.7 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 4 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-2   
8.5 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 8 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-2   
18.7 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 1 hour, deposition 
velocity 10-3  
2.6 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 4 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-3   
6.5 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 8 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-3  
17.6 
 
                                                          
1 For all combinations, the instantaneous activity concentration in air at 5km due east at 50-60 minutes 
after the start of the release is 2.6 105 Bq m-3 
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The results presented in the figures below show the areas in which the 
sheltering countermeasure is predicted to be required.  Overlaid on the maps is 
a 30º sector centred towards 90º (due East), with distances from the point of 
release shown for scale.   
Figures 5.3a – 5.3c show results for the three alternative weathers as 
summarised in Table 5.1, namely ‘mostly dry’, ‘rain’, ‘very wet’.  For each 
weather, the sheltering areas are illustrated using a different set of colours.  
Within each figure, the same alternative release durations and deposition 
velocities are included.  It can be seen from Figures 5.3a – 5.3c that there are 
significant differences between the predicted sheltering zones.  The most 
significant influence here is the duration of the release and the variation in wind 
direction through the period of plume travel, although other factors also affect 
the predictions.   
Figure 5.3a Sheltering areas; weather 1 (‘mostly dry’), 3 alternative release durations and 
2 deposition velocities 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
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Figure 5.3b Sheltering areas; weather 2 (‘rain’), 3 alternative release durations and 2 
deposition velocities 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
Figure 5.3c Sheltering areas; weather 3 (‘very wet’), 3 alternative release durations and 2 
deposition velocities 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
It is interesting to note in Figure 5.3c that there is little difference between the 
predicted sheltering areas for the long release duration for the lower and upper 
deposition velocities.  This is due to the influence of plume depletion, which is 
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modelled in NAME but not in R91.  Bedwell et al (to be published) show that 
plume depletion reduces the time integrated air concentration by a factor of 2 or 
more from about 10 km downwind for a rainfall rate of 10 mm h-1.  A lower 
rainfall rate of 4 mm h-1 was shown to reduce the TIAC by a factor of 2 or more 
from about 20 km downwind. 
Figures 5.4a – 5.4e illustrate more clearly the relative importance of the release 
duration and deposition velocity variables.  Figure 5.4a shows the area covered 
by sheltering if the release duration is predicted to be 1 hour, retaining the three 
alternative weathers and two deposition velocities.  Figure 5.4b shows the area 
covered by sheltering if the release duration is predicted to be 4 hours, retaining 
the three alternative weathers and two deposition velocities.  Figure 5.4c shows 
the area covered by sheltering if the release duration is predicted to be 8 hours, 
retaining the three alternative weathers and two deposition velocities.  Figure 
5.4d shows the area covered by sheltering if the deposition velocity is 10-2 m s-1, 
retaining the three alternative weathers and three release durations.  Figure 
5.4e shows the area covered by sheltering if the deposition velocity is 10-3 m s-1, 
retaining the three alternative weathers and three release durations. 
Figure 5.4a Sheltering area; 1 hour release duration, 3 alternative weathers and 
2 deposition velocities 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
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Figure 5.4b Sheltering area; 4 hour release duration, 3 alternative weathers and 2 
deposition velocities 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
Figure 5.4c Sheltering area; 8 hour release duration, 3 alternative weathers and 2 
deposition velocities 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
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Figure 5.4d Sheltering area; 10-2 m s-1 deposition velocity, 3 alternative weathers and 3 
release durations 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
 
Figure 5.4e Sheltering area; 10-3 m s-1 deposition velocity, 3 alternative weathers and 3 
release durations 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
In this example, as shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, there are 18 alternative 
sheltering zones, arising from all combinations of three weathers, three release 
durations and two deposition velocity alternatives.  How can this information 
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best be presented to those who have to make decisions on the sheltering 
areas?  Assuming first that all 18 possible outcomes are regarded as equally 
possible (which is an unlikely situation, in reality), a colour saturation map (see 
Figure 5.5a) can be produced.  This overlays all the sheltering countermeasure 
areas, and the density of colour indicates the probability of the countermeasure 
being required (in terms of a total dose, as defined above, of 3mSv being 
exceeded).  The darkest shade, red, corresponds to the areas most likely to 
require sheltering, and yellow shows the least likely.  It can be seen that while 
the sheltering areas do overlay to some extent there are areas which only 
feature with lower likelihood. 
Figure 5.5a Sheltering area; 3 weathers, 3 release durations, 2 deposition velocities: 
colour density 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
An alternative presentation of the same information, again assuming that all the 
weathers, all the release durations and both the deposition velocities are 
equally likely, is shown in Figure 5.5b.  Here the information presented in Figure 
5.5a is categorised.  Figure 5.5b shows as red the areas where sheltering is 
predicted with more than 75% likelihood (here, in more than 13 out of the 18 
runs), orange where sheltering has 50% - 75% likelihood, yellow where 
sheltering has 25% - 50% likelihood, and pink where sheltering has 1% - 25% 
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likelihood.  Although, as discussed above, Colvile et al (2002) and Davis and 
Keller (1997) have suggested the use of red, yellow/green and blue as colours 
to present emergency data, in the present context pink is suggested as being 
preferable to either green or blue.  Green and blue may mistakenly give the 
impression of an area which is ‘safe’ or ‘unpolluted’; additionally, green and red 
may be difficult to differentiate for those who are colour-blind.   
HPA staff with roles in emergency response, when presented with the 
alternative presentations, have thought the colour classification as shown in 
Figure 5.5b to be clearer and more informative than the colour density approach 
in Figure 5.5a. 
Figure 5.5b Sheltering area; 3 weathers, 3 release durations, 2 deposition velocities: 
colour classes 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
The areas shown in Figures 5.5a and 5.5b assume all permutations are equally 
likely.  In reality, it is to be expected that certain alternatives will be thought 
more likely than others.  To illustrate the influence of this, the sheltering areas in 
this example have been re-assessed, giving more weight to weathers 2 and 3 
than to weather 1 (ie it is thought more likely to rain than be dry), and also 
greater weight to the longer release durations.  Weights have been associated 
with the results of the basic 18 individual runs to reflect this. The weights 
>75% 50-75% 25-50% 1-25% 
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applied are shown in Table 5.2. Only the colour classification presentation is 
shown here, in Figure 5.6, with the colours showing the same percentages of 
likelihood as in Figure 5.5b.  
Table 5.2 Weightings applied to the 18 combinations to reflect increased probability of 
rain and long release durations 
Description Weighting factor1 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 1 hour, 
deposition velocity 10-2   
1 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 4 hours, 
deposition velocity  10-2   
2 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 8 hours, 
deposition velocity  10-2   
5 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 1 hour, 
deposition velocity 10-3  1 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 4 hours, 
deposition velocity  10-3   
2 
Weather 1 (mostly dry), release duration 8 hours, 
deposition velocity  10-3  
5 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 1 hour, deposition 
velocity 10-2   
2 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 4 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-2   
4 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 8 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-2   
10 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 1 hour, deposition 
velocity 10-3  
2 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 4 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-3   
4 
Weather 2 (rain), release duration 8 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-3  
10 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 1 hour, deposition 
velocity 10-2   
5 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 4 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-2   
10 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 8 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-2   
25 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 1 hour, deposition 
velocity 10-3  
5 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 4 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-3   
10 
Weather 3 (very wet), release duration 8 hours, deposition 
velocity  10-3  
25 
Note: 
1.  Contributory weights are ‘mostly dry’ = 1, ‘rain’ = 2, ‘very wet’ = 5, release duration 1h = 1, release 
duration 4h = 2, release duration 8h = 5. 
 
Figure 5.7 shows a different split of likelihood areas, which decision makers 
may find helpful.  Here, the pink area represents a ‘less than 10% chance of 
sheltering being required’ and the red area is ‘a greater than 90% chance of 
sheltering being required’.  The two yellow zones show the 10% - 90% region, 
with the division in yellow tone marking the 50% boundary. 
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Figure 5.6 Sheltering area; rain and longer release durations preferentially weighted: 
colour classes 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
Figure 5.7 Sheltering area; rain and longer release durations preferentially weighted: 
colour classes 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
A presentational option for computer display is the draggable slider scale.  For 
example, by sliding across a scale showing likelihood of outcomes, the user can 
move the areas shown from the full probability range, for example all sheltering 
>75% 50-75% 25-50% 1-25% 
>90% 50-90% 10-50% 1-10% 
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zones with a greater than 1% probability, to those areas where there is at least 
a 75% chance of sheltering being required.  An example of this is shown in 
Figure 5.8 below, which shows the same information as that presented in 
Figure 5.6, but in a sequential format.  Alternatively, the slider could move along 
a scale showing the influence of changing the intervention criterion (for example 
from the lower ERL to the higher ERL). Techniques such as a slider scale may 
temporarily remove parts of the overall picture, such as the areas where there is 
a low chance of a countermeasure being needed, for example; it is important 
that misunderstandings do not arise from selective presentation of data. 
Figure 5.8 Sheltering areas; likelihood slider scale from >1% to >75% 
   
Sheltering: >1% likelihood    Sheltering: >25% likelihood 
 
   
Sheltering: >50% likelihood    Sheltering: >75% likelihood 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
An alternative feature is the use of transparency.  It has been suggested that 
greater transparency can be used to indicate areas of higher uncertainty or 
lower likelihood.  This is shown in Figure 5.9, which presents the same 
information as Figure 5.6 but with the use of a single colour combined with 
degrees of transparency ranging from 5% (nearly all solid colour) for the areas 
most likely to require sheltering to 80% (mostly transparent) for the areas least 
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likely to require sheltering.  HPA emergency staff considered that some degree 
of transparency was helpful as it enables the underlying map details to be 
viewed, but it was not considered particularly effective when the degree of 
transparency varies from one part of the zone to another. The optimum 
presentation for clarity would therefore seem to be combining colour 
classification with semi-transparency. Figure 5.10 is a modified version of 
Figure 5.6, using 30% transparency throughout. 
Figure 5.9 Sheltering areas; rain and longer release durations preferentially weighted: 
transparency 5% - 80% 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
5.3.1 Presenting doses on maps 
The presentation of predicted doses, which can either be done for a single 
exposure pathway, or a sum over all pathways, can be made by using a similar 
colour coding to that discussed above, to represent the percentage of model 
runs which show a dose in excess of a user specified dose level.  A slider scale 
could be used for this endpoint.  The slider could run across probability (from 0 
to 1) with the mapped information showing as colour density the magnitude of 
dose, at each location, which corresponds to the level of probability shown on 
the slider scale.  Alternatively, the scale on the slider could show the range of 
dose magnitude (either from 0 to the highest identified in the accident options 
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considered, or across a user-specified range) and the colour density can 
represent the probability at each location of that dose occurring.  Doses can 
also be represented simply by the percentage of model runs showing a dose in 
excess of a user specified dose level.   
The calculation of doses in conjunction with probabilities requires some care as 
in combining severity of effect with probability of occurrence, different 
combinations can give rise to the same value.  For example, a dose of 10 mSv 
with a probability of 0.3 gives the same value as a dose of 5 mSv with a 
probability of 0.6.  This would lead to loss of information if the dose/probabilities 
are simply summed, and care would be needed to undertake the calculation in a 
way which avoids this.  
Figure 5.10 Sheltering areas; rain and longer release durations preferentially weighted: 
colour classes, transparency at 30% 
 
Background map © Crown copyright.  All rights reserved HPA. 100016969 (2010) 
 
 
5.4 Discussion and possible future developments 
As was suggested in Section 4, the user should ensure that the input values 
chosen do not just scope the spread but also include several intermediate 
values, so that the probability mappings generated do reflect the range. The use 
>75% 50-75% 25-50% 1-25% 
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of discrete weather evolutions present a slightly different problem, as illustrated 
by the results presented in this section.  This is likely to be partly a 
consequence of the archived weather sequences used here for illustrative 
purposes, which although based on very similar meteorology were not obtained 
from adjacent time periods.  These examples should therefore not be taken to 
indicate that alternative weather evolutions developed by Met Office in real 
weather conditions on a particular day will diverge very significantly.  It does, 
however, remain a possibility that the alternative plume patterns will show some 
discreteness, representing a genuine distinction due to the different weather 
possibilities.   It is unrealistic to expect the Met Office to produce a continuum of 
weather possibilities at present, as their modelling capability is also based on 
discrete choices of input parameters as is the tool proposed here.  Hence 
several alternative plume patterns will be received from Met Office, and it is 
reasonable to surmise that any apparent ‘gaps’ between these in the results 
obtained by the tool will also have a probability of being affected by the accident 
but the discrete nature of the results presented will not fully show this. Given 
current computer power limitations, the work-around solution is to remind users 
and decision makers of the discrete nature of the results, and that any edge 
effects of the discrete plumes should be treated with a degree of caution; the 
actual probabilities are likely to be rather blurred representations of those 
shown in the results.  In practice, decision makers are likely to treat the results 
with flexibility in any case, marking delineation lines of countermeasures along 
suitable county boundaries, for example, or along geographical lines such as 
rivers or roads, and any degree of false discretisation in the results is unlikely to 
be very significant. 
An additional presentational technique which could be considered is one in 
which the shading used represents the overall impact of the emergency action 
rather than just the likelihood of the action being required.  For example, the 
likelihood of evacuation being required can be combined with information on the 
density of the population in the immediate area.  An area where there is a 
medium risk of evacuation being required but which has a high population 
density could be shown with the same shading as an area with a high risk of 
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evacuation being required but a medium population density.  This information 
gives an indication of the potential problem represented by each zone, and the 
degree of preparation potentially required.  However, the composite parts of the 
information (in this case, the likelihood of evacuation being required and the 
population density) would be vital to avoid the situation being misunderstood.  
This approach would need more investigation to determine whether it has 
potential value, or whether it is too likely to result in confusion. 
5.5 Section summary 
Alternative methods of presenting assessment endpoints in a way that clarifies 
their associated lack of precision have been illustrated.  A preferred approach 
for the presentation of spatial results has been identified which uses colour 
classification in combination with a uniform degree of transparency.  This 
approach is particularly suitable to the display of potential countermeasure 
areas, incorporating information on the associated imprecision. The 
presentation of predicted doses can also use a similar colour classification, 
representing the percentage of model runs which show a dose in excess of a 
user specified dose level.  A slider scale could be used for both countermeasure 
and dose endpoints.  Alternative presentations of dose information using a 
slider scale are possible; the slider can represent probability (from ‘very low’ to 
‘almost certain’) with the corresponding mapped information showing with 
colour density the magnitude of dose at each location for that probability, or 
alternatively the slider can move across dose magnitude, with the colour density 
representing the probability at each location of that dose occurring.   
 It is intended to apply the approach in a new HPA emergency response 
assessment tool, currently under development.  It should be noted that although 
the display options present results in a clear and transparent manner, an expert 
user is required to provide the estimated likelihoods of the various imprecision 
parameters considered and to apply the tool in a way appropriate to the 
circumstances of the emergency.  While the new tool, with the spatial displays 
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outlined here, is intended to be essentially simple in its assessment capabilities, 
its application in an emergency is not intended for the inexpert user. 
 150
6 CONCLUSIONS  
6.1 What problem does the study attempt to solve? 
This thesis describes work which was undertaken to investigate the extent and 
the causes of imprecision in emergency response assessments and to find 
better ways of including it in assessments and representing it in assessment 
results.   
The background to the work is the risk and consequences of the accidental 
release of radionuclides to the environment through accidents arising in the 
nuclear fuel cycle or other uses of radioactivity, or from deliberate releases.  As 
environmental radioactivity may cause injury to people, emergency response 
assessments are important so that decisions on actions such as the introduction 
of countermeasures to protect human health can be made rapidly and 
appropriately.  As countermeasures can only influence the radiation dose that 
will be received in the future, only predicted future doses are relevant to such 
decisions, and as future doses cannot be measured there must therefore be a 
modelling component in their assessment.  These predictions of dose will 
inevitably be imprecise due to lack of knowledge about the nature of the release 
and the weather, and also due to measurement inaccuracy.  
The significance for emergency decisions of such imprecise or incomplete 
knowledge of the emergency situation in the early stages of a release, and the 
current lack of capability to adequately characterise the extent and the 
significance of the consequences of this lack of knowledge, was the reason for 
undertaking the work described here.  There has been no other comprehensive 
study of the key causes of imprecision in the predictions output by emergency 
assessments.  Although it is often surmised that weather parameters are among 
the most significant in estimating the radiological consequences of releases in 
emergency response, with a correspondingly significant impact on the decisions 
regarding early countermeasures in the local affected region, this conclusion 
has not been clearly demonstrated by a modelling study considering the 
imprecision associated with a wide range of input parameters.  Further, there is 
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no tool which currently incorporates these elements of imprecision 
comprehensively and presents imprecision information to decision makers.   
6.2 What steps have been taken to solve the problem? 
The work started in Section 1 with an overview of early emergency response 
assessments and a summary of several major international emergency 
response systems.  The section ended with a discussion of the implications of 
imprecision in emergency response predictions, and a review of relevant 
published literature.  It was concluded that it is vital, when decisions are being 
based on assessment results in emergencies, for the decision maker to be fully 
aware of any significant imprecision or uncertainty associated with the results.   
The work continued with a review phase (Section 2).  The aspects reviewed 
were: 
 what radiological emergency response assessment tools do, and what 
tools are currently available, 
 what the key exposure pathways and the basic dose calculations are in 
an emergency response assessment,  
 what assessment models and data are currently available, 
 what the current basis is, in the UK, for countermeasure decisions, 
including the ERL system.  
The work then moved on, in Section 2, to identify the causes and extent of the 
imprecision in input parameter values.  The first step to this was to examine the 
values taken by parameters in emergency dose assessments, and then to 
develop ranges for the possible variability of key parameters in a typical 
accident scenario.  A specific accident scenario was assumed as the aim was to 
estimate the impact of the imprecision associated with predictions based on a 
few off-site measurements at early times, by considering the range of values 
each parameter may take, within the context of an example emergency.  The 
features of the accident scenario chosen included commonly occurring weather 
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conditions, so that the results would have the widest possible applicability.  Off-
site measurements were taken as the starting point of the assessment, as this 
is the most likely early information on which an emergency assessment would 
be based; the simulation of an actual emergency assessment, as the basis for 
the imprecision estimate, was the aim.   
Using the parameter ranges derived in Section 2, the extent and sources of the 
imprecision associated with emergency response calculations in the first few 
hours of a release was explored through two sensitivity studies, as described in 
Section 3.  The first of these used a simple Gaussian dispersion model, and the 
second used a complex dispersion model, the Met Office’s Langrangian model 
NAME.  Each parameter was in turn varied to its plausible minimum and/or 
maximum by considering the range of values the parameter may take within the 
context of a ‘baseline’ accident scenario (ie, not the full range of values the 
parameter may take in any accident).  The effect of these variations on the 
predicted extent of countermeasures was calculated, as the focus was on the 
imprecision associated with assessment support for decisions on 
countermeasures in the area beyond that covered by the emergency planning 
zone (ie extendibility).   Two radionuclides were considered, 137Cs and 131I, to 
represent two significant radionuclides in potential accidental releases, which 
have differences in their modelling and data requirements.    
The results summarised in Section 3 identified the key parameters contributing 
to imprecision in emergency response assessments.   These were essentially 
the same regardless of whether the simple or the complex dispersion model 
was used.  They were factors relating to the release, and factors relating to 
meteorology and dispersion/deposition, namely the release duration, wind 
direction (in assessments where an assumed plume centre line wind direction is 
required), enhanced deposition velocity and rainfall, and a significantly elevated 
release height.  The results demonstrate the importance of a radiological 
emergency assessment tool being linked to an appropriate real-time 
weather/dispersion prediction tool, and in particular for UK application with the 
Met Office’s NAME/NWP models.  Furthermore, the influence of real weather 
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conditions on the predicted results was also demonstrated in Section 3, which 
linked NAME plume predictions with real meteorological sequences from 
2007/2008 to show the predicted extent of countermeasures.  This visually 
demonstrated the potentially very significant impact of variation in weather on 
the estimated location and extent of sheltering areas, even for weather 
conditions which are similar, and confirmed the importance of real-time weather 
predictions being used in assessments. 
The next stage of the work, in Section 4, built on the results obtained in 
Section 3.  As a system to comprehensively evaluate the extent of imprecision 
in emergency assessments does not yet exist, and is clearly of importance in 
deriving information for decision makers, a new calculational approach was 
developed.  The aim was to enable the key causes of imprecision, as identified 
in Section 3, to be represented and carried through the calculations into the 
assessment results; this includes the effect of weather uncertainty and also the 
lack of knowledge on other key parameters.  Section 4 describes a proposed 
new tool which would link radiological emergency assessment models to the 
predictions of the UK Met Office’s NAME dispersion model.   
The aim of the tool is to minimise lack of knowledge of the significant 
weather-related parameters through using the best and most up-to-date 
dispersion predictions available, and also to take into account any lack of 
knowledge in the key non-weather parameters, by reflecting the significance of 
possible variation in these on the endpoints produced.  A key element is that the 
main causes of imprecision each have several associated likely values, and the 
probabilities associated with these are carried through the calculations into the 
assessment results.  The method proposed is consistent with the suggestion by 
Dieckmann et al 2010, that ‘a forecaster could vary assumptions about the 
reliability of the evidence and the structural model of the situation to see how 
these changes affect the assessed probability of different outcomes’.  
The tool predicts countermeasure extents and other radiological endpoints, with 
visual display in a spatial format using the ArcMap system as developed by 
ESRI(UK).  ArcMap can combine calculations with map-based displays and also 
 154
show features in the affected area such as population, schools, hospitals and 
roads, in addition to the assessments endpoints.   
The calculational structure developed, as described in Section 4, indicates the 
imprecision associated with the results through incomplete knowledge, but also 
retains a simple and transparent assessment capability.  It was concluded in 
Section 1 that for decision making in the UK in the very early stages of an 
emergency it is important that the tools used are transparent, ideally based on 
simple calculational assumptions which would permit approximate checking to 
be feasible through hand calculations.  This is considered to be an important 
factor in quality assurance in emergency assessments, and also in being able to 
present and explain assessment results to senior decision makers such as 
those on government emergency committees, as was for example required of 
HPA during the incident in November 2006 when Alexander Litvinenko was 
poisoned with 210Po.  The tool outlined requires real-time input from dispersion 
and weather prediction systems.  In the UK, such input is obtainable from the 
Met Office.  
The tool outlined in Section 4 clearly has application in UK emergency 
response.  However, it also has application in UK emergency exercises and 
planning by enabling exercise data generation to be based on real (archived) 
meteorological results for the site in question, thereby increasing realism and 
providing enhanced site-specific details.   
A prototype version of the tool was then created using spreadsheets in 
conjunction with ArcMap, and this was used to produce example results.  These 
results have been used in the final stage of the work, presented in Section 5, 
which explores alternative ways in which imprecise information in radiological 
assessment results can be presented to decision makers.  Alternative methods 
of presenting assessment endpoints in a way that clarifies their associated lack 
of precision have been illustrated.  A preferred approach for the presentation of 
spatial results has been identified which uses colour classification in 
combination with a uniform degree of transparency.  This approach is 
particularly suitable to the display of potential countermeasure areas, 
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incorporating information on the associated imprecision.  The presentation of 
predicted doses can also use a similar colour classification, representing the 
percentage of model runs which show a dose in excess of a user specified dose 
level.  A slider scale could be used for both countermeasure and dose 
endpoints.  For countermeasure areas the slider can move across a scale 
showing likelihood of outcomes, with the mapped information showing the 
corresponding extent of the countermeasure zone.  Alternative presentations of 
dose information using a slider scale are possible; the slider can again 
represent likelihood of outcomes with the corresponding mapped information 
showing with colour density the magnitude of dose at each location for that 
probability, or alternatively the slider can move across dose magnitude, with the 
colour density representing the likelihood at each location of that dose 
occurring.  In addition, the tool as proposed offers the possibility of rapidly 
viewing the influence of specific input parameters on the results.  For example, 
it can easily be spotted if the results obtained for a single weather option are 
inconsistent with those resulting from other weather options.  This provides 
some warning of possibly significant developments; if one weather development 
was to have a more significant health impact than others, any increase in the 
likelihood of the weather evolving towards it could be watched for and 
precautionary protective actions prepared.  Similarly, measurements which are 
inconsistent to the majority of the other measurements can easily be identified 
The work undertaken has been in a logical flow, where each section was 
dependent on the results obtained previously.  The culmination of the work, the 
development of presentational techniques, could theoretically apply to the 
presentation of results regardless of the way in which the results were derived.  
They could, for instance, be used to reflect only limited elements of the 
imprecision, such as that deriving from alternative weather evolutions but not 
considering other issues such as an uncertain release duration. However, as 
presented here the techniques can be used to indicate the complete picture to 
those taking decisions on public protection.  In this, the work has required all of 
the proceeding steps; the review of pathways and parameters, the analysis of 
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the key sources of imprecision in early assessments, the development of the 
structure of a new tool which takes all the key elements into account and 
propagates the imprecision through to the results, and finally the development 
of techniques for demonstrating the imprecision visually.   
6.3 What is original in the work? 
It has been argued by others that the complicated tools and models developed 
for emergency response in the last 10 years or so do not adequately reflect or 
represent the uncertainty associated with their predictions, and that the 
appearance of apparent sophistication and complexity in the newer tools can 
lead decision-makers into over-confidence in the model predictions.  The 
inherent uncertainty in complex decision support systems has been described 
as ‘grossly underestimated’ (French and Niculae 2005). In a more recent paper 
the same authors ask whether the uncertainties associated with the predictions 
of large models are understood, and question whether capability since the 
Chernobyl accident has actually improved because of this, despite the 
‘enormous amount of research and development that has occurred since 1986’  
(French et al 2007).   
As an example of the problems this may lead to, the tabling of several different 
dispersion model predictions by different organisations at the COBR meetings 
held during the Buncefield fire incident in 2005 led to confusion among 
government decision makers, as all of the model results were presented as the 
‘true’ picture, and yet appeared to be inconsistent with each other.  The 
presentation of the imprecision associated with each, together with greater 
clarity as to what was actually being presented, would have aided the decision 
makers and avoided at least some of the confusion.  In the context of 
radiological emergencies, the lack of this capability and the need to undertake 
research to develop an improved capability, is the basis for originality in the 
thesis.   
The work described here has therefore tackled two key areas where the current 
state of knowledge and availability of tools is lacking: 
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 there has been no study of the key causes of imprecision in the 
predictions output by emergency assessments, 
 there is no tool which currently incorporates these elements of 
imprecision comprehensively and presents the resulting imprecision 
information to decision makers.    
None of the radiological emergency response systems summarised in Section 1 
include all significant sources of imprecision and most do not include any.  The 
consequences of possible alternative weather evolutions are incorporated in the 
most complex systems (RODOS, ARGOS and possibly HPAC) through the use 
of real-time weather predictions and the optional use of ‘ensemble’ dispersion 
modelling, but non-weather sources of imprecision can only be represented 
through a series of alternative runs, by varying input parameters.  Towards the 
end of this study, the EURANOS research programme which concluded in 2009 
incorporated a research package which was presented at the EURANOS final 
contractors meeting in June 2009 but which does not appear to have been 
otherwise published.  This considered the communication of uncertain results to 
the decision maker arising through uncertainty in the source term and the wind 
direction, and represented the results of example calculations on a shaded map 
but did not include the other possible sources of imprecision.  This suggests 
that there is a perceived need for the work described here, although the 
EURANOS research only covered a limited aspect of it.    
The original aspects of the study are summarised below: 
1. Investigation of the variability of the key input parameters to emergency 
response assessments, and estimation of the values they may potentially 
take in a particular emergency.   
The derivation of the values each parameter may take in the baseline 
accident considered has not been done before.  The values were derived 
from the literature specifically for this application. In general, there has 
been no comprehensive development of imprecision ranges for 
emergency response calculation parameters.  One previous study has 
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produced ranges for certain atmospheric parameters, but not in the 
context of emergency response, other studies have considered 
uncertainty in probabilistic accident assessments but again not in 
emergency assessment systems. 
2. Exploration of the sensitivity of the predictions of emergency response 
calculations to variations in key input assumptions and parameters.  
The analysis using the R91 and NAME models of the significance of key 
parameters, and the conclusions drawn are original.  This has been 
reflected by the two papers summarising this work being published in a 
peer reviewed international journal (Haywood 2008, Haywood et al 
2010). 
3. Outline of a new method for assessing radiological consequences, to be 
used in conjunction with real-time weather prediction and dispersion 
tools, to improve early phase response to future emergencies by 
estimating the consequences of lack of knowledge.   
The proposed tool is an original development.  Current radiological 
emergency assessment tools use similar formulae for the calculation of 
(for example) inhalation dose and external dose, as these are standard 
methods used internationally, as recommended by IAEA for example.  
The originality of the tool lies in the proposed combination of calculations, 
using multiple values for the key parameters identified in the earlier part 
of the study.  By associating a probability with each parameter value, 
likelihoods can be associated with each calculated result.  This results in 
a system which presents more useful information to decision makers 
than the current systems which essentially present single value outputs 
resulting from single value inputs on most if not all of the parameters. 
One complex system is thought to present apparent ‘probabilities’ with its 
predictions (the US system HPAC) but this is misleading because of the 
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restricted nature of the uncertainties considered, which are specific 
aspects of meteorology and dispersion only.   
4. Development of new ways in which imprecise information, in particular 
that resulting from alternative weather outcomes and different 
radiological measurements, can be presented to decision makers and 
demonstration of these using example results.  
The originality of the work continues in the presentational features of the 
proposed tool, in the planned mapping of doses linked to a probability 
range and countermeasure areas shaded to show the likelihood of a 
countermeasure being required at each point.  This provides decision 
makers with more relevant and comprehensive data on which to form 
decisions on actions.  The shading of map areas to illustrate the degree 
of likelihood in different zones is not in itself original, as several authors 
referred to in Section 5 have applied similar approaches, but the 
proposed use here in a radiological emergency response context is an 
original application.  The work proposes a number of alternative methods 
of visualisation and concludes with a preferred approach (transparent 
colour classification for spatial data, and slider scale presentation of 
probability-linked dose information) which is an original development.  
The work outlining the new tool and describing the approach to 
visualisation was submitted to a peer reviewed international journal in 
June 2010 (Haywood, 2010), and has been accepted subject to minor 
modifications in August 20101.  A further paper focussing specifically on 
the presentation of imprecise information to decision makers is planned, 
for likely submission to the international Risk Analysis journal.  
The need for the work undertaken in this study has been partially driven by the 
increased use of spatial data, as output by Geographical Information Systems 
(GIS).  Mapped output is now the expected form of emergency data.  Plume 
dispersion data is prepared by Met Office, and is rapidly available via web-sites 
                                                          
1 Published December 2010, J. Radiol. Prot. 30 (2010) 673-685. 
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such as the BBC, as seen for example during the Icelandic volcanic ash release 
in 2010.  Mapping systems such as ArcGIS are readily available and are in 
widespread use commercially and increasingly by government.  There is 
considerably more familiarity with GIS systems now than there was 10 years 
ago. Old-style emergency results, typically of the form ‘countermeasures extend 
to about 5km’ are no longer sufficient.  However, the need for associated 
imprecision estimates is increased by the use of mapped data.  The level of 
detail provided by mapped results, presented on a grid which suggests detailed 
spatial resolution, implies clarity and certainty in the data that are mapped to a 
far greater extent than rounded numbers on a table or textual statements.  It is 
therefore necessary to present, simultaneously with the basic results, an 
indication of imprecision to avoid unwarranted conclusions being drawn. 
Finally, a contribution to originality comes from the linking together of a series of 
separate aspects in this study.  Section 6.2 above describes how the work was 
undertaken in sequence, with each part building on the preceding parts.  The 
combination of identifying the sources of imprecision, developing a new 
approach to calculating the imprecision, and then developing alternative ways in 
which the imprecision associated with the endpoints can be visualised, creates 
in composite a significant new approach to radiological emergency response 
assessments.   
6.4  What are the key contributions to knowledge? 
These can be summarised as: 
 Identification of the key causes of imprecision in the predictions output by 
emergency assessments. 
 Identification of the extent of imprecision in the predictions output by 
emergency assessments, for a representative accident scenario. 
 Identification of the potential impact of real weather scenarios on the 
extent of countermeasures and the distribution of doses.  
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 Creation of a new calculational approach to incorporate these elements 
of imprecision comprehensively in an emergency assessment system. 
 Through the use of a prototype system, the development of novel ways 
of visualising information on the imprecision in radiological emergency 
response assessments for decision makers.   
The work has also led to further investigation and analysis of the reasons for 
differences between the R91 Gaussian dispersion model and the Met Office’s 
Langrangian model NAME.   This work has involved other staff at HPA and at 
the Met Office.   
6.5 What is the potential practical application of the work? 
To illustrate the potential practical application of the tool and mapping system 
developed, it is worth summarising what would have been the approach up to 
now, and how the new developments will provide better information. 
Currently available tools will typically produce a best estimate calculation of 
dose, at a particular location, which is based on the user’s choice of the most 
likely values for input parameters.  As an example, assume an accident 
scenario where a standard assessment of the current type produces a best 
estimate of dose (to 2 days, at a particular location) of 2.8 mSv.  If a decision on 
the appropriateness of the sheltering countermeasure at this point was required, 
this dose of 2.8 mSv would be compared to a dose criterion for sheltering of 
3 mSv, and it could be concluded that the countermeasure was not required at 
that location.   
The tool outlined here would undertake a series of calculations of dose at the 
point, based on alternative input values.  These could, for example, be 2 
possible weather evolutions, 3 release durations, and 2 deposition velocities, 
and therefore 2 x 3 x 2 = 12 dose calculations are undertaken for the location.  
If we imagine these 12 calculated doses at the location to be 0.5, 0.5, 1, 2, 2, 
2.1, 2.7, 2.7, 2.7, 2.8, 3.5, 4, and 7.1 mSv, the average dose (assuming all the 
alternatives are equally likely) is 2.8 mSv but the spread is 0.5 mSv to 7.1 mSv.  
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In 25% of these calculational combinations, sheltering would be required.  
There is also a 1 in 6 chance that the dose is around 0.5 mSv and a 1 in 12 
chance that it is around 7 mSv.  All of this information is of more value to a 
decision maker than a single dose value and single on/off countermeasure 
indicator.  The ability to incorporate estimates of likelihood into the possible 
inputs, which are then taken through the calculations into the outputs, is a 
further refinement.   
It would be interesting to explore the implications of such calculations and 
increased knowledge of the spread of possible doses with decision makers, and 
to discuss with them how such information would influence their decisions.  
HPA is starting a series of stakeholder meetings in 2011, as part of a revision of 
emergency advice, and such discussions will now form a part of these 
discussions.  There are psychological and social science aspects to the impact 
of increased information on decision making, for example some decision 
makers will be more risk averse than others and more inclined to take decisions 
at the lower end of the ERL scale, and to attach greater weight to more 
pessimistic outcomes.  Factors that are specific on the day of the accident, such 
as ease of implementing countermeasures, and the scale of the area affected, 
will also have an impact.   
This is only one example of the additional information available, to decision 
makers and others, as an outcome of the work.  Endpoints other than dose may 
be estimated, for example activity concentrations in air, depositions on the 
ground, and the extent of foodchain restrictions may be calculated.  The scope 
of the work is also not restricted to emergency response assessments, but also 
has application in emergency planning and training.  These aspects are 
discussed further below.     
6.6 What are possible future developments from the work? 
There are a number of developments possible on the basis of this work: 
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 The full tool would have application in emergency preparedness, 
planning and exercises, in addition to its use in emergency response.  
For example, mapped predictions of activity concentrations in foodstuffs 
could be used in emergency exercises to present alternative 
developments, and the concepts of risks and likelihoods, to those taking 
decisions on the need for food countermeasures.  This would require the 
pre-exercise generation of weather scenarios for the exercise by the Met 
Office, but this is feasible as they already have a role in emergency 
exercise data preparation. 
 Applications in emergency training are also possible.  The results have 
demonstrated the substantial influence of real weather conditions on the 
predicted extent of countermeasures, which can be very variable in 
location and extent even for weather conditions which are similar. A 
general extension of the study could usefully consider more widely 
varying weather conditions sourced from historical weather records, to 
analyse more fully the impact of weather evolutions which have actually 
occurred.  Analysis on a site-specific basis would also be useful.  This 
could produce illustrative results for use in emergency response training 
for site personnel, enabling exercise data generation to be based on real 
meteorological results for the site in question.  
 The results presented in Section 3 on the varying spatial distribution of 
doses in different real weather conditions suggest that useful insights can 
be gained through the tool on the cross-wind spread of an affected area.  
There is a common view that plumes, and hence affected regions, may 
extend to long distances but are unlikely to be wide.  This is partly a 
consequence of the common past use of Gaussian plume modelling, 
which does often result in quite narrow plumes.  As a consequence there 
is a tendency for planners to plan for emergency countermeasures 
affecting only a few radial segments around the site.  This work suggests 
that real weather sequences have the potential to produce wide plumes, 
and also that plume width, and hence the area affected by the release, 
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increases with increasing release duration.  A comprehensive review of 
past weather conditions around a selection of UK nuclear sites, using 
NWP data held by Met Office, in conjunction with dispersion predictions 
and radiological assessments, would indicate what crosswind spreads in 
contaminated areas are plausible.  This could have significant 
implications for emergency planning in the UK. 
 Directly measurable action levels (for example, a dose rate or a 
concentration in air) are used in the UK nuclear industry to indicate when 
a particular emergency action or actions should be taken.  For example, 
a total beta and gamma activity concentration in air of 105 Bq m-3 is 
commonly regarded as being a level at which evacuation may be 
triggered. The results of this work suggest that a wide spread in possible 
countermeasure extents may correspond to a single measured activity 
concentration in air at a particular location.  This aspect may warrant 
further study, to determine whether conclusions on the meaning and 
application of action levels can be drawn.    
 It would be interesting to investigate what doses and potential 
countermeasure areas would be suggested by measured data from 
actual dispersion tracer experiments in the open air.  Unfortunately, data 
for this appear to be currently lacking.  I have consulted Met Office 
(2010) and they have been unable to identify a suitable dataset for the 
purpose.  NAME has been subject to intercomparison exercises using 
tracer data, but the step further required here to extend the results to 
radiological dose estimates needs more data than are collected on a 
sufficiently fine resolution in tracer experiments.  A good spatial and 
temporal coverage of 'instantaneous' air concentrations, total depositions 
and time integrated air concentrations would be needed.  Most short 
range field experiments record only total air concentrations from a short 
puff, and often only the maximum on an arc.  Deposition is almost never 
measured.    However, should a suitable tracer data set come to light, or 
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result from a new experiment, the assessment of simulated doses and 
countermeasure areas resulting from the release would be of interest. 
 Once a full tool is created, fuller experimentation together with 
consultation with a wider range of users, including decision makers in 
government (for example in Dept of Health) would be possible. A 
particular focus of this could be further developing the presentation of 
dose and risk information to meet the needs of decision makers.  This 
could, for example, investigate the potential use of the micro-mort (1 in 1 
million risk of death) as proposed by Professor David Spiegelhalter of 
Cambridge University to convey health risks. This could be a useful way 
of presenting the effects of alternative emergency actions on possible 
health outcomes, for example the generation of a map showing the risk 
of death or other health impact from 2 days exposure without 
countermeasures.  
 Finally, an alternative angle is to contrast the results suggested by 
presentation of positive outcomes against negative outcomes, for 
example a 5% chance of sheltering being required at a particular location 
is also a 95% chance of it not being required, and it is not clear whether 
the perception of the two alternatives is equal and whether decision 
makers would gain the same amount of information from both. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to fill a gap in radiological emergency response 
capability by identifying the sources of the imprecision potentially associated 
with the predictions of assessment support tools for assisting early phase off-
site countermeasure and public health protection decisions, considering the 
implications of this imprecision for decision making and developing improved 
techniques for early phase assessments, including the visualisation of the 
results.  This thesis summarises the steps undertaken, the results obtained, and 
the originality of the work undertaken.  Possible future developments of the 
work are identified. 
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APPENDIX A Differences between the R91 and NAME 
models 
This appendix contains more discussion and explanation of differences between 
the UK Met Office’s Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment 
NAME III (referred to as NAME in the remainder of this Appendix) and the ‘R91’ 
Gaussian plume model.  These models were used in the calculations 
undertaken as described in Section 3, and the differences between the models 
explain the differences seen in the results.  The key differences are therefore of 
interest in this thesis. Only the differences which are particularly significant to 
the work undertaken in Section 3 in terms of the impact on the imprecision 
analysis are discussed in this Appendix.  The work supporting the conclusions 
presented here has been undertaken as a result of this thesis.  It has involved 
not only myself but also staff at HPA and at the UK Met Office to resolve the 
details of the differences between the models.    The work is summarised in the 
report Bedwell, P, Wellings, J, Haywood, S M and Hort, M C (to be published).   
Table A1 shows the instantaneous (time-averaged) plume centre-line activity 
concentrations in air obtained from R91 and NAME, for a release of 1 1016 Bq of 
137Cs, for the baseline scenario described in Section 3.  A release duration of 1 
hour and a release height of 10 m were assumed, together with Pasquill 
meteorological stability category D, a wind speed of 5 m s-1 and no rain; the 
terrain assumed is typical rural land with a roughness length of 0.3 m and no 
significant features to influence the dispersion.   
NAME models explicitly the time taken for the plume to reach each grid point, 
and the instantaneous activity concentrations in air from NAME given here are 
those predicted to occur 50-60 minutes after the start of the release; the values 
are the time-averaged concentrations over this 10 minute period.  In contrast, 
R91 as applied in this study calculates the total eventual time integrated air 
concentration (TIAC) at each point, and the instantaneous activity 
concentrations in air from R91 given in Table A1 are obtained by dividing the 
TIAC by the numbers of seconds in one hour; these therefore represent an 
average over the total time of plume passage.  Because of the explicit modelling 
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in NAME of the time taken for the plume to reach each grid point, as opposed to 
the calculation in R91 that assumes instantaneous travel, the NAME results 
show a source-to-measurement dependence on distance that means that 
measurements at different distances reach a steady-state at different times.  
For example, the average activity concentration in air at 20km in the period 
50-60 minutes after the start of the release is not yet a steady-state value; the 
air concentration predicted by NAME is about a factor of 50% lower than the 
levels reached about 20 minutes later.   
It can be seen from Table A1 that for the same source term NAME predicts 
instantaneous time-averaged activity concentrations in air which are somewhat 
smaller than those predicted by R91 but the difference decreases with distance 
(a factor of about 4 at 1km, 3 at 2 - 5 km, and less than 2 at 10 - 20 km).  There 
is less difference if the time integrated concentrations are considered.  Very 
similar results were also obtained for the same release of 131I, but are not 
presented here for brevity.  It can be seen that a scaled release of 3 1016 Bq of 
137Cs would result in NAME predicting an instantaneous activity concentration in 
air of approximately 1 107 Bq m-3 at 2km on the plume centre line, for the 50-60 
minute ‘measurement’ period; the value used in the R91-based study as the 
baseline ‘measurement’, at the same location was 1.1 107 Bq m-3.  Similarly, for 
131I, an instantaneous activity concentration in air of 1.1 106 Bq m-3 at 2km on 
the plume centre line, for the 50-60 minute ‘measurement’, would be predicted 
by NAME from a release of 3 1015 Bq of this radionuclide.   
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Table A1 Instantaneous and time-integrated activity concentrations in air predicted by 
R91 and NAME   
 Instantaneous activity concentrations in air at specified down-wind distance on 
the plume centre line, for a release of 1 1016 Bq of 137Cs over 1 hour (Bq m-3) 
 1km 2km 5km 10km 20km 
R91 4 107 1 107 3 106 9 105 3 105 
NAME1  1 107 4 106 1 106 5 105 2 105 
  
Time integrated activity concentrations (TIAC) in air at specified down-wind 
distance on the plume centre line (Bq s m-3) over total time of plume passage  
 1km 2km 5km 10km 20km 
R91 1 1011 4 1010 9 109 3 109 1 109 
NAME 4 1010 2 1010 5 109 2 109 8 108 
Note: 
1.  The activity concentration in air in NAME given here is that predicted to occur 50-60 minutes after the start of the 
release. 
  
The reasons for differences between NAME and R91 are complex, being due to 
the way in which the two models apply meteorological data and the different 
approaches to modelling plume dispersion.  In general, while R91 considers 
each input parameter independently (for example, atmospheric stability and 
wind speed are incorporated in separate parameters with no dependency or 
inter-relationship upon one another), in NAME the impact of one parameter on 
another is accounted for (for example, atmospheric stability impacts on wind 
speed).  Factors which particularly differ between the models are wind speed, 
the cross-wind and vertical plume profiles, and the treatment of an elevated 
release height.  These aspects are discussed further below.   
A1 WIND SPEED 
The treatment of wind speed with height above the ground is different in the two 
models.  R91 assumes a single wind speed, typically at 10m above the ground, 
whereas NAME considers multiple wind speeds and wind directions at multiple 
levels within the boundary layer, enabling the modelling of turbulence and 
mixing.  Because of this wind profile, the wind speed in NAME typically 
increases with height as a result of the decreasing influence of the earth’s 
surface; the overall effect is to reduce the air concentrations at ground level, 
unlike in R91 where air concentration is proportional to the inverse of the wind 
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speed at about 10m.  Bedwell et al (to be published) have demonstrated the 
influence on the R91 results by using a single modified wind speed in R91 
based on the mean wind speed across the boundary layer, and so simulating 
the value in NAME; improved agreement was seen with increasing distance 
(from about 5 - 10 km), demonstrating that at these distances this is a 
significant component of the differences between the models. 
 
A2 CROSS-WIND AND VERTICAL PLUME PROFILES 
In the calculations underlying Section 3, it was noted that if the plume centre 
line is +/- 10º from the baseline direction, the source term predicted by NAME is 
about 2 times greater than that predicted by R91, reflecting the underlying 
model differences.  For the greater difference of a change in the plume centre 
line of +/- 20º from the baseline direction, the source term predicted by NAME is 
about 3 times smaller than that predicted by R91.  
The difference is due to the NAME plume being significantly wider than the R91 
plume at 2 km, but of a more comparable width at 5km.  The spread of the 
plumes is illustrated in Table A2.  At 2km, R91 predicts a ratio between the 20 
degree air concentration and the plume centre line air concentration of 300 
whereas NAME predicts a ratio of 40, a difference of a factor of 8.  This 
difference of a factor of 8 explains the reduction of the NAME source term from 
3 times greater than the R91 source term in the baseline case, to 3 times less 
here.  At 5km, R91 predicts a ratio between the 20 degree air concentration and 
the plume centre line air concentration of 500 whereas NAME predicts a ratio of 
250, a difference of a factor of 2.   
The wider width of the NAME plume at 2km downwind in comparison to R91 is 
due to a greater degree of horizontal mixing in NAME than in R91 at around 
2km.  This decreases with increasing downwind distance such that by 10km the 
degree of horizontal mixing in R91 is greater than that in NAME.  At 10 degrees 
off axis, in this baseline calculation, the 2 km and 5 km receptors are some 
distance from the ‘edge’ of the plume whereas at 20 degrees off axis, the 2 km 
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and 5 km receptors are relatively close to the ‘edge’ of the plume in R91 
although still well within the NAME plume.   
In R91 the cross-wind spread of the plume is described by the standard 
deviation of the cross-wind plume profile (σy), which is based on a turbulent 
diffusion term from empirical data and a wind direction fluctuation term also 
from empirical data. The standard deviation of the vertical spread of the plume 
in R91, σz, is based on the atmospheric stability, downwind distance and ground 
roughness. The horizontal and vertical spread of the NAME plume includes the 
flow and turbulent motion of the particles. To investigate the contribution σy and 
σz make to the difference in the predictions of NAME and R91, a modified R91 
run using the σy and σz derived from NAME output in the baseline calculation 
was undertaken by Bedwell et al (to be published).  The differences in TIAC 
between this run and the NAME baseline run are less than a factor of 2.5 at all 
distances downwind when the modified σy is used, and are less than a factor of 
2 at all distances downwind when the modified σz is used.  The improved 
agreement between NAME and R91 suggests that the different method used in 
the two models to describe the cross-wind and vertical spreads of the plume is 
partially but not entirely responsible for the differences in the observed model 
output.  
A3 COMBINED IMPACT 
As the cross-wind and vertical spreads of the plume, and the wind speed all 
have impacts on the output of the NAME and R91 models, Bedwell et al (to be 
published) have considered their cumulative effect.  This has shown that the 
NAME and R91 TIACs are within a factor of 1.4 at all distances up to 40km if 
the R91 parameters used are modified to simulate the NAME values.  Within a 
few kilometres of the release point the agreement is very close, and suggests 
that these parameters almost entirely explain the difference.   
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Table A2 Instantaneous activity concentrations in air at 2km and 5km for a release of 
1 1016 Bq of 137Cs over 1 hour (Bq m-3) on plume centre line and at +/- 20º off axis 
Instantaneous activity concentrations in air at specified down-wind 
distance, for a release of 1 1016 Bq of 137Cs over 1 hour (Bq m-3) 
R91a NAMEb
On plume centre line at 2 km 1 107 4 106 
At +/- 20º from plume centre line and 2 km from release point 
 
3 104 1 105 
Ratio between plume centre line at 2 km and +/- 20º from plume centre 
line 
 
300 40 
On plume centre line at 5 km 3 106 1 106 
At +/- 20º from plume centre line and 5km from release point 6 103 4 103 
Ratio between plume centre line at 5 km and +/- 20º from plume centre 
line 
 
500 250 
Notes: 
a. Time average activity concentration in air over time of plume passage. 
b. The activity concentration in air predicted by NAME to occur 50-60 minutes after start of release. 
 
 
A4 ELEVATED RELEASE HEIGHT 
For the elevated release height considered in Section 3 (200m), the sheltering 
predicted by both R91 and NAME extends to beyond 30km but for NAME the 
extent is only just beyond 30km while for R91 the actual extent is predicted to 
be about 80km.  The reason for this difference is that, for the same release, the 
TIAC at 2km predicted by NAME is three times greater than the TIAC predicted 
by R91, but that at distances beyond a few kilometres the TIACs from the two 
models are very similar.  Hence if the values are normalised at 2 km by 
reducing the NAME source term by a factor of 3, the doses beyond a few 
kilometres estimated on the basis of the NAME predictions are smaller than 
those predicted by R91 by about a factor of 3, which reduces the extent of 
countermeasures considerably. Also, at distances less than 2km the TIACs 
predicted by NAME are considerably greater than those predicted by R91 for 
the same source term.     
Table A3 shows the time integrated activity concentrations in air for 137Cs and 
131I for the results normalised to 1.1 107 Bq m-3 at 2km on the plume centre line 
for 137Cs, and 1.1 106 Bq m-3 at 2km on the plume centre line for 131I, and also 
the time integrated activity concentrations in air for 137Cs and 131I for the results 
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normalised to 2.6 106 at 5km on the plume centre line for 137Cs, and 2.6 105 at 
5km on the plume centre line for 131I.  These more detailed results show where 
the predicted doses fall below the 30 mSv (evacuation) and 3 mSv (sheltering) 
countermeasure criteria assumed.   The key difference is that whereas in R91 
the peak activity concentrations in air and hence in dose occurs at about 5km, 
in NAME the peak occurs at around 2-3 km.  Normalising results to a 
measurement at 2km leads to differences at greater distances of about a factor 
of 3, because the R91 results continue to increase beyond 2 km. Normalising to 
a measurement at 5km leads to very similar predictions beyond that point, as 
the models demonstrate a similar fall-off pattern. Also, R91 predicts low 
concentrations at around 1km, and the results are therefore very sensitive to the 
precise locations in this region.   
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Table A3 Time integrated activity concentrations in air (TIACs) for 137Cs and 131I from 
R91 and NAME for a 200m effective release height, for baseline measurement at 2km 
and 5km  
 
Release scaled such that instantaneous air concentration at 2km is 1.1 107 Bq m-3 137Cs    
 1km 2km 5km 10km 20km 30km 
R-91 TIAC on plume centre 
line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (mSv) 
3 108
 
0.2 
4 1010 
 
30 
1 1011 
 
76 
6 1010 
 
45 
3 1010 
 
20 
2 1010 
 
12 
NAME TIAC on plume 
centre line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (mSv) 
2 1010 
 
14 
4 1010 
 
30 
3 1010 
 
23 
2 1010 
 
14 
9 109 
 
6 
6 109 
 
4 
 
Release scaled such that instantaneous air concentration at 2km is 1.1 106 Bq m-3 131I   
R-91 TIAC on plume centre 
line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (mSv) 
3 107 
 
0.2 
4 109 
 
27 
1 1010 
 
68 
6 109 
 
40 
3 109 
 
17 
2 109 
 
11 
NAME TIAC on plume 
centre line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (over 3 
hours) 
2 109 
 
12 
4 109 
 
27 
3 109 
 
21 
2 109 
 
12 
8 108 
 
5 
5 108 
 
3 
 
Release scaled such that instantaneous air concentration at 5km is 2.6 106 Bq m-3 137Cs    
 1km 2km 5km 10km 20km 30km 
R-91 TIAC on plume centre 
line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (mSv) 
3 107 
 
0.02 
4 109 
 
3 
9 109 
 
7 
6 109 
 
4 
3 109 
 
2 
2 109 
 
1 
NAME TIAC on plume 
centre line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (mSv) 
5 109 
 
4 
1 1010 
 
9 
9 109 
 
7 
6 109 
 
4 
3 109 
 
2 
2 109 
 
1 
 
Release scaled such that instantaneous air concentration at 5km is 2.6 105 Bq m-3 131I   
R-91 TIAC on plume centre 
line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (mSv) 
3 106 
 
0.02 
4 108 
 
3 
9 108 
 
6 
6 108 
 
4 
3 108 
 
2 
2 108 
 
1 
NAME TIAC on plume 
centre line (Bq s m-3) 
Total effective dose (over 3 
hours) 
5 108 
 
4 
1 109 
 
8 
9 108 
 
6 
5 108 
 
4 
2 108 
 
2 
2 108 
 
1 
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It cannot be argued on the basis of these results that NAME predicts the plume 
to come to the ground nearer to the source of the release than is the case in 
R91, as there are considerable uncertainties in the predictions of R91 at such 
close distances.  However, NAME’s turbulent mixing scheme is clearly 
enhancing ground deposition in the region 1 - 2km in comparison to that 
predicted by R91; in general, there is greater vertical mixing of the plume in 
NAME than in R91 at all distances up to 20km, as discussed above, as the R91 
values of σz are lower than the values implied by the NAME results up to this 
distance.  One consequence of this is that the R91 plume will require a greater 
distance downwind to reach ground level. 
A5 CONCLUSION 
The overall conclusion from the above discussion is that fundamental 
differences between the two dispersion models lead to differences in their 
predictions, but that these are largely understood.  They are primarily due to 
differences in the approach to modelling the standard deviation of the cross 
wind plume profile (σy) and vertical plume profile (σz), resulting depth and 
spread differences within the first 20km. The spread parameters in R91 are 
based on empirical data, unlike the particle random-walk techniques in NAME, 
and are known to become less sound with increasing distance from the release 
point, at distances further than those from which the empirical data were 
derived.  The particular case of elevated release heights also shows the 
differences between the models, again being fundamentally due to the different 
approach to vertical mixing.  The differences in the models explain the 
differences in the results of the calculations based on R91 and NAME in 
Section 3.  Despite the differences, the conclusions from the two parts of the 
study remained the same, in terms of the most significant parameters for 
imprecision, and it is concluded that the differences between the models, while 
of considerable interest, do not in themselves impact on the conclusions of this 
study. 
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